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# THE THIRD WORLD

*Problems  
and Prospects*

Current Stage  
of the National-Liberation  
Struggle



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ТРЕТИЙ МИР: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ  
(Современный этап национально-освободительного движения)

На английском языке

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## Preface by the Authors

The struggle for national independence and social advancement which the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are carrying on, has come to be the focus of world-wide attention and a subject of enlightened theorisation. A number of factors have contributed to bring this about.

To begin with, the national-liberation movement is currently developing on an unprecedented scale, engulfing gigantic areas and drawing tens of millions, even hundreds of millions into active participation in political strife. Politically, as well as theoretically, it is of great importance to discover the nature and main trends of the various national-liberation revolutions and establish their historic role and relevance in the revolutionary and democratic movements of modern times.

In the second place, these national-liberation movements have been developing in countries marked by a wide range of inchoate social relations and truly unique historic, national and social conditions, all of which has given rise to complicated political, economic and ideological problems that require objective analysis and an exhaustive Marxist interpretation. Many of the social phenomena currently observable in the countries belonging to the so-called Third World are of interest from a broad theoretical viewpoint.

In the third place, the increasingly aggressive policies of the imperialist powers and the growing activity of domestic reactionary forces have considerably complicated, in recent years, the tasks that the national-liberation movement must face. The events in Ghana and Indonesia, the Middle East crisis, and other developments indicate that the forces of imperialism are endeavouring to open a counter-offensive



against the national-liberation movements, create political and economic instability in the new national states, and re-establish themselves—in one way or another—in their former positions. This situation calls for a profound analysis of the causes of the temporary reverses suffered by the national-liberation movements in specific cases, the nature of their present difficulties, and the ways and means of dealing with these.

Among the former colonial lands of Asia and Africa that have gained their independence the process of development differs from country to country. Some have elected to follow the capitalist road; some have embarked on a programme of far-reaching social and economic reforms in the interests of the masses; and others are still marking time at a historic cross-roads, still unable to make up their minds. This is undoubtedly due to a certain extent to the fact that some of these countries achieved their political independence over twenty years ago and others only recently; but the main reason is to be found in the different levels of social development attained by the countries of the Third World, in the difference in their social or class structure, in the scope and vigour of their national-liberation movement, in the relative numerical and organisational strength of their social classes, and so on. If, in addition to these differences, one considers the historic, ethnic and national peculiarities, the cultural and religious traditions, and such factors as area, population size and geographic features, it will be seen that many of the problems faced by the countries of Asia and Africa will require a different approach in each individual case. This conclusion holds true, incidentally, not only for social and economic problems, but also for the various aspects of politics and statesmanship, and particularly for the forms, methods and rates of social development.

Nevertheless, any profound analysis of the concrete problems standing before the national-liberation movement today presupposes certain generalisations and conclusions, which would make it possible to arrive at a number of general laws common to the movement as a whole. Many new developments within the national-liberation movement, moreover, can be properly understood and interpreted only if examined in the context of current international developments or, more specifically, in the context of the struggle between the two world social systems, rather than singly.

Any concrete analysis of the socio-economic and political processes at work in the developing countries must therefore necessarily include a statement of problems of general theory related to the revolutionary movement as a whole.

In recent years, the rapid development of the national-liberation movement has served to produce quite a few studies in which a scholarly general inference drawn from data concerning the most interesting events and phenomena observed in the new national states is ably combined with a statement of major theoretical and practical problems. The torrent of writings on the subject of the developing countries contains, however, few works summing up and interpreting social phenomena characteristic of the Third World as a whole. Modern historiography, moreover, misinterprets many of the problems of the national-liberation movement. Some authors give a bourgeois interpretation of events and facts relative to the developing countries, while others make an attempt to interpret these phenomena from a radical left-wing opportunist viewpoint.

All this makes it doubly important to present an objective scientific analysis which would reveal the laws governing the liberation struggle waged by the nations concerned and to show both the characteristic features imposed on it by the exceptional diversity of idiosyncrasies peculiar to the new independent countries and the future trends of development of the present-day national-liberation movements.

The present study proposes to examine these problems under three headings: political, socio-economic, and ideological.

Under the political heading such problems will be included as an examination of the nature of present-day national-liberation revolutions and the motive forces behind them, and an evaluation of the relationship between these revolutions and the other revolutionary movements of our time.

An analysis of the relationships of classes and social groups and their relative importance in a society is of great practical value for the new independent states of Asia and Africa in their choice of ways, means and forms of consolidation of all progressive anti-imperialist forces within the framework of a common national-democratic front.



Following achievement of political independence national-liberation revolutions grow in scope and intensity, rather than die down. In the countries of the Third World, the new way of life is born in conditions of intense conflict. The revolutionary-democratic forces fighting to secure, for the liberated countries, ways of development consonant with social progress and genuine independence find themselves confronted by the forces of local reaction in collusion with imperialism. The choice of this or that road of socio-economic and political development is a crucial problem for the new sovereign states, because it has a direct bearing on the lives of millions. From the theoretical sphere where it belonged prior to the achievement of independence this problem has now been shifted to the sphere of ordinary politics, to become the criterion *par excellence* for the grouping of social-class forces and the political parties that serve their interests.

Socio-economic problems have acquired particular urgency in this current phase of the national-liberation movement. This calls for a serious scientific investigation of many important problems, especially such as a theoretic explanation of the unique nature of the period of transition, an identification of the objective and subjective factors considerably facilitating the social and economic development of the liberated countries, as, for example, the role of the State in the period of transition, the significance of the political organisation of the masses, the ways and means of drawing the masses into the work of state administration, etc.

In developing their national economies the countries of Asia and Africa encounter numerous major and minor problems whose solution is no simple matter. Economists both in the developing countries and elsewhere are preoccupied with the problems associated with their economic upsurge, namely: the causes of the economic difficulties most of these countries are experiencing and the ways of overcoming them; the sources of financing the national economies; the agrarian issue and food problem; the comparative importance of the state and private sectors in the national economies; industrialisation rates and the ratio of light and heavy industries; the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on the developing countries; and so forth. Not all these problems, of course, can be fully answered today; but the fact that these and other problems are formulated may itself

aid their proper comprehension and solution. The reference here is chiefly to discovering forms and methods of economic management scientifically justified for adoption by the developing countries in present-day conditions, in the light of their actual possibilities and prospects of their economic co-operation with one another and with the countries of the world socialist system.

Students of the national-liberation movement have lately been paying increasing attention to the related ideological problems. This is no mere coincidence; for the area of the national-liberation movement has become a battle-ground of the ideological war. The imperialist powers have no intention of surrendering their ideological positions even if they have suffered a serious political defeat here and find themselves compelled to grant the developing countries certain economic concessions. As a matter of fact, they have increased their ideological pressure on the Third World in the hope of devising a system of ideological concepts that would impede—if it couldn't forestall—any further development of anti-imperialist revolutions and keep the liberated countries, for a long enough time to come, from contact with any radical social reforms. Another aim is to regenerate on the soil of the Third World the withered concepts of bourgeois ideology for use against the spread of socialist principles in this area.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that in this area the forces of revolution and progress must fight against the fallacious political and theoretical principles which the present leadership of the C.P.C. are trying to foist on the world revolutionary movement in general and the national-liberation movement in particular.

No single study, however voluminous, can pretend to examine all the aspects of the life and struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa; and it has therefore been necessary to limit the scope of the present work: many problems have merely been stated and will require further examination.

Inasmuch as the processes under review are extremely complex, and events have not yet become stabilised, and the very situation in the countries in question is subject to frequent and often unexpected changes, the authors have tried to refrain from any unqualified statements of opinion or final conclusions.



Their task, as the authors see it, is to help the reader discern, beneath the superficial phenomena, those profound processes which determine the attitudes of the different classes, social groups, political parties and leaders of the national-liberation movement, and thereby to make some contribution, however small, to the difficult struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for their national and social freedom.

## Chapter One

### THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN OUR TIME

One of the distinctive features of our time is the vigorous development of national-liberation revolutions, whose impact is shattering the world colonial system. New, national states are emerging from the ruins of the old colonial empires, and their peoples, no longer content to be victims of historic circumstance, are taking the shaping of their own destinies in their own hands. Seventeen countries of Asia threw off the colonial yoke within twelve years after the end of the Second World War. India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, to name but a few, are now embarked on a programme of independent development.

Dealt a significant political defeat in Asia, the colonial powers expected to be able to stand fast in Africa. "The fabulous and challenging continent," wrote at the time John Gunther, an American journalist and an active proponent of colonial regimes, "is vital to the Western world not merely because it is important strategically and is packed with vital raw materials, but because it is our Last Frontier. Much of Asia has been lost; Africa remains."<sup>1</sup> Africa did not long remain quiescent, however, as the colonialists had expected. The breakers of anti-imperialist revolutions rolled in with mounting force, crumbling the foundations of colonialism first in Northern and then in Tropical Africa. Thirty-four African states achieved national sovereignty between 1956 and 1965.

At the present writing, there are over 70 countries in Asia and Africa no longer subject to direct colonial rule. Back in 1919 colonies and dependencies occupied 72 per cent of the world's surface and contained over 69 per cent of its population, whereas at present the remaining colonies occupy less than 4 per cent of the globe's surface and contain

<sup>1</sup> John Gunther, *Inside Africa*, New York, 1955, p. 4.



1.1 per cent, or slightly more than 37 million, of its population.

The emergence of these sovereign states in the international arena as an active anti-imperialist force represents an important consequence of the national-liberation movement, a logical result of the long and hard struggle waged by the peoples of the colonial and dependent lands. It is a historic event of great significance.

### 1. Roots of Success of the National-Liberation Struggle

Varied have been the roads travelled by the colonies and dependencies to reach political independence. Some achieved their independence by peaceful means; others had to resort to arms. Yet varied and unique though these ways and means of achieving political independence may have been, in the specific conditions obtaining in the various countries, they all shared the one common feature of having achieved it after a long and arduous fight. For independence must be won in hard battle: it doesn't come of itself.

To hear the ideologists of colonialism talk, the colonialists had seen fit to grant independence to the subjugated peoples of their own volition since the nature of modern imperialism had allegedly changed and even stood to gain by giving up its colonies.<sup>1</sup> The proponents of British colonialism want it believed that British colonial policy had been designed all along "to guide the Colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Such, for instance, is the viewpoint of Cyrus L. Sulzberger, political commentator of the *New York Times*, who writes: "In sum, the rich lands seem to be getting richer while the poor get poorer. The people of Rwanda decline into a more miserable if prouder life of independence while Belgium, no longer responsible for African imperial expenditures, gets still more prosperous. The inhabitants of Gabon eat less and those of Tanganyika dress worse while Europe, shed of the cost as well as pride of colonialism, booms." (See C. L. Sulzberger, *Unfinished Revolution. America and the Third World*, New York, 1965, p. 9.)

<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Bradley, *Britain's Purpose in Africa*, London, 1959, p. 3.

The kind intentions, so-called, of the colonialists are quite beside the point, of course: the point is that the world has changed to such an extent—and the colonies and dependencies with it—that factors beyond their control have been forcing the imperialists to give up one position after another.

Let us try to identify these factors.

The main, decisive factor that has contributed to the success of the national-liberation movements of colonial peoples has been the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917, which released the vast latent energy of hundreds of millions and stimulated them to active participation in political affairs. The colonial world found itself in a state of flux, in direct response to the revolutionary events in Russia which had made a breakthrough in the capitalist world and sparked the general crisis of capitalism and with it a crisis of the imperialist colonial system.

Prior to 1917 all national-liberation struggles in the colonies and semi-colonies were crushed by the superior power of international imperialism, then paramount throughout the world.<sup>4</sup> The October Revolution worked a radical change in the situation. It meant a turning point in the development of the national-liberation struggle. The revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependencies developed thereafter on a far greater scale and improved organisationally. More than that: the October Revolution had implanted in the revolutionaries a strong faith in their imminent liberation.

Even the overt proponents of colonialism are forced to admit that the October Revolution has given a strong impetus to the national-liberation struggle in Asia and Africa. What

<sup>4</sup> R. Palm Dutt, a prominent leader of the international workers' and communist movement and for many years a close student of the national-liberation movement, recalls: "I well remember the world of the national-liberation movement before 1917, when the leaders of the national movement in India and other countries visited my father in Cambridge, England, and when the Majlis or first association of Asian students, founded in 1907 in honour of the Persian Revolution (Jawaharlal Nehru, then a student, used to be a member, though not very active), met in a room in my father's house. The popular movement in Britain conducted agitation against the atrocities of imperialism and colonial wars and oppression all over the world. There were ceaseless meetings of protest. Protest against suppression in Egypt, in India, in Persia, in the Congo. Protest followed protest. But before 1917 there were no victories to celebrate." See *Marxism Today*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1964, p. 9.



the bourgeois writers refrain from doing, however, is being done by the present leadership of the C.P.C., who have undertaken to belittle the significance of the October Revolution—and the very fact of the existence of the world's first socialist state—for the development of the liberation movement. Mao Tse-tung had something altogether different to say back in 1949: "Victory is possible even without international aid", we are told. That is a fallacy. While imperialism exists, no truly people's revolution can win in any country without various types of aid from the international revolutionary forces; nor could security be ensured even in the event of victory. . . . If there was no Soviet Union; if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War; if—and this is particularly important for us—Japanese imperialism had not been crushed; if no people's democracies had emerged in Europe; if the struggle of the oppressed countries of the East wasn't gathering momentum; if it wasn't for the struggle waged by the masses in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the other capitalist countries against the ruling reactionary cliques; if, in short, it were not for all these factors, the pressure exerted by the international reactionary forces would be a great deal stronger, of course, than it actually is. Could we have been victorious in the absence of these factors? Of course not."<sup>1</sup> Today, in China, they prefer to disremember these words, for they are at odds with the present frankly chauvinistic, nationalist policies of the Chinese leadership.

The military débâcle of nazi Germany and militarist Japan and the victorious socialist revolutions in numerous countries in Europe and Asia delivered a new and mighty blow against imperialism and the colonial system. That system, already in a state of crisis, began to disintegrate.

The expansion of socialism beyond the confines of a single country and the formation of a world socialist system radically altered the balance of power in the international arena and created a situation favouring the successful development of the national-liberation struggle. So momentous an event as the rapid disintegration of the imperialist colonial system, which has already brought freedom to over 1,500 million, could never have taken place if socialism had not

become a powerful force exerting a growing influence on the trends of development throughout the world.

It is no longer imperialism, but the world socialist system and the forces fighting imperialism in the interests of a socialist reconstruction of the society, that now determine the main content, the main trend and the main features of the historic development of the human race. The capitalist system as a whole is going through a grave crisis, attended by growing contradictions within it. It should in no way be equated, of course, to the concept of capitalism as a system which, being in the grip of its internal contradictions, is fated to collapse automatically. The experience of the post-war years shows that capitalism has been successful in using to its own advantage the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, automation of industry, new forms and methods of state regulation, economic integration, militarisation of the economy, and a number of other factors. This has not cured capitalism of its basic vices, however, and can never do so. Despite all its efforts the capitalist system has failed to overcome its intrinsic propensity to stagnation. World socialism, in its economic competition with capitalism, on the other hand, is continuously making gains as the bourgeois economists must willy-nilly admit.

The changes that have overtaken the socio-economic structure of present-day capitalism have failed to overcome the basic contradiction within the capitalist society, namely, that between labour and capital; rather, they have aggravated this contradiction, increasing the polarisation of class forces. In the countries of advanced capitalism the strike movement has been increasing in scope in the post-war period. There were 165,600 strikes involving 74,500,000 workers between 1919 and 1939, whereas between 1946 and 1966 the number of strikes went up to 309,800, and 259,100,000 workers were affected. The average annual number of strikers in the industrially developed capitalist countries has increased by a factor of 3.5 as compared with the pre-war period.<sup>1</sup>

Nowadays, the struggle of the working class tends increasingly to acquire an anti-colonial slant, in defence of

<sup>1</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *O diktature narodnoi demokratii* (On People's Democracy), Moscow, 1949, p. 9.

<sup>1</sup> See *Veliky Oktyabr i mirovoi revolyutsionny protsess* (The Great October and the World Revolutionary Process), Moscow, 1967, p. 271.



peoples become the victims of imperialist aggression. This is an important feature of the development of the international working-class movement in the post-war period. A most important contribution to the liberation of colonial and semi-colonial peoples has been made by the progressive forces of France, Italy, Britain, the United States, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Portugal.

The national-liberation revolutions in Asia and Africa are marked by close mutual contact and co-operation; there is no tendency to play a lone hand.<sup>1</sup> Every time a people waging a national-liberation struggle wins independent statehood there is a net gain for those colonial peoples who must still carry on their fight for freedom and national independence. The peoples of Asia and Africa have forged a formidable weapon—their unity and solidarity—in the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. They have common aims, these peoples who have won or are winning their freedom; and imperialism is their common foe. That is the objective basis of their active, fighting alliance, despite any differences in the way they fight, which stem from differences inherent in the participating classes or social strata and frequent differences in ideology, political convictions and religious faith.

Such are the basic foreign-policy factors that account for the successful development of national-liberation revolutions in Asia and Africa. These revolutions, however, would not have been successful in the same measure if certain socio-economic and political precursors had not matured within the colonies and dependencies themselves. One such development has been the emergence of social forces which have proved themselves capable of taking charge of a national-liberation movement besides taking an active part therein.

The years immediately preceding the achievement of national independence were marked by a rapidly growing political activity on the part of all social strata. Important

<sup>1</sup> This attitude has been aptly set forth by Aung San, the Burmese leader, who saw very clearly that "the revolution in Burma can be brought to a successful end only provided it is carried on within the framework of the general revolutionary movement in South-East Asia". See Aung San, *Birma brosayet vyzov* (*Burma's Challenge*), a collection of articles and addresses, Moscow, 1965, p. 239.

action was undertaken practically universally by workers and peasants alike. Political parties appeared, as well as trade unions and various mass democratic organisations. In India, for instance, in late 1946 and early 1947, the independence movement rallied workers in practically every branch of industry, peasants, bank clerks, teachers, etc. The demand for "independence now" became general: it was supported by all classes, from workers to the national bourgeoisie, and by all progressive parties and organisations.<sup>1</sup> In Burma, during the winter months of 1946/47, numerous meetings, demonstrations and strikes were staged by workers, employees and students throughout the land to back a demand for genuine independence. In January 1947, Burma was practically in the throes of a general political strike.<sup>2</sup>

In colonial Africa, too, all strata of the population were increasingly on the move.<sup>3</sup> In the countries of Tropical Africa, as the national-liberation movement developed, trade unions were organised as well as political parties which brought together forces belonging to different social classes and which were, to all intents and purposes, organisations of the national-democratic front type, with programmes calling for a struggle against colonialism in the interests of political independence.

That was the period during which an alliance of all patriotic forces and political parties took shape and came to be one of the main factors leading to the relatively rapid victory of the national-liberation revolutions. This alliance remains the most important weapon in the hands of the formerly oppressed peoples even now, for the struggle against colonialism and imperialism is not yet over.

<sup>1</sup> See *Noveishaya istoriya Indii* (*Modern History of India*), Moscow, 1959, p. 461.

<sup>2</sup> See V. F. Vasilyev, *Ocherki istorii Birmy (1885-1947)* (*Essays on the History of Burma*), Moscow, 1962, p. 364.

<sup>3</sup> As Derek Kartun, an English student of African problems, pointed out very rightly in the early 1950s, "What is significant about the past years is not primarily the astonishing picture of almost ceaseless bloodshed in almost every French and British possession in the continent. It is the varied, resourceful, relentless advance of the African people, taken by and large, in the face of the worst that the imperial Powers could do to them." See Derek Kartun, *Africa, Africa! A Continent Rises to Its Feet*, London, 1954, p. 27.



## 2. New Aspects of the National-Liberation Revolutions

In our day, the national-liberation movement has acquired new traits, which distinguish it from the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and which we shall now attempt to examine.

1. The national-liberation movement involves, in our day, so many countries and such vast multitudes of men as had never been known before. Now that, having expanded beyond the confines of a single country, it involves almost a third of the world's population, it may be said to have acquired an international character. No longer directed solely against any single colonial power, it is now a challenge to imperialism and colonialism as a whole.

This international national-liberation movement, engendered more or less simultaneously far and wide over the face of our planet as a manifestation of the general crisis of capitalism, is articulated into national forces varying in their level of development. This is a consequence both of the historical, cultural and economic peculiarities of the various countries encompassed in the movement and of the nature of that movement in the individual countries, the class pattern of its participants, and the efficiency of its leadership.

The common struggle against imperialism and colonialism has brought about a fusion of almost all classes and social strata into broad political coalitions, and has thus turned into a veritable mass movement. On the other hand, the national-liberation struggle has been erratic in its development and somewhat inconsistent in the achievement of the immediate and long-range aims of the national revolution; and this can be largely traced to the objective fact that the movement involves strata and segments of population of different social standing, who bring in their own often somewhat vague conceptions and judgements regarding current problems, as well as their own nationalist and religious prejudices, shortcomings and errors.

2. The present-day national-liberation movement has led to the emergence of a system of new sovereign states that have not yet completely broken away from the world capitalist economy but are, for the most part, no longer members

of the imperialist political system. Many of the independent Asian and African states follow active anti-imperialist policies and take part in decisions on important issues of direct concern to mankind. They join the socialist countries in opposing the imperialist policy of aggression and war and contribute to the strengthening of peace and friendship among nations.

The imperialist powers are fearful of the growing influence of the new national states on international politics and the progressive changes in international relations. They would like to prevent any democratic tendencies in the foreign policies of the developing countries, whom they would prefer to see following obediently in the wake of their own aggressive policy. Writing in *Foreign Policy in the Sixties*, one of the co-authors suggests that India should renounce the policy of non-alignment, which is allegedly no longer in line with the changed international situation, and take an active part in Western military preparations in Asia.<sup>1</sup>

Bourgeois ideologists are trying to convince the national leaders of the new independent states that the non-alignment policy, which may have had a *raison d'être* in the early 1960s, is now becoming largely illusory.<sup>2</sup> Eventually, they hope, the non-aligned countries will become a reserve position in the international strategy of imperialism and anti-communism.<sup>3</sup> In this they bank particularly on a split within the Third World, on a clash of national interests among the developing countries and their eventual fragmentation into various groups, which will provide the imperialist forces with an excellent opportunity to take action in that area.<sup>4</sup> The imperialists are well aware that close co-operation of the new sovereign states with the socialist states and an increasing progressive trend in their foreign policies will stand

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Policy in the Sixties: the Issues and the Instruments*, ed. by Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Non-alignment*, ed. by J. W. Burton, London, 1966, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. John Donald Miller, of the Australian National University, insists, in particular, that the militant anti-colonialism which is at the root of the Third World countries' desire for unity is now beginning to waver and that "it seems likely that there is little future for Afro-Asianism as such". See J. D. B. Miller, *The Politics of the Third World*, London, 1966, p. 38.



in the way of implementation of their own aggressive schemes.

3. The emergence of national states speeds the liberation of the remaining colonial and semi-colonial peoples. It is also a sign that the national-liberation movement has entered a new phase and that attention will hence focus on socio-economic problems.

The expansion and strengthening of political independence in countries that have won or are winning their freedom is essential to the liquidation of their economic backwardness, which is, in turn, an indispensable condition for true independence; greater political independence is at the same time a consequence of the importance and scope of socio-economic reforms. The socio-economic factor is of supreme importance in the current phase of the national-liberation movement, just as economic competition is in the foreground of the relations between the two world systems. That is why the Chinese theoreticians are wrong who claim to see a contradiction between the efforts of the new sovereign states to build up a national economy and solve their social problems, on the one hand, and the political struggle against imperialism, on the other, as also to see the development of a national economy as an "abandonment" of the aims of the national-liberation movement.<sup>1</sup> The contrary is nearer the truth: to ignore the solution of the problems of socio-economic development is to weaken the newly-won independence and make it easier for the forces of imperialism to strike blows at the national-liberation movement.

<sup>1</sup> In the new phase, according to an editorial appearing in the *Jen-min Jih-pao*, the top-priority task of the liberated countries "remains to press the struggle against imperialism and against colonialism, old and new, and their accomplices. This struggle is as violent as before and encompasses the political, economic, military, cultural, ideological, and other spheres. As before, it is prosecuted chiefly in the political sphere, but when imperialism resorts to armed repressive measures, direct or indirect, the struggle is often necessarily carried into the sphere of armed conflict". (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 22, 1964.) The article, wholly devoted to the national-liberation movement, does not contain so much as an attempt to analyse the current phase of that movement and identify the changes that the national-liberation revolutions have undergone. Today, merely to mention that the national-liberation movement "is developing with irresistible force" or that "it has been smashing the positions of the American imperialists and their partners far and wide" is to limit the account to quantitative data, while overlooking the profound qualitative changes that have taken place in the national-liberation movement.

Lenin, in exposing the bourgeois ideologists, stressed that they "are talking of *national* liberation. . . , leaving out *economic* liberation. Yet in reality it is the latter that is the chief thing".<sup>1</sup> His words are particularly timely today, when the new national states must face the problem of making an end of their economic exploitation at the hands of the imperialist powers. The truth is that while they remain tied to the world capitalist economic system those newly-liberated countries where productivity is low will be inevitably plundered economically by the industrially developed imperialist powers. Political independence, in the circumstances, is not economic independence and does not automatically end dependence upon the industrially more advanced capitalist states. The countries of Latin America offer convincing evidence in this respect: they won their political independence a hundred and fifty years ago, but economically they are still largely dependent upon the imperialist powers, notably the United States.

If economic independence is to be won, therefore, the struggle for political independence must go hand in hand with a struggle for profound socio-economic reforms, which will prepare the ground for a gradual change-over to socialist construction, which, for the oppressed peoples, is the only way to true independence.

4. In our day, national-liberation revolutions are setting themselves more far-reaching aims. There was a time when they were no more than democratic-bourgeois revolutions that merely cleared the way for capitalist development, as in the case of Iran and Turkey. Now, however, the altered relationship of class forces in the international arena makes possible a relatively rapid development of national-liberation, anti-imperialist revolutions into anti-capitalist, socialist revolutions.

When the Second Congress of the Communist International met back in 1920 it was decided, in connection with the final editing of the theses on the nationalities and colonial issues, to change the phrase "bourgeois-democratic movement" to read "revolutionary nationalist liberation movement". Far from being a mere formality, the change had become a necessity inasmuch as the difference between a reformist and a revolutionary movement had by then become

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 398.



sufficiently distinct in the colonial and dependent countries. "The distinction I have referred to has been made in all the theses," wrote Lenin, "with the result, I think, that our view is now formulated much more precisely."<sup>1</sup>

The two types of revolution, national-liberation and socialist, are drawing closer to each other in our day. The former are frequently directed from the very start not only against imperialism and the feudal system but also, in a measure, against capitalism, that is to say, essentially against the selfsame foe that the socialist revolutions led by the working class set out to fight. This cannot warrant, of course, any identification of the current phase of the national-liberation movement and its mainly general democratic aims with the socialist phase, and, hence, any artificial forcing of the development of the society. To guard against setting any tasks which are objectively premature as well as against any temptation to disregard the essential intermediate links in the chain of developments it is necessary to take careful account of the current level and stage of development of the national-liberation struggle in any given country.

On the other hand, the indubitable fact must not be overlooked that even a national-liberation movement may set and may often accomplish tasks, which are normally accomplished by a socialist revolution. Nowadays, the aims of national-liberation and socialist revolutions tend to merge considerably more than before, since the liberation movement, originally aimed at achieving national freedom, logically tends ultimately to turn against capitalism as the social system that engenders colonial oppression.

5. Contemporary national-liberation revolutions employ a wide variety of means and tactics.

Each people chooses the particular form of struggle that is indicated by the concrete situation within the country and the stage that the national revolution has reached. All means, including armed uprising, are employed in a struggle against imperialism aimed at winning national independence and ensuring its security.

Marxists-Leninists have always recognised the revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars and given them their active support.

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 242.

It is not a matter of preferring some one form of struggle, be it even armed revolt, but rather a matter of giving all-round consideration to the situation in a given country, to the relationship of political forces, and to political expediency. Whatever form a fight for freedom might take, its success will depend, in the long run, upon the participation of the masses. Armed revolts, unless they are assured of the full support of the working people, who must empirically test the adequacy of the forms of struggle chosen, may simply lead to a loss of contact between the small armed detachments involved and the people. That approach is in the spirit of putsches and petty-bourgeois gambles.

The concept of violent revolution, which the ultra-left opportunists seek to impose upon the national-liberation movement, has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. According to that concept "determined revolutionary armed struggle is of first-rate significance both for the proletarian revolution and for the national-democratic revolution of the oppressed nations".<sup>1</sup> While paying lip-service to the principle of diverse forms of struggle, the opportunists in fact advocate armed struggle as the sole means of winning national freedom and seek to impose it on all and sundry regardless of situation, place or time. "Power, independence, freedom and equality," according to the official records of the Chinese Communist Party, "can be won only by force of arms and maintained also by force of arms. That is the general law of class struggle."<sup>2</sup>

The ultra-left opportunists are fond of quoting the records of the Communist International in support of their anti-Marxist thesis of the absolute priority of armed struggle. In doing so they are wont to pluck out at will those propositions of the International which speak of the necessity of bold and determined action when the revolutionary situation reaches its apex, while deliberately refraining from any mention of the fundamentally important views of the Communist International on the matter in question. The Programme of the Communist International adopted by the Sixth Congress stressed the following point:

"In passing over to new and more radical slogans, the Parties must be guided by the fundamental rule of the

<sup>1</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 11, 1965.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 24, 1964.



political tactics of Leninism, which calls for ability to lead the masses to revolutionary positions in such a manner that the masses may, by their own experience, convince themselves of the correctness of the Party line. Failure to observe this rule must inevitably lead to isolation from the masses, to putschism, to the ideological degeneration of Communism into 'Leftist' dogmatism and to petty-bourgeois 'revolutionary' adventurism."<sup>1</sup>

If we turn to the record of the national-liberation movement we shall see that many former colonies won their independence without recourse to armed struggle. In the current phase of the national-liberation movement, when new national states are emerging all over Asia and Africa, and many of them are taking the road of progressive socio-economic reform, a call to armed struggle, viewed objectively, aims either to justify uprisings against existing regimes, including those in advanced countries, or to provoke armed conflicts between the developing states and the former colonial powers in the interests of "speeding up" the revolutionary process. Such "revolutionary" postures can merely produce a schism in the united anti-imperialist front building up in these countries, cause serious harm to the national-liberation movement and hold up its further development.

Such, then, are some of the new features of the national-liberation movement that bear witness to its greatly increased role and significance in the world in our day.

### 3. Constituent Part of World Revolution

Inasmuch as all manner of concepts have been conjured up latterly for the purpose of providing a theoretic explanation of the allegedly decisive role of the national-liberation movement in our day, it will be highly expedient, at this moment, to determine just what are the objective role and function of the national-liberation movement within the world-wide revolutionary process. By working on the nationalist feelings of the struggling peoples

<sup>1</sup> "The Programme of the Communist International", *International Press Correspondence*, Special Number, Vienna, Dec. 31, 1928, Vol. 8, No. 92, p. 1767.

the authors of these newfangled concepts, who range from neo-Trotskyites all the way to ultra-left opportunists, have been intentionally exaggerating the role and significance of the national-liberation movement and trying to dissociate it from the other revolutionary forces of our day.

This viewpoint has been expressed most succinctly in the official records of the Trotskyite so-called Fourth International. The following excerpt is taken from one of its resolutions.

"Since the postwar revolutionary upsurge in Western Europe and the postwar strike wave in the United States great changes have taken place in the labour movement and in the objective conditions it faces in the imperialist countries. Contrary to the expectations of both Marxist and non-Marxist economists, the capitalist economy of the advanced industrialised countries, including Japan, underwent an expansion not experienced since the first world war; i.e., for nearly half a century. The interaction of such economic growth and the treacherous opportunist policies of the traditional working-class leadership in Western Europe and the trade-union bureaucracy in the U.S. in the absence of an alternative revolutionary leadership, made possible the temporary relative stabilisation of capitalism in Europe. The main centre of the revolutionary movement thereupon shifted for the time being to the colonial countries."<sup>1</sup>

The same notion, similarly expressed, is to be found in the official Chinese records. According to an editorial appearing in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* and the *Hung Ch'i*: "Wide areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America are precisely the focus of the various contradictions of the modern world, the weakest link of imperialist domination, the main zone of revolutionary storms that are now rocking the imperialist system. . . . In a certain sense, therefore, the cause of the international proletariat's revolution as a whole depends, in the long run, on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples inhabiting these areas, who form an overwhelming majority of the world's population."<sup>2</sup>

This argument leads to the conception which has the "world farm", that is to say, the national-liberation move-

<sup>1</sup> *Fourth International*, Special Number, October-December 1963, No. 17, Colombo, Ceylon, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 22, 1963.



ment, surrounding and destroying the "world town", that is, the capitalist world. Lin Piao, one of the active exponents of the so-called "people's war theory", writes as follows: "Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the 'cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world'. Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas."<sup>1</sup>

Here we have a clear case of identity of views as held by the neo-Trotskyites and the ultra-left opportunists. In early 1961 the neo-Trotskyites proclaimed that the colonial revolution constitutes the vanguard of the world revolution and acts as the main force designed, among other things, to rouse the advanced countries to revolutionary struggle and that it represents, objectively, the motive force of the world revolution. And in 1963 the leadership of the C.P.C. declared: "The national-liberation revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America is currently the main force that is actually fighting imperialism."<sup>2</sup>

There is nothing new about the thesis that the focus of the world revolution has shifted to the area encompassed by the national-liberation movement, as maintained by the neo-Trotskyites and the ultra-left opportunists. The opinion had been voiced back in the period between the two world wars that the capitalist system in the West would have collapsed under its own weight long ago if it had not been for its extensive colonial possessions, which it needed as a market for its goods and a purveyor of raw materials, and that imperialism would be vanquished not in its citadel but in its colonies, which were the most vulnerable part of world imperialism, its Achilles's heel, as it were.

The exponents of this viewpoint, who also exaggerated the role of the national-liberation movement in the world revolution, nevertheless worked on the assumption that the struggle for the national liberation of the oppressed peo-

ples would be headed by the working class and its party, while the national bourgeoisie would be excluded or neutralised. Our contemporary advocates of the so-called Three Continent theory, however, consider the national-liberation movement headed by non-proletarian elements to be the main force of the world revolution, thus differing in this respect from the Marxists, who have invariably associated the shifting of the focus of the world revolution with the struggle waged by the proletariat.

The two viewpoints have a feature in common, however. Both are based on the erroneous concept of imperialism's automatic collapse, which may allegedly be brought about by the revolutionary movement in the colonial hinterland independently of the struggle of the people, notably the working class as a whole, in the advanced capitalist countries.

The record of the world liberation movement shows that the focus of the world revolution shifted in each case in accordance with changes in the general situation. Marx and Engels wrote as follows in *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*: "The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation, and with a much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution."<sup>1</sup>

Subsequently, however, after the fall of the Commune of Paris, the focus of the world-wide liberation movement started gradually to shift to Russia, where an upsurge of the revolutionary movement was beginning. "During the Revolution of 1848-49," wrote Engels in 1882, "not only the European princes, but the European bourgeois as well, found their only salvation from the proletariat, just beginning to awaken, in Russian intervention. The tsar was proclaimed the chief European reaction. Today he is a prisoner of war of the revolution, in Gatchina, and Russia forms the vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Peking Review*, Sept. 3, 1965, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 22, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.



In 1902, Lenin, developing further Engels's line of thought in his *What Is To Be Done?*, described the prospects of the liberation movement in Russia as follows: "History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the immediate tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat."<sup>1</sup>

Later, after the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin explained why leadership in the revolutionary proletarian International had passed to the Russians, as it had passed at different periods of the 19th century from the English to the French and to the Germans. He wrote, *inter alia*, as follows: "Britain was the model of a country in which, as Engels put it, the bourgeoisie had produced, alongside a bourgeois aristocracy, a very bourgeois upper stratum of the proletariat. For several decades this advanced capitalist country lagged behind in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. France seemed to have exhausted the strength of the proletariat in two heroic working-class revolts of 1848 and 1871 against the bourgeoisie that made very considerable contributions to world-historical development. Leadership in the International of the working-class movement then passed to Germany; that was in the seventies of the nineteenth century, when she lagged economically behind Britain and France. But when Germany had outstripped these two countries economically, i.e., by the second decade of the twentieth century, the Marxist workers' party of Germany, that model for the whole world, found itself headed by a handful of utter scoundrels. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

The foregoing excerpts from the writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism leave no room for doubt that the shifting of the focus of the world revolution was directly linked, in their opinion, with the struggle waged by the proletariat. It is probable that the main node of capitalist contradictions and the focus of the peoples' liberation movement coincide until the socialist revolution wins in some one country. After the victory of the socialist revolution

in one or more countries the centre of the world-wide liberation movement will shift, as history teaches us, to that particular socialist country which is more advanced socially and economically and which, in virtue of its achievements in the political, economic and social fields, exerts the greatest influence on social progress the world over. Very understandably, too, for the countries where socialism has won exert their main influence upon the world revolutionary process precisely by their example, by their economic policies, and by their actual achievements in the economic competition with capitalism.

Lenin, having convincingly expounded the theory of the possibility of socialism winning in a single country (brilliantly substantiated in the case of the Soviet Union), expected that the victorious socialist revolution in Russia would initiate a victorious pageant of socialist revolutions in the capitalist West. Asia, Africa and Latin America were looked upon mainly as regions constituting the reserves of the world socialist revolution. Actually, however, it developed that socialism owed its expansion to its victories both in the advanced capitalist states *and* in the economically backward countries. This circumstance sets new problems, practical as well as theoretical, before the Marxists-Leninists. More than that: it means that the focus of the world revolution will probably remain for quite some time to come in the socialist country (or countries) which outdistances the others in laying the foundation of communism. No sudden shift of that focus can be expected, for communist relations will take root only when the essential infrastructure has been created, exceptional gains have been made in the field of science and technology, when life has become richer culturally and in material things, all of which takes decades, as practice over the ages has shown.

The focus of the present-day world revolutionary movement will not remain for ever, of course, in the country which was the first to effect a proletarian revolution. Lenin associated the possibility of a further shifting of the focus of the world revolution not so much with the next breakthrough of the capitalist system at its weakest point as with the prospects of a victorious socialist revolution precisely in the countries which had outdistanced Russia in the matter of economic development and could, in that case, outdistance her in the social sphere as well.

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 29, p. 309.



When we speak of the focus of the world revolution as shifting we mean that it is moving more and more into the sphere of creative activity of the working class and all the working people engaged in building a communist society. For a country to be the centre of the world socialist revolution means, in our day, to be in the vanguard of social progress.

The contentions that the focus of the world revolution has shifted into the zone of the national-liberation movement are based on a nationalist ideology and are used, moreover, to disguise the claims to dominance of those who consider that that focus has long since shifted to Peking. These contentions are designed to refute the Marxist characterisation of the current epoch and to substitute for the basic contradiction of our day, which is that between socialism and capitalism, the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism, which is often identified with that between "rich" and "poor" nations, the "rich North" and the "poor South". These conceptions in reality seek to push into the background and play down the significance of the revolutionary struggle waged by the peoples of the socialist community of nations, the international proletariat and the other democratic forces. They are completely alien to a class interpretation of the nature of the current epoch. "Our time, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national-liberation revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale."<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion that the contradiction between the two social systems constituted the main contradiction determining the process of development in the world belongs to Lenin, who wrote: "Reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet Russia. Unless we bear that in mind, we shall not

<sup>1</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1963, p. 38.

be able to pose a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world. The Communist parties in civilised and backward countries alike, can pose and solve political problems correctly only if they make this postulate their starting-point."<sup>1</sup>

Merging with the international working-class and national-liberation movements to form a single powerful revolutionary stream, the world socialist system determines the main trend of historic development. The international communist movement, developing in the light of current events Lenin's thesis of the main contradiction of the present epoch, emphasises in its programme documents that the struggle of the international working class and the socialist countries against imperialism for world-wide victory of socialism has become the focal point of world social development. "The central factors of our day are the international working class and its chief creation, the world socialist system," noted the Communist and Workers' Parties in their 1960 Statement.<sup>2</sup>

The leading role of the world socialist system in the development of our society is based on the growing economic, political and military might of the socialist states. Each new socialist victory in the economic competition with capitalism means another shift in the balance of power in the world arena in favour of progress and improves the prospects for the development of the world revolutionary process.

The objective fact that the socialist system is a leading factor in the world revolutionary process must in no way be taken to belittle the importance of the other constituent elements of the world revolution, such, for instance, as the fight the oppressed peoples are waging. All these elements of the revolutionary process are linked with one another in close and continued interaction, merging into a single torrent which is washing away the foundations of world imperialism. The more the world socialist system achieves and the harder the workers of the developed capitalist countries fight, the better will be the prospects for the development of the national-liberation movement among the Asian and

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 44.



African peoples and the greater will be their contribution to the common anti-imperialist cause.

Official Chinese spokesmen become quite effusive when the subject of the national-liberation movement is touched upon. They have waxed particularly eloquent ever since their anti-Marxist conceptions regarding the world revolution were resolutely rejected (this can now be told) in the developed capitalist countries. Now they still cling to the national-liberation movement, playing it against the other revolutionary forces.

Upon closer examination of the above-mentioned conceptions it will be seen that the "super-revolutionary" verbiage in "defence" of the national-liberation movement actually conceals a supercilious attitude towards the vast changes that have taken place in Asia and Africa. Why, dozens of states have acquired political independence thanks to the courageous struggle put up by oppressed peoples, and here we have the Chinese theoreticians still insisting, in the face of facts, that the dependence of the former colonies and semi-colonies upon the imperialist powers has increased, rather than diminished! According to their scheme, in some of the liberated countries "the old colonialists have become transmuted into new colonialists and continue to maintain their colonial domination through agents of their own nurturing. In others, the old colonialists have been replaced by new, still more powerful and formidable American colonialists."<sup>1</sup>

Such an approach, classifying as it does all the new national states as agents of neo-colonialism, leaves no room either for the countries which have opted for social progress or those which have adopted an independent foreign policy. One might say this scheme was specially made to fit the statements of the official representatives of China, such as "Africa is ripe for a revolution" or "A new, still vaster and mightier wave of anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle will soon sweep over Asia and Africa", and the like.

The eclecticism and contrariety characteristic of the Chinese conception of the national-liberation movement generally are mirrored starkly both in the Chinese theoreticians' thesis of a people's war as the best—and to all intents and

<sup>1</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 23, 1963.

purposes the only—means of adding momentum to the world revolutionary process<sup>1</sup> and in the "intermediate zone" theory, which is based on the rejection of a class approach to a study of the present-day world and which completely effaces all distinction between the countries of the socialist community, on the one hand, and the imperialist states with their policy of aggression, on the other.

This last theory justifies, essentially, any ties China may form with any imperialist country in its own narrow nationalist or chauvinistic interests.

This policy has led, *inter alia*, to the resuscitation of pseudo-revolutionary theories and conceptions which had been exposed and discarded as fallacious. Now that they have made sure of the backing of a solid sponsor in the person of a great Asian power that had been quite influential in stimulating the national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa, the neo-Trotskyites, left opportunists of all shades, extremists, etc., have redoubled their subversive efforts. However much certain Chinese theoreticians may try to cloak themselves in Marxist terminology, they are finding it more and more difficult to conceal their departure from Marxism-Leninism. "Marxism," Lenin stressed, "is an extremely profound and many-sided doctrine. It is, therefore, no wonder that *scraps* of quotations from Marx—especially when the quotations are made *inappropriately*—can always be found among the 'arguments' of those who break with Marxism."<sup>2</sup>

Marxists-Leninists have always considered the national-liberation movement an important element of a single world-wide revolutionary process, a powerful force battering down the defences of imperialism. They work on the assumption that three important revolutionary forces exist in the world today, namely, the world socialist system, the international working-class movement, and the national-liberation revolutions. If the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation and social progress is to win, the three forces

<sup>1</sup> As early as 1960 the Chinese leaders conceived the notion of a world revolution brought on by a thermonuclear war, blandly declaring that the inevitable staggering loss of life "would be compensated" and that "the victorious people could, in record time, create on the debris of imperialism a civilisation a thousand times superior to the capitalist civilisation and would build its own truly wonderful society". (See *Long Live Leninism*, Peking, 1960, p. 23.)

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 212.



must achieve unity and work in close contact and co-operation. The world-wide liberation movement will win out if the three forces achieve close alliance and refuse to be played off against one another.

The national-liberation revolutions have already dealt imperialism a punishing blow. If the new Asian and African states could now win complete independence, world imperialism would find its positions further weakened, this time even more seriously.

The national-liberation movement cannot be regarded, however, as a self-sufficient force able to make an end of imperialism solely by its own efforts. A resolution carried by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ceylon very rightly points out that national-liberation movements "fulfil general democratic rather than class tasks. They are delivering heavy blows at imperialism and breaking down the system of colonial enslavement. But, for all that, the national-liberation movement cannot, by itself, defeat the socio-economic system from which imperialism springs—namely, monopoly capitalism in the metropolitan countries. The loss of their colonies considerably weakens, but does not automatically bring about the downfall of the monopoly capitalists and the imperialists. This task must be fulfilled by the working class."<sup>1</sup>

The end of the second world war found the imperialist powers shorn of almost all of their colonies. But imperialism continues to exist, to the great detriment of the peoples of these colonies. Yet only these peoples can make an end of American, British and French imperialism, by availing themselves of the new class relationship in the world, a relationship that has resulted in consequence, notably, of the successes won by the national-liberation movement.

As matters stand at present, the most important thing, from the viewpoint of the eventual success of the national-liberation movement, would probably be to achieve unity within the movement itself and a close alliance with all the revolutionary forces of our day. Any efforts to isolate the national-liberation struggle from the world revolutionary process, especially from the socialist community, no matter where such efforts may come from, would play into the hands of the imperialists and weaken the united anti-imperialist front.

<sup>1</sup> *Information Bulletin*, No. 3, Prague, 1963, p. 7.

## Chapter Two

### DRIVING FORCES OF THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS

In the developing countries of Asia and Africa the preponderant mass of the population are farmers. In respect of their property status they may be classified as belonging to the comparatively wealthy and numerically smallest class of farmers who own substantial land plots and the necessary farm equipment; to the class of land-poor farmers, who make up the majority; and, finally, to the numerous class of peasants who cultivate mainly land they do not own but which they rent from wealthy landlords who, as a rule, belong to the privileged social strata. The plots of land held by the farmers differ in size, of course, from country to country. Typically, however, the farmers, or peasants, in the Asian and African countries are land-poor, agricultural technique is primitive, and productivity is consequently very low. Crop yields are generally considerably poorer than those in industrial countries.

Insufficiency of land, often attributed to its unjustifiable concentration in the hands of a relatively small group of privileged landowners, results in a surplus of farm labourers in the villages, who are unable to find enough work. This systematically lowers the already low standards of living characteristic of the main mass of the agricultural population. In bad years (and crop failures are frequent, for the peasants have no money to buy fertilisers or pay for land improvement, irrigation, etc.) many overpopulated areas in Asia and Africa suffer famines, epidemics and other incident calamities.

What the farmers want is to do away with the unfair distribution of land: they want each tiller of the soil to have a field of his own. In some of the Asian and African countries a part or all of the surplus lands have already been expropriated by the government from the big landlords (in



most cases with compensation) and transferred to land-poor and landless farmers. Such reforms are definitely useful: they improve conditions in the rural areas, in a measure, and weaken the influence wielded by the privileged big landowners, whose economic power gives them free rein to abuse the farmers, especially their tenant-farmers (as by raising rents at will, dispossessing tenants for non-payment of rent, etc.).

The implementation of these reforms, however, is running into the strong opposition overt or concealed, of the privileged landowners, and quite a few land holdings end up by remaining in their hands. This means that the lands that become available to the government for distribution among the farmers are insufficient to satisfy all those who are in need of land. And, in the second place, those farmers who do get land lack the money that could buy modern farm implements, etc., and would thus allow them to till their land as it should be tilled.

And so the peasantry gets no relief from their economic plight. Many are in debt and continue to be dependent to a greater or lesser extent on the big landowners, money-lenders, all sorts of profiteers who buy and sell farm produce to the detriment of the cultivators.

The farmers cannot but long for a change in their present condition. And since, as has been said above, they form by far the greater part of the population of the developing countries, they constitute a vast potential force.

The struggle to strengthen statehood, to achieve complete independence in all political and economic matters, can be won by a country only provided that struggle is wholeheartedly supported by its peasantry. A government that takes its tasks seriously must take into account the interests of its peasantry and find the means required to improve its lot. The very level of a country's socio-economic development is largely determined by the condition of its peasantry. The national income of developing countries depends primarily on the state of agricultural production. Prospects for the continued development of national industry depend on the capacity of the domestic market, and this in turn depends on the farmers' ability to buy the goods produced. And a country's cultural level is determined largely by the literacy of its main population segment, that is to say, its rural population.

A country's future, the trends and rates of its progressive development are inextricably linked with the future of its peasantry. While this proposition is unquestionable, it would be wrong to deduce from it that the peasantry, as such, is the leading force in the society's progressive advance. Its numerical preponderance does not automatically assign the peasantry that role: far from it. There are a number of reasons for this, which require investigation.

It should be pointed out, to begin with, that owing to the nature of agricultural production the farming population is scattered over the breadth and length of the land and nowhere concentrated in sufficient numbers to allow it to act as a unified social organism. A farmer's immediate, purely mundane interests tie him to his plot of land. Lack of even elementary mechanisation turns his work into heavy labour, exhausting labour if he is undernourished. Given a complete absence or insufficiency of mass means of communication the farmer interprets external events and phenomena (current national political events, for instance) in the light of his local interests, and his mental horizon is consequently closely circumscribed.

In almost all of the countries of Asia and Africa the peasantry had been for centuries deprived of any political rights whatsoever, living under one hierocratic system or other, which meant either the domination of feudalists or tribal chiefs or the rule of a centralised despotic government. The long years of foreign imperialist domination did little to change the situation. As a rule, the colonialists not only kept intact the privileged stratum of big landowners who subjected the peasants to cruel exploitation, but even used it as their social pillar. The peasants' humiliating condition did much to delay their spiritual growth, affected their outlook, made them the victims of superstitions, primitive ideas and prejudices, which the dominating elements deliberately fostered. The peasants thus remained, in their majority, an illiterate, inert mass.

The consequences are still visible: the level of political consciousness and general culture of the peasants in the developing countries is a good deal lower than that of the urban population. It is important to keep this in mind.

It must be said, however, that there has never been a time when the peasantry remained entirely passive. History offers many examples of mass peasant revolts provoked by



unbearable exploitation and violence at the hands of the privileged elements. Armed peasant uprisings against the feudalists were occasionally prolonged and involved vast areas. Such were the peasant wars in China, India, Iran and the Arab countries, which have had a strong influence on the general development of these lands. Owing, however, to that specific social propensity of the peasant—his attachment to the land—these peasant revolutionary movements usually fell short of expressing national interests, that is, the interests of the people as a whole. They were aimed, as a rule, against those who were responsible for the destitution and poverty of the peasants in a given region, mostly against the local feudalists, officials and money-lenders. Once a purely local success was scored, a peasant rebellion began to peter out: the rebels began to make tracks for home. That gave the exploiting elements their chance. Better organised, stronger militarily, and disposing of an apparatus of government, they rallied to crush the peasant movement.

In those rare cases when a peasant war brought victory and its leaders set up a new state organisation,<sup>1</sup> that state broke down later owing to the preoccupation of the peasants with purely local interests, which outweighed the interests of the state.

Moreover, the upper stratum of the peasant state soon fell victim to the typical sins of the feudal state organisation, set themselves apart from the mass of the population, built up a bureaucratic hierarchy headed by a supreme leader who attributed to himself the functions of a king and exacted deification and general veneration. In this way the leaders of the peasantry, ephemeral victors over the feudalists, themselves succumbed to the feudal ideology, which they proceeded to impose upon the people, thereby with their own hands undoing their efforts to level ownership of land and other means of production, though the idea of doing this had been the main motive force of the peasant revolutionary war.

The leaders of the Tai-ping rebellion proved no exception. They turned feudalist eventually and recreated, on a new basis, the social relations that the peasants had set out to destroy; and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that this

<sup>1</sup> An outstanding example was the Tai-ping state (T'ai-p'ing T'ien Kuo) in China, which lasted in the country's central provinces for several years in the middle of the 19th century.

peasant movement, most powerful of all, should have been finally crushed.

The peasant masses constitute a formidable revolutionary force. If, however, that force is to play a really important historic role it must not hold aloof but should act in concert with and under the direction of a segment of the society which exhibits a higher degree of unity and internal organisation, puts the common interests above local, and sets the movement national aims. In other words, the peasantry should accept the leadership of the town.

The peasantry may be said to be an army that can win only if it is under a competent command, which is generally provided by a different social milieu.

It must be emphasised again that the peasantry of Asia and Africa, being a victim of the various relics and vestiges of the middle ages—a direct heritage of their recent colonial past—constitutes a great reservoir of potential revolutionary energy. It remains to be seen how that energy will be used.

The urban population in developing countries is numerically considerably smaller than the rural. In many of these countries the towns stand like small oases in a boundless desert. Here, in the towns, however, gather the material and cultural goods and values drawn from all over the land. It is here that the production of manufactured goods develops and industries concentrate, ranging from the tiniest artisans' workshops, which are, naturally, the most numerous, all the way to industrial plants using modern machinery and equipment. A sizable share of the farmers' agricultural output is sold in the towns. And the town market is where the farmers, as indeed the rest of the population, buy the goods they consume and the goods they use in the process of production.

Here, in the towns, are to be found the schools that turn out personnel trained in the various trades and professions. Finally, towns are political centres that generally house both the local, urban administration and that of the adjacent, frequently quite extensive rural areas.

Throughout history, the formation of towns and urban populations has been a progressive process, mirroring the various important shifts in the economic and political life of the peoples. Towns have provided the unifying element in the development of countries, linking region with region, ensuring the exchange of material goods produced by those



who people these regions and the exchange of political, philosophical and religious views and ideas.

The geographical location of towns has generally been dictated by considerations of ease of communication with adjacent and relatively distant areas. Many towns that were originally centres of barter trade straddle cross-roads leading into the country's interior. Towns having access to the sea or situated on the banks of important navigable rivers have achieved higher levels of development because of greater facilities for the transportation of commodities or, at the instance of the rulers concerned, for the movement of troops or officials either for the purpose of administering the territories ruled or in order to conquer new lands.

It is a matter of historic record that conquerors have begun their campaigns with the seizure of towns, in recognition of their commanding position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the land. Often the towns thus seized served for long periods of time as the conquering power's main base, as in most of the lands of Asia and Africa overrun by the European colonialists.

Yet even in conditions of alien rule it is precisely in the towns that the social forces took shape which secretly prepared to fight for their national liberation. This was due more than anything else to the fact that here was to be found the most compact stratum of the local population, and the most closely-knit, owing to the objective conditions of urban living. Even under the iron heel of alien occupation towns remained the centres of a people's spiritual culture. An urban population, continuously made to feel the heavy hand of a colonial or some other kind of foreign administration, was in a position to give vent to popular indignation against the alien rule in a most tangible manner.

In virtue of the material and spiritual way of life of urban populations towns assumed the guiding role in the shaping of a people's national consciousness.

This, then, is what makes it incumbent on some one stratum of the urban population to take upon itself the leadership of the peasant masses to assure the success of a liberation movement.

Let us now try to identify the most important strata of urban populations.

Since a town is a centre of industrial production and commerce, its population is mainly composed of entrepreneurs, that is to say, proprietors of large, medium-sized and small

industrial and commercial enterprises, on the one hand, and those who actually produce material goods, that is to say, workers of various categories, and commercial employees. (Other strata of urban populations will be examined at a later point in this work.)

The two social strata or classes of the urban population are known, respectively, as the bourgeoisie and the working class.

In most developing countries there is continuous intercourse between the peasantry and these two most important strata of the urban population, the bourgeoisie and the working class.

"Bourgeoisie", as here used, denotes the local so-called national bourgeoisie, that is to say, the local capitalist entrepreneurs doing business in the field of industry, trade or finance.

The national bourgeoisie of the developing countries is not a closely-knit social entity. It is articulated into various social sub-strata, each with its own particular group interests, determined by its economic and general standing in the community.

Viewed as an entity, the national bourgeoisie stands for national (as distinguished from foreign-owned) commerce and industry—big, medium-sized and minor. The interests of these are by no means always identical.

The big bourgeoisie constitutes the right and most conservative group, inclined towards compromise with foreign imperialist forces and the big landowners at home. The reason is to be found in the generally high profits earned by the big bourgeoisie, which make it indifferent to any changes in the existing political and social conditions. Not even this big national bourgeoisie, however, are willing to submit to the domination of foreign capital. Their plans call for national development along "normal" capitalist lines, adequate modernisation of the industrial plant, and partnership with capitalist powers, including the former metropolises. They are dead set against any radical reforms, viewing these as a potential threat to their interests. They are particularly fearful of the growth of those democratic social forces which favour opting for the socialist programme. Concerned—ostensibly—with the freedom of private enterprise, the big bourgeoisie looks askance at the idea of establishing or strengthening the state sector in the national economy. In



some of the developing countries the big bourgeoisie shows a trend towards monopolising certain branches of the national economy, that is to say, towards concentrating control over certain branches of industrial production in the hands of several powerful capitalist trusts.

The middle national commercial and industrial bourgeoisie find themselves in different circumstances. They do not enjoy the same degree of economic stability. This makes them more vulnerable to the pressure of foreign capital and to the evils of economic dependence. Hence their much more active role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Because the domestic market is relatively restricted due to the low purchasing power of the great mass of the population (mainly peasant), the middle national bourgeoisie are impelled to support agrarian reform programmes. Unlike the big bourgeoisie, the middle and petty bourgeoisie favour creating a state sector within the national economy, in so far as that does not affect their immediate financial interests but helps strengthen their country's national independence and build up its defences.

Clearly, however, there is no Chinese wall between the big and middle national bourgeoisie. The latter, like the former, are all for strengthening capitalist principles and not a whit interested in socialist programmes. Hence, exposed as they are to constant pressure from the more conservative elements, they are all the more prone to vacillate. They are incapable, as a body, of implementing consistently any definite programme of progressive socio-economic reforms.

Rather unstable is the economic situation of the urban petty bourgeoisie. These, comprising mainly tradesmen and proprietors of small workshops, are a numerically important stratum of the population in most developing countries. This urban petty bourgeoisie are therefore not infrequently susceptible to the influence of various, often contradictory, social forces. Unlike the middle bourgeoisie, on the other hand, they are in continuous and rather close contact with the labouring and indigent strata of the population. This makes them receptive to radical ideas and often they themselves begin to impart progressive views to others. They become politically highly active along the whole front of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist struggle. Many such petty bourgeois are consistent advocates of radical social reforms,

restriction of private capitalist entrepreneurial activities, nationalisation of key industries, and democratic agrarian reform. Closely associated with the urban petty bourgeoisie are intellectuals, minor employees, army officers and students.

As a body, the national bourgeoisie is impelled by objective developments to favour the destruction of colonialism as an obstacle to the unrestricted entrepreneurial activities of local national capital. The formation of a sovereign national state does not resolve the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, for foreign capital will go to any extremes to maintain and expand its positions in the economies of developing countries. True, foreign capital does frequently alter its tactics in line with current political changes. It makes attempts to establish contacts with local entrepreneurs, to interest them in co-operation. It puts great faith in mixed companies, that is to say, companies with the participation of both national and foreign capital. Occasionally it operates exclusively in the guise of local national capital. In such cases foreign monopolies, operating under so dependable a cover, consider themselves much less vulnerable than otherwise. In winning the national bourgeoisie over to co-operation, foreign monopolies resort to the important tactic of holding up to the local entrepreneurs the bogey of the anti-capitalist consequences that may result from the growth of the democratic forces, and an upswing of the working-class movement, and of a possible change-over to socialist development. Posing as "friends" of the national bourgeoisie, these external imperialist forces seek to prevent united action on the part of the anti-imperialist forces in the developing countries, and provoke internal conflicts to weaken them, with the single all-important aim of creating conditions propitious for the restoration of colonial rule, even if not the old one.

Those members of the national bourgeoisie who are politically more far-sighted realise the dangers inherent in the manoeuvres of their imperialist "friends": they see through their game; and it would definitely be a mistake, therefore, to classify all of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries—its tendencies to vacillate notwithstanding—as allies or abettors of imperialism. The political attitudes of this very influential segment of society are determined, in the event, by objective factors. Imperialist policies in regard to the developing countries, however



camouflaged they may be, remain basically predatory. They are directed against the national interests of the peoples that have won their independence. And they are directed also against the independent development of national industry, trade, finance and credit systems. It follows, then, that these imperialist policies largely affect the crucial interests of the national bourgeoisie as well.

It would be equally rash both to overestimate the revolutionary, anti-imperialist potentialities of the national bourgeoisie—to idealise it, so to speak—and to completely rule out its participation in the national anti-imperialist struggle.

A role apart in the national-liberation movement and progressive development of the countries in question is the role of the *workers*. The working class of the countries of Asia and Africa is relatively unimportant numerically; but its role and significance are determined by factors other than numbers.

When political independence was still to be won, that is to say, during the colonial period, in most of the Asian and African countries the workers formed that segment of society which, more than the others, felt the sting of double oppression: national and social. The plight of the indigenous worker was always incomparably worse, both economically and in respect of his legal status, than the condition of even the least skilled and lowest-paid worker in the metropolises. It will be recalled that in the colonies the early capitalist proprietors of industrial plants and other businesses were generally foreigners. Taking advantage of their dominant position in the colonies, these capitalists ran their enterprises in typical colonial fashion. Production managers, foremen, and highly skilled workers were whites, as a rule. They were the "masters". They were relatively well-paid and enjoyed certain privileges. The rest of the labour force, that is to say, the main mass of the workers, were recruited among the local population, chiefly impoverished small artisans, or local peasants driven by hunger from their villages. In countries where the colonial regime was particularly cruel the colonialists used to round up the local poor and put them to work in their plants, furnishing them with quarters remindful of prison conditions. Their pay was a fraction of that of the foreigners, their working day as long as the owner made it. Labour safety was non-existent.

In this manner workers in colonial countries were put

through a rapid course of harsh training in colonial oppression, exploitation and deprivation of rights. In these conditions the nascent indigenous working class could not but realise the urgent necessity of freeing their country from colonial slavery.

No interests of private ownership, no proprietary psychology exert any restraining influence on the uncompromising stand taken by the working class against the imperialists. Indeed, they have only the shackles of inequality and cruel exploitation to lose. The tasks of social liberation are closely intertwined with those of national liberation. The concentration of workers in industrial, transportation and other facilities helps develop in them comparatively rapidly a realisation of a community of interests, a spirit of solidarity and mutual aid. Industrial production, as such, facilitates worker organisation and promotes class consciousness. It should not be surprising, therefore, that in many Asian and African countries the working class is led by force of circumstances to become the most steadfast and undesigning defenders of the national interests.

Incidentally, many of these workers are farm hands from plantations and large estates. Very like them are those farmers whom poverty has driven to work for hire in addition to tilling their own tiny plots.

Since the industrial labour force is recruited mainly from the peasantry, urban workers in developing countries keep in close touch with the rural population and its needs and are always ready, as a rule, to back the peasants in their struggle against the various relics of feudalism, which the domestic and external foes of social progress and greater independence find to be of aid.

Inasmuch as statistical data are unreliable and criteria vary from country to country it is difficult to quote accurate figures on the numerical growth of the labour force in the countries of Asia and Africa. That it has been growing in recent years, however, is an undeniable fact.

In India, which is one of the biggest Asian countries, the number of workers engaged in industry, transportation and on the plantations has topped 10,000,000 (1965 data). While this is a relatively modest share of the total population, available data indicate that this labour force has been consistently growing, largely owing to the development of the state sector of the national economy.



Most hired workers in Asia and Africa work in plants of relatively modest size. This makes for difficulty of organisation and much lower living standards on the whole. Those who work in small and quite insignificant enterprises find it harder, being widely scattered, to fight for fairer wages and shorter hours with the traditional weapon of strikes. This has also a detrimental effect on the political activity of the working class.

On the whole, however, the strike movement in the countries of Asia and Africa shows a tendency to grow. In developing industrial production, private entrepreneurs usually try to increase their profits by reducing workers' wages to a bare minimum, forcing them to work in unspeakable conditions, and using the labour of women and children.

The working class of the countries under discussion has attained to nowhere near the high level of consolidation that is characteristic of the proletariat of the industrially developed capitalist states. This is particularly true of industrial workers. In most of these countries they are still numerically quite few as compared with the other social groups. In some of the African countries the workers have only just begun to take shape as a distinct segment of the working people, and this is one of the features indicative of the socio-economic backwardness of these countries and of the inadequate development of their productive forces. Surviving relics of archaic social relations (tribalism, feudalism) retard the development of towns and expansion of industrial production. That is what accounts for the peculiar structure of the working class in these countries. Most of the workers are employed in the service industries and agriculture, rather than in industrial plants. Plantation workers form a very considerable part of the working class. Seasonal occupations are largely prevalent, workers periodically migrating from the towns back to their villages. Many workers are closely linked with the peasantry not only through their peasant origin but also because their families continue to live in the villages and till the soil. Both seasonal employment and labour turnover are generally attributable to the fact that local workers lack special training in any particular trades. They are mostly employed in heavy physical labour, performed under special overseers who often resort to brutal measures, including whipping, to drive and punish the workers.

Semi-feudal methods of exploitation of the workers are typical of many Asian and African countries. One such method is the recruitment of workers by special middlemen who extort all the money a man has for getting him a job, while drawing a handsome commission from the entrepreneurs for providing them with the cheapest possible labour. Taking advantage of the desperate plight of the poor in areas stricken by natural disasters, famines or epidemics, the middlemen do not stop at buying minors, especially girls, from their parents in order to put them to work in urban factories, where they are brutally exploited and forced to live in conditions resembling those of gaol inmates. Their exploitation is reminiscent of feudal methods: thus, they aren't given their full pay, and the nature of their occupation subjects them to social discrimination; all of which adds to their distress. Deprived of all rights, they receive cruel treatment. Protest, in whatever form, brings punishment. Employment of women and children, widely practised, makes matters worse. Women and minors are paid less than the usual very low wages, and this availability of cheap labour enables the capitalists to reduce wage levels even more, as well as to keep the workers in constant terror of dismissal.

All these factors make it difficult for the working class to assume the role of a leading social force in the countries of Asia and Africa, and retard the process of its consolidation. On the other hand, these same factors contribute to the growth of a justifiable feeling of indignation among the working masses and become the source of a mounting social protest. While possibly purely spontaneous in the beginning, in time this protest assumes increasingly organised forms. This pattern of brutal exploitation and rightlessness and social discrimination characteristic of many Asian and African countries lends any manifestations of protest by the workers a specifically political colouring. In fighting for an improvement of their economic conditions the workers demand a modification of the social conditions that are responsible for the worst features of their exploitation and the abolition of a social system which has outlived itself. Inasmuch as the social and political backwardness of by far the most Asian and African countries is rooted in colonialism, the working class—for all of its relative numerical and organisational weakness—has invariably been, as we have already seen, in



the forefront of the struggle for national independence and against the imperialists and their local agents.

Organisation and united action are the main weapons of the working class. The workers' traditional tactic is the strike: an organised joint action intended to bring pressure to bear on the entrepreneur in order to compel him to grant the demands of the labour force.

That this specifically proletarian tactic is finding ever wider use in Asia and Africa may be seen from the development of the workers' movement in the countries concerned. There is a wholly erroneous impression in certain quarters that workers in these countries are economically much better off than the peasantry. Those who entertain this quite groundless notion are occasionally led to draw the far-reaching inference that the peasantry, precisely because they are worse off, are a more revolutionary force than the working class. This theory is also completely groundless.

It is based on the assumption that the worker is economically better off. But in just what way is he better off? Even the poorest farmer owns a plot of land which he tills. The worker, however, owns no means of production. To keep alive he must sell his power to work, his only possession. He is wholly dependent on certain circumstances which he can neither change nor otherwise influence. Before he gets a job there must be a demand for his power to work, a buyer willing to pay him for his work. The rate of pay for the work he does, however, and the conditions in which he works are established entirely by his employer, the entrepreneur, and not by the worker.

It is sometimes argued that a worker's real wages in some countries are greater than a farmer's income. That holds true, however, only when there is a substantial demand for labour power in a given country or region, which may be purely temporary, or when the workers who demand wages higher than a farmer's meagre income are highly organised. In the latter case the only possible correct inference would be that the workers constitute a more active social force than the peasantry.

Despite the many obvious features that characterise the working class as a social force fighting more consistently than any others against imperialism and capitalism for the complete liberation of their country, the workers do not yet constitute, at the present time, the leading element in the

national-liberation movement of the Asian, African and Latin American countries; and this for a number of reasons. In some of the countries of Asia, and even more so of Africa, the working class is still in the phase of formation. In other countries, where the level of industrial development accounts for the presence of a numerically fully adequate labour force, the workers often still lack the necessary degree of organisation as also experience and competent leadership. In many instances the workers cannot even read or write. All these factors constitute serious obstacles to the workers taking in their hands the leadership of the national-liberation movement as a whole.

A factor to be taken into account in this respect is the high degree of political activity on the part of the national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, who have both the cadres and political experience and are therefore better able, as well as more willing, to assume leadership in the national struggle against imperialism. We have had occasion to mention that the national bourgeoisie is prone to vacillate. The quality of its leadership suffers because of this propensity; it lacks the required firmness and singleness of purpose. It is this that has led to the passing of political leadership in some Asian and African countries into the hands of progressive intellectuals, who, in addition to following an anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist policy more consistently than the national bourgeoisie, have been able to offer a sufficiently explicit national programme of non-capitalist development. The working class of a given developing country may not yet be the leader of the national anti-imperialist front; but that will not preclude its taking over that leadership in the future.

Enough factual evidence exists to warrant the assertion that political independence would never have been won in quite a few Asian and African countries if it hadn't been for the working class and the determined fight put up by it against the colonialists. While the peasantry constitutes the national-colonial revolution's main force, acting either on its own initiative or under the guidance of other social strata, the working class constitutes, in most cases, the fighting revolutionary army's shock force, which suffers the heaviest losses, but without whose courageous efforts no victory can be won.

A flourishing stratum in most of the countries of Asia and many African lands are artisans and small shopkeepers.



It has already been mentioned here that the urban petty bourgeoisie may be regarded as the extreme left wing of the national bourgeoisie in close contact with the working strata. Closest to this urban petty bourgeoisie from the standpoint of origin is the *intelligentsia*.

The intelligentsia comprises teachers, lawyers, physicians, minor officials, students and army officers. This segment of the population has no sufficiently distinct class interests and is extremely active in the anti-imperialist movement. It is easy to see why this is so. Under a colonial regime the local national intelligentsia either finds very restricted opportunities for applying its skills or else is simply unable to make an independent living. Before the winning of political independence, the apparatus of government was staffed mainly by colonial officials from the metropolis. Local members of the intelligentsia had to be satisfied with minor posts in the civil service.

It was only natural that the national intelligentsia should take a most active part in the liberation struggle: only victory over the colonialists and the achievement of national independence would make for large-scale employment of national cadres in the intellectual sphere and assure them a livelihood.

An event in the history of the national-liberation struggle in a number of countries has been the prominent role played for the first time by members of the *military intelligentsia*. The officer corps in developing countries comprises mainly persons who have received a military education in the metropolies. This moulds to some extent the political sympathies and disposition of many officers. Service in the colonial forces under foreign command, however, exercises a dual, contradictory influence.

Native officers were keenly aware of their underprivileged position, the necessity of taking orders from foreigners who often took no pains to conceal their feelings of disdain. These native officers of foreign colonial forces enjoyed no prospects of advancement in the service, because all higher posts of command and the corresponding ranks were reserved exclusively for the colonialists.

And, lastly, the very use of colonial armies as an instrument of imperialist policy could not but contribute to a nascent national consciousness among native officers. During the two world wars important contingents of colonial troops

were sent to fronts far removed from their homelands. This too, of course, served in a measure to broaden the outlook of officers and men since it gave them a chance to observe how people lived in other countries and see wherein the imperialist powers were strong and where they were weak and vulnerable.

These officers could not but share in the growing objection to colonial rule. Secret circles were organised, in which political issues were discussed, and the feeling grew stronger that national freedom would have to be fought for.

The system of military organisation, as such, favoured conspiracy, effective co-operation, and contact among the revolution-minded officers.

Secret patriotic circles of members of the military intelligentsia became important in many Asian and African colonies as the most efficiently organised nuclei of the anti-imperialist movement.

On the other hand, such officer organisations were necessarily somewhat exclusive and lacked, as a rule, adequate contact with other population groups. Their activities were consequently often of a purely conspirative nature. In planning armed action against the imperialists or their agents from among the local privileged strata, the officers relied on their own ability instead of drawing the masses into the national-liberation struggle. This has sometimes foredoomed such revolutionary action to failure, for the comparative fewness of the conspirators made it easy for the imperialists to defeat them. In other cases, even when such military plots were successful, they produced a certain confusion and vacillation among the people. Victorious, the revolutionary officers did not immediately find the strong local social support they needed and found themselves confronted with serious difficulties; all of which undoubtedly played into the hands of the imperialists and their agents and threatened a re-establishment of colonial rule.

When national independence had been won by most of the countries of Asia and Africa and formation of national armed forces had begun, the role of the officer corps became, in a sense, even more important. Foreigners holding high ranks began gradually to be replaced with native officers, even when they signified their willingness to stay in the service.



Thus the army became an important pillar of the national government. And much depended, henceforward, on the reliability of that pillar.

Attitudes differed, to be sure, within the officer corps in regard to the role and nature of a national state and the prospects of its development. Those officers who had not only received their professional training under the colonialists but had also come to share certain of their political views and sympathies assumed a conservative posture, declaring against any democratisation of the state and against drawing the people at large into the business of government. The feeling of caste exclusiveness to which this element of the officer corps was naturally predisposed was all the stronger because, by token of their social origin, they were closely linked with the privileged groups, such as the big estate-owners, high officials and aristocrats.

These privileged classes were intent on establishing their undisputed control of state government, in their own interests, and therefore determined to maintain their control over the army. To this end they encouraged anti-democratic attitudes among the officer element in question, setting the armed forces over against the masses, their political associations and other departments of the administration.

It is hardly surprising, in the circumstances, that in some of the Asian and African countries the army, led by this officer element, became an instrument in the hands of the reactionary forces and operated anti-democratic putsches in the interests of the privileged minority.

A considerable segment of the officer corps remained un-receptive to anti-democratic feelings, however, for many officers did not belong to the privileged groups mentioned above. Many were linked with the working population, urban and rural. These patriotic officers were active in the national-liberation movement and had no intention of putting up with the prospect of their country remaining socially, economically and culturally backward for years to come. Many were concerned about the ways and means of strengthening the national state and speeding up its progressive development.

Being more efficiently organised than any other elements of the national intelligentsia, it was precisely the officer corps in a number of countries that denounced the avarice of the privileged groups and initiated far-reaching social

and economic reforms. Officers of more radical tendencies demanded urgent measures to deal with the cupidity of a big bourgeoisie completely indifferent to national interests, and to eradicate corruption among the old officialdom. In some instances such action on the part of the officer corps, with or without support from the people at large, engendered sharp internal conflicts. It is a matter of record that in some of the Asian and African countries the officers have not hesitated to oust statesmen who had either compromised themselves or failed to show sufficient energy, and to assume full political responsibility for the government of the country. In such cases the officers had acted as representatives of the great majority of a people determined that no avaricious private interests should interfere with the progressive development of the national state.

The officers as a body are a special segment of the national intelligentsia, more efficiently organised than its other segments; but, as it is, are incapable of independently designing national policy for any length of time. An army inevitably becomes a policy tool in the hands of some important social stratum or class. That explains, in the event, why in some countries the army has been an active revolutionary factor, and in others a reactionary one.

Those leaders of the patriotic, revolutionary officers, who see farther ahead, are fully aware that the army, acting alone, cannot guarantee the successful achievement of progressive political aims. It must find sufficient support among the people, the working stratum of the population, without whose active help it cannot achieve any tangible results in the struggle for complete national independence and social progress. This point is illustrated by the experience of the United Arab Republic, Burma and certain other countries.

There is yet another weighty factor that must be taken into account if a proper evaluation of the profound social changes currently taking place in Asia and Africa is to be arrived at. The national intelligentsia (the military included), not being a strictly defined class such as are the basic social classes, namely, the peasantry, bourgeoisie and workers, does not adhere unswervingly to any single ideology, adopted once and for all. Their political and philosophic views are subject to occasional substantial changes and exhibit new trends under the impact of changing circumstances.



We have seen, for example, that in the United Arab Republic the nation's progressive leaders, who were already closely linked with the army, became gradually convinced that the national bourgeoisie<sup>1</sup> were unable to control their avaricious instincts. This pursuit of wealth, this urge to grab as much as possible in complete disregard of state interests or the need to strengthen the national economy, were characteristic of the activities of important private capital. In many cases this practice went hand in hand with the subversive efforts of foreign imperialist forces to dislocate the economy of the United Arab Republic—an independent national state—with a view to re-establishing themselves in their old position of dominance. These developments showed the national bourgeoisie to be extremely unstable and its influential circles definitely reluctant to sacrifice their ownership privileges for the sake of satisfying the urgent needs of state and people—to the very understandable disappointment of those of the nation's leaders who had initially entertained definite expectations of possible joint effort on behalf of social progress. There followed an evolution of the political and general philosophic conceptions held by the U.A.R. leadership, who worked out and started implementing a programme of socio-economic measures designed to curb private capital, emphasise the planning and regulation element in the management of the national economy, and strengthen by all available means the public state sector of that economy.

The U.A.R. leadership called upon the working people, the workers and peasants, to take an active part in carrying out the programme of national construction. It was found essential to set up a political organisation that should reflect the will of the population at large. The consistent development of an increasingly definite, explicit programme of social construction bears witness to the fact that a serious shift has taken place in the political thinking of the United Arab Republic leadership, a shift entirely in line with the national interests of the country and the aspirations of its people.

We have cited a case where there has been a gradual but decisive shift in the right direction, for the better, so to speak. A look at the historic record reveals, however, that

<sup>1</sup> Notably its most influential conservative right wing which reflects the position of big private enterprise.

regressive processes are equally possible, when the progressive views formerly espoused cede ground to views of a reactionary nature. Whenever there is a trend on the part of the governing circles to wall themselves off from the masses and rely exclusively on the privileged strata of society there follows practically every time a revision of political and sociological views, a turn, so to speak, for the worse. In parallel with this the democratic elements are forcibly suppressed, as a rule, progressive organisations are banned and their leaders are subjected to persecution. In Indonesia, for example, when the reactionary trend in politics gained the day there began a wholesale merciless extermination of political opponents and a ban was introduced not only on socio-economic literature of a progressive nature but even on fiction, including classical works ideologically "subversive" in the view of the ruling circles currently in power.

History teaches us that social progress requires a democratisation of the political and social system of government and the participation of the masses in the business of government. Social progress is in the interests of the people. Accordingly, there can be no social progress without the people's participation, behind their back.

How democratisation may be accomplished is, of course, another thing. That depends on the conditions prevailing in a given country, the level of socio-economic development it has reached, and the literacy of its population. The political regimes of the countries of Asia and Africa differ greatly among themselves. There are countries where the democratic forces can be an active factor of political life, take part in state leadership or exercise important influence thereon; and there are others where the democratic forces have little or no opportunity for such activity. It has been established that the greatest threat to national independence is posed by an artificially created disunity among the population, always present wherever political leadership has been monopolised by some one relatively restricted social group. Such a concentration of power places a minority in a privileged position, which in turn leads to its artificial isolation, precluding the fullest possible utilisation of the creative energy latent in the people to achieve social progress.

The foreign imperialist forces are set on preventing the developing countries from achieving national consolidation. Internal friction tends to weaken the new national states and



often furnishes a convenient pretext for foreign intervention in their internal affairs.

Just what degree and what kind of unity of all democratic forces can be achieved, one may well ask, when the specific interests of the heterogeneous strata of the society are often contradictory and prone to clash? This question requires close study.

It is a matter of fact that these various social strata do have a common interest that tends to unite them, all the diversity of their individual political and economic interests notwithstanding.

This is, above all, a desire to maintain and strengthen national independence. That there must be no re-establishment of colonial rule is in the interests not only of the masses, the working people (peasants, workers, craftsmen and intellectuals), but also, in consequence of certain objective reasons, of the national bourgeoisie, with the exception of a relatively unimportant corrupted element directly connected with foreign capital. At the same time it is evident that national independence can be enduring only if state power is based on the people's support, in a measure sufficient, at any rate, to stand up to any external threat, any hostile move, that is to say, on the part of the imperialist forces. It follows that even socially dissimilar forces can find unity in a programme based on the defence of national sovereignty and on the recognition of the necessity of supporting the kind of state government that pursues a progressive policy as an indispensable condition of the people's support.

There are bound to be differences of opinion, of course, when it comes to determining the concrete nature of such state policy and the scope of progressive measures adequate to meet the needs and wishes of the people at large.

Debate on these problems could proceed, nevertheless, within the framework of a certain amount of co-operation among the various social strata, based on a common anti-imperialist stand. Far-sighted leaders of the national bourgeoisie, for all their predilection for the capitalist principles of private enterprise and freedom of exploitation, cannot fail to see that serious urgent measures are called for if the new national states are to overcome their economic backwardness. So long as a developing country remains subject to the anarchy of the capitalist market, where the leading monopolist cartels of the imperialist powers call the tune

and virtually run the show, their newly-won national independence will never be out of danger. Even granting a considerable growth of the average annual increment of industrial production in the developing countries since their achievement of political independence, it will take them all of a hundred years, at the present rate, to catch up with the leading capitalist states in respect of the total volume of industrial production. Neither the working class nor the propertied classes, that is, the national bourgeoisie, will ever be willing to accept the prospect of lagging behind for so long a span, which would actually mean continued deprivation of the developing countries of equal rights. There are thus objective grounds to justify a search for more effective and speedier ways of closing the gap and achieving economic independence. And there is an objective possibility of co-operating to implement a programme of economic and cultural development.

Let us emphasise once more that the various socially dissimilar patriotic elements can co-operate fruitfully only if they adopt a democratic approach implying actual equality of rights for all participants in the anti-imperialist struggle: any dictate, any monopoly of political power must be ruled out.

This implies a coalition or union of patriotic forces capable of using the creative initiative of the masses to ensure enduring political and economic independence. It stands to reason that such an alliance of dissimilar social elements cannot be a dictatorship of any one of these elements and that any despotic methods of state leadership are out of the question.

On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the tremendous power of the opposition to progressive national policies offered by the foreign imperialist forces and their reactionary agents inside the developing countries (former feudalists, various corrupted elements, etc.). The state leadership, therefore, faced with the continuous possibility of various subversive action, including coups-d'état, must wield great power and stand ready to nip any such action in the bud. The stronger the democratic quality of the regime, the better able, naturally, that regime will be to cope with any reactionary challenge by invoking the support of the people.

Speaking of today's reactionary opposition in the developing countries, we should attempt to identify the social ele-



ments on whose support it depends. Different though they were, the agrarian reforms carried through in most of these countries upset the old system of privileged estate proprietorship: the estate-owners ceased being the dominant force practically everywhere. The sole exception was a small group of states such as Saudi Arabia, whose feudal theocracies have given the American monopolies a free hand in their oilfields and are in open alliance with the foreign imperialist forces.

The landlord element has not disappeared without a trace, however, nor has it dissolved among the other social elements. Pre-capitalist forms of land tenure continue to exist in many countries, though on a smaller scale. As a rule, land reform laws fix the maximum area of land that may be owned by private persons. These figures substantially exceed the size of average peasant holdings in the countries concerned and sanction the continued existence of small and medium-sized landed estates. In the Philippines, for example, the maximum area for privately owned land has been fixed at 75 hectares, while the average size of peasant holdings is 3 hectares.

This means that landlord estates continue to exist. Their economic importance has diminished, however, and this, together with the deprivation of the landlord class of its political privileges, means that it has forfeited its role as the main support of domestic reaction. Owing to a preponderance of the national bourgeoisie in the governments of most of the countries of Asia and Africa it became possible, *inter alia*, to bring economic pressure to bear on the now weakened landlord class with a view to transforming it gradually into the bourgeois variety of entrepreneurs. In many developing countries the old agrarian system of economy, largely semi-feudal, is ceding ground to a bourgeois economy, largely capitalist, with its typical pattern of employment of labour, financing of production and marketing of farm produce.

This serves to strengthen the political and economic positions of the national bourgeoisie both in town and country. It is making its influence increasingly felt by the peasantry, which is going through the process of social stratification. The increasing prosperity of the well-to-do peasantry is conducive to an expansion of the political influence of the bourgeoisie.

The diminishing importance of the landlords (semi-feudal landowners) is paralleled by the increasing importance of the right-wing national bourgeoisie, that is to say, the big bourgeoisie, which becomes the basic reactionary force, around which rally all the anti-socialist and in fact all the anti-democratic elements. India is a good example, for here the increasing activity of the right-wing, reactionary political groups openly in favour of close contacts with foreign imperialist forces is in complete accord with the position of the national big bourgeoisie, which opposes any at all radical social reforms.

Those countries, especially on the continent of Africa, where class stratification is not yet sufficiently distinct, face a different situation. Here progress is delayed, as before, by those elements which represent social relations of the archaic order, such as the former tribal chiefs, the old civil servants with their old loyalty to the colonialists, all sorts of profiteers making a living as brokers in deals with foreigners, etc.



## Chapter Three

### MODERN COLONIALISM

Writings on post-war developments in Asia, Africa and Latin America reveal an occasional tendency to make no distinction between the terms "colonial system" and "colonialism" and to equate these two concepts. And if the colonial system has ceased to exist, so, it is argued, by the same token, has colonialism. Actually, however, the collapse of the colonial system does not by any means signify the end of colonialism. The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have seen how, in their own case, their newly-achieved political independence and the termination of their colonial regimes have failed to protect them either from foreign exploitation or from systematic and often extremely rude foreign interference in their internal affairs. This exploitation and this interference, effected by methods which the imperialists endeavour to attune to present-day international conditions, form the content of modern colonialism or neo-colonialism.

For the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America colonialism, that is to say, the policy of subjugating and exploiting other countries and nations, has been and continues to be enemy number one.

The aims and methods of colonialism have grown substantially more complicated than they were when the countries in question were caught in the tight noose of the colonial system. Today no imperialist power can any longer establish its direct political authority in another country and openly despoil it of its material wealth without any visible compensation. Modern colonialism has to be satisfied with indirect control of the political, economic and spiritual life of other lands. It endeavours to guide the evolution of the radical social changes now in progress in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in a direction that suits its purposes. Hence, neo-colonialism differs from traditional

colonialism in that its forms and methods are more diverse and its content more complex.

Nevertheless, the one and the other are essentially the same. And that explains why the neo-colonialists constantly borrow from the arsenal of their predecessors. Flexible manoeuvring and the use of agents, so characteristic of neo-colonialism, alternate with violent frontal assaults on the national interests and sovereignty of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, actions, in other words, reminiscent of the blackest episodes of the times of colonial conquests.

While the colonial system is generally falling apart, there are still some areas left whose population does not enjoy national independence and carries the yoke of foreign rule.

Table 1

Remnants of the Old Colonial Empires<sup>1</sup>

Metropolies	Colonies	
	Population (in thousands)	Area (in thousands sq. km.)
Great Britain . . . . .	13,502	2,032.9
France . . . . .	1,360	143.4
U.S.A. . . . .	2,768	13.2
Holland . . . . .	486	144
Portugal . . . . .	12,922	2,086
Spain . . . . .	480	295.7
South African Republic . . . . .	534	824
Australia, New Zealand and under "Joint Administration" <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	2,064	490.3
Total	34,116	6,029.5

<sup>1</sup> Area as at close of 1965; population according to 1960-1964 estimates.

<sup>2</sup> I. e., territories ruled jointly by mutual agreement by two metropolies.

At present the area of these last remaining imperialist colonies totals 5,000,000 sq. kilometres or less than 4 per cent of the globe's territory, with a population of 37,000,000, which makes up 1.1 per cent of the earth's population. These remaining colonies are scattered all over the world, serving the colonialists as bases in their struggle against the national-liberation movement in adjacent countries and regions.



Portugal has been plundering and oppressing colonial peoples for more than five centuries. Her colonies total over 2,000,000 sq. kilometres, thus covering an area more than 20 times greater than her metropolitan area. In 1951 an amendment to her constitution turned all her colonies into "overseas provinces".

The Portuguese colonialists love to dwell on their special historic rights to their colonies. The governor-general of one Portuguese colony made the following remark to John Phillips, a British journalist: "We Portuguese are in a very special position in Africa: we were the first of the European nations to make a home—we shall be the last to leave—because much of our blood, down the centuries, has mingled with that of Africa. We belong to Africa and these parts of Africa belong to us."<sup>1</sup>

The truth about the actual state of affairs in Angola and Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea, San Thomé and Príncipe has been leaking out bit by bit despite the efforts of the Lisbon government to suppress it. In 1905, H. W. Nevinson, a British journalist, travelled in "Portuguese" Africa. His book, *A Modern Slavery*, revealed the large-scale use of forced labour in conditions hardly discernible from slavery.<sup>2</sup> Fifty years later another student of Africa, Basil Davidson, made a similar trip and published, in 1955, a book in which he showed that the plight of the native population of the Portuguese colonies remained basically unchanged. In Angola, he wrote, nearly half the labour force (379,000 men) were engaged in forced labour.<sup>3</sup>

The British weekly *New Statesman* gives the following excerpt from a report of Henrique Galvão, who had been sent by the Portuguese Government to investigate labour conditions in the colonies: "In some ways the situation (in Angola.—*The Authors*.) is worse than simple slavery. Under slavery, after all, the native is bought as an animal: his owner prefers him to remain as fit as a horse or an ox. Yet here the native is not bought—he is hired from the state, although he is called a free man. And his employer

cares little if he sickens or dies, once he is working, because when he sickens or dies his employer will simply ask for another."<sup>1</sup>

In their efforts to wall off the territories under their rule from the logical process of disintegration and collapse of the colonial system the Portuguese authorities are resorting to harsh measures of repression, terror, complete isolation and planned forcible assimilation. Their efforts to perpetuate slavery and barbarism are destined to remain fruitless, however; for the seeming "tranquillity" in the Portuguese colonies is coming to an end. The national-liberation movement in Angola and the other Portuguese colonies is mounting: it is a natural reaction of a frustrated people to the colonialists' efforts to run the country their own way.

What is left of the British empire is rapidly falling apart. Virtually only the so-called minor colonies remain under direct British rule, their population totalling around 17 millions. Still held by Britain, by dint of occasional violent measures, are Oman, Bahrein and a few other principalities in South Arabia. Strategically situated and rich in strategic raw materials, these territories are being used as sites for air and naval bases. The military base at Aden, also British-ruled until recently, was frequently used for strikes against the national-liberation movement in South Arabia. It served as a base for armed incursions into Oman and as a threat to Yemen; and armed forces were dispatched from here to Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, allegedly to maintain law and order.

British colonial policies have been held up as proof of the argument that the policies and aims of colonial powers differ. "British political aims in West Africa are in complete contrast to those pursued by Spain, Portugal and France," writes R. J. Harrison Church. "These three powers have sought to attach their territories in a close political and economic union with the mother country. Portuguese territories

<sup>1</sup> *New Statesman*, Aug. 11, 1961, p. 176. The report also stated that "only the dead are really exempt from compulsory labour", that the plight of the Africans was much worse than plain slavery, that in some enterprises mortality among the workers was as high as 30 per cent, but there was never any difficulty about recruitment of replacements. See *The Observer*, Jan. 29, 1967, p. 7. Captain Henrique Galvão was sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment for circulating his highly critical report. See Anthony Sampson, *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>1</sup> John Phillips, *Kwame Nkrumah and the Future of Africa*, London, 1960, p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> See Anthony Sampson, *Common Sense About Africa*, New York, 1960, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> Basil Davidson, "The African Awakening"; *New Statesman*, Aug. 11, 1961, p. 176.



are Provinces of Overseas Portugal, and the French ones are Territories of Overseas France. The culture and outlook of these mother countries are diffused widely, so that as many Africans as possible shall become assimilated or at least closely associated and identified with the governing power."<sup>1</sup>

There do exist certain differences, admittedly, in the policies pursued by the colonial powers. The author just quoted is quite right in pointing out that the French colonialists had tried to make Frenchmen out of Africans. For seven and a half years they carried on a war of annihilation in Algeria in order to turn Algerians into Frenchmen and Algeria into a part of France. This is essentially the same policy of assimilation that underlies the so-called French Community that was intended to present the old French colonial empire in a new guise. Great Britain, on the other hand, laid greater stress on establishing broad economic relations with her colonies and, rallying elements of the local population to her support, granted the local rulers a certain amount of independence, in line with her policy of "indirect administration".

The differences and special features of the imperialist powers' colonial policies concern particulars only, not their main substance or essence.

While the old colonial empires may be crumbling in this post-war period, it does not necessarily follow that the imperialists are not endeavouring to build, on their ruins or in their immediate vicinity, new *points d'appui* for their power and influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States of America has been especially active in this respect; with the result that several countries have become virtually territories occupied by the present-day American colonialists.

Let us examine a few typical cases.

The dedicated national-liberation fight waged by the peoples of Indo-China put an end to French colonial dominance in that region of South-East Asia. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China formalised the termination of French colonial rule, *inter alia*, in South Vietnam. The American imperialists, however, were already on the spot by then, having helped the French colonialists fight their "dirty war" against the Vietnamese people, and, taking advantage of the French defeat, established their own con-

<sup>1</sup> R. J. Harrison Church, *West Africa. A Study of the Environment and of Man's Use of It*, London, New York, Toronto, 1957, p. 181.

trol over the land, to the exclusion of all other powers. Onerous agreements on military aid imposed on the puppet South-Vietnamese regime brought a flood of American advisers, who drifted into key positions in the country's army, administration and economy.

Between 1955 and 1962 around \$2,500 million were paid by Washington into the South-Vietnamese exchequer, over four-fifths of this being used to finance the formation and equipment of a local army that took its orders from the Americans. By mid-1962 the armed forces of South Vietnam numbered 400,000 effectives, to a population of 14,000,000! Militarisation on such a scale was more than the country's weak economy could bear, so that before long the puppet state found itself wholly dependent on the United States in well-nigh every respect.

This American operation on the peninsula of Indo-China was, to all intents and purposes, a modern version of a colonial "grab". Subsequent developments have shown what such colonial operations lead to in our day: the United States, once definitely in the saddle, launched a war of aggression in the country, which has latterly been the chief source of international tension.

When the Chiang Kai-shek clique, ousted by the Chinese people's revolution, fled to Taiwan, the American imperialists used its flight as a pretext for occupying that island, even though it was an integral part of China. Having undertaken to provide the Chiang clique with bed and board, the United States turned Taiwan into a military camp, a mainstay of the Chinese counter-revolution, a kind of outpost of international reaction in South-East Asia.

In South Korea the American imperialists have made themselves very much at home. Here, their dominance is based both on economic expansion and on the presence of a 60,000-strong U.S. army. The privileges enjoyed by the American imperialists in South Korea are legally based on the "mutual defence" treaty concluded by Washington with the Seoul puppet regime immediately following the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea in 1953. A South Korean Army, 600,000 strong, equipped and trained by the Americans, serves the Pentagon as cannon fodder. On orders from Washington South Korean units are dispatched to South Vietnam, to take part in the Americans' predatory colonial war.



International factors must still be reckoned with, however, and the imperialists are therefore constrained, in the cases mentioned above as well as in others, to maintain indigenous governments in the lands they conquer. The flag remains the same, but the modern imperialist yoke is none the lighter for the peoples of the dependent lands to bear.

The facts recounted above make us wonder whether, by any chance, the old, legally formalised colonial empires are not being replaced—in our present-day world—by new, “invisible” empires. Is it possible, in other words, that the elimination of colonial regimes is nothing more than a replacement of one form of colonialist domination with another?

If we are to find the right answer, we should recall just what are the historic forces that determine the current situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the days when imperialism held undisputed sway on the three continents, if a metropolitan power lost its grasp or influence, it simply meant that another imperialist marauder stepped into its shoes. That is what happened, for example, after the first world war, when the colonies of defeated Germany were taken over by the victorious imperialist powers. Similarly, while the colonial empires still existed, American imperialist power reached a point where the United States, using its expanding trade and export of capital as a lever, contrived to seize very strong positions in various colonies and dependencies which it turned into bastions of American colonialism, though without hoisting the U.S. colours.

Nowadays, however, when socialism and the national-liberation movement are increasingly coming to be the weightiest international factors determining development trends in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the situation has radically changed. There is no longer any question of colonial powers, forced out of the picture, handing their positions over to some other colonialists. The national liberation is forcing colonialism into a retreat; which means that, on a world-wide scale, the power and influence of the colonialists is on the wane. Moreover, it would be wrong to imagine that all the positions, all the power, and all the opportunities which pertained to the colonial regimes are being bequeathed *in toto* to neo-colonialism, that is, colonialism without colonies.

In the clash of social forces on the arena of history, however, as in the clash of armed forces, a general retreat does not mean that there will be no hard-fought defensive battles,

no flanking manoeuvres, or even temporary counter-offensives. All of these tactics are employed by colonialism in its retreat. Aware that nothing can save it, colonialism has no scruples of conscience as to choice of means in its effort to hold and expand its positions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have already seen that the present-day national-liberation movement intends to go beyond the mere elimination of the colonialists' direct control, that is to say, the overthrow of the colonial regimes: its aim is to make an end of the base of their indirect control, an end, in other words, of economic dependence. In this field colonialism is nowadays resorting to other methods than political or political-military pressure or domination: it uses a sophisticated system of economic measures and launches campaigns of ideological expansion in the newly-liberated countries, bribes—sometimes in a genteel and delicate manner, but more often openly and crudely—individual leaders or even entire socio-political groups in its former colonies and semi-colonies. Such methods as seizure of alien lands and maintenance of political dominance in subjugated countries are relatively unimportant in the arsenal available to modern colonialists. And while there are still some colonies and territories occupied by the colonialists in our day, the main field of activity of present-day colonialism still lies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the only difference being that today the colonialists are forced to take into account the fact that practically all of the countries of the three continents are national sovereign states.

Two interconnected propositions are rather clearly discernible in current bourgeois writings, which pre-eminently underlie the conceptions worked out by the ideologists of neo-colonialism. They are trying to prove, in the first place, that colonialism, viewed historically, has been an inevitable phenomenon and that the Western powers have played an important civilising role in the economic and social development of the colonial and dependent nations; and, in the second place, that colonialism has vanished, and imperialism with it, having now been replaced by relations of equality between the former metropolitan powers and the developing states.

Bourgeois writers are careful to enumerate, in book and article, all the “positive” contributions that the colonialists have made during their rule in the colonies. Kenneth Brad-



ley, for instance, writes as follows: "When the British administrators and missionaries arrived they had, almost everywhere, except here and there along the coast of West Africa, to begin building civilisation in an economic and social vacuum." Yet he is compelled to admit that "if we compare standards of living in the United States or Western Europe today with those in Central Africa, we shall of course find the Africans poor and ill-educated."<sup>1</sup> Seeking to justify this situation, he suggests comparing socio-economic conditions in the African countries not with the current conditions in the advanced capitalist states, whose economic prosperity has been largely due to colonial plundering, but, rather, with the conditions that obtained in these states sixty years ago.

Frankly apologist are the opinions of David Hapgood, who considers that "by opening up the continent to the outside world, Europeans brought in new ways of life, new goods, and new ideas. . . . Most Europeans would say they did more good than harm in those last years. Many Africans disagree, and some say: 'All our troubles are due to colonialism.' . . . And no one can know what would have happened in Africa if the Europeans had never come."<sup>2</sup> African colonies, according to Hapgood, had never been any too lucrative or very important, especially for Britain or France. More than that, he declares that "in an economic sense, much of Africa is less independent now than it was before it gained its political freedom. . . . This dependence has in most cases increased since formal independence."<sup>3</sup>

Robert C. Good, the former U.S. ambassador to Zambia, goes so far as to say that "post-colonial states owe their existence to colonialism"; and there are other writers who, anxious to whitewash colonialism, share his opinion. Some apologists of neo-colonialism hold that the colonialists went along with the idea of seizing foreign lands only because they wished to end slavery and draw the backward peoples into the orbit of European civilisation by preaching the Christian way of life. Sir Andrew Cohen, formerly British Governor of Uganda, stated, *inter alia*, that "in West and East Africa the economic interests of European companies

and countries, although they entered into the picture, were not the major motive or even the first in the field; not all the arguments of Marxist historians can make me believe that they were. The abolition of slavery and, in revulsion from the slave trade, the sense of mission toward the people of Africa were the first motives in time in the British penetration of both West and East Africa."<sup>1</sup> Harry R. Rudin set out to prove that Europe's problems in those days offered her no way out but through the seizure of alien lands. "It is important to realise," he wrote, "that Europe in the nineteenth century found that the solution of its major problems lay outside Europe, far beyond its borders; that this kind of economic internationalism [i.e., colonialism.—*The Authors*] has done for Europe more than has been accomplished by any other ism."<sup>2</sup> A similar notion of justifying colonialism is to be found in *The Idea of Colonialism*, produced by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, which says: "To the areas which they have ruled the colonial powers have brought many advantages—legal and administrative reform, education, scientific and technological progress, the beginnings of industrialisation, and improved transportation."<sup>3</sup> The authors attempt to prove that over the past few decades the term "colonialism" and the closely allied concepts of "empire" and "imperialism" have acquired an entirely new meaning. According to the authors it is quite enough for a colony to proclaim its political independence for colonialism to cease to exist.

The charge usually made against the critics of the colonial system by the proponents of imperialism is that they refuse to recognise the "beneficial and progressive" contributions made by the colonialists in the backward countries. There is no denying that the European powers have been creatively active in the colonies: they have built highways and railways, constructed port facilities, sunk mines, set up raw material processing industries, promoted urbanisation, opened the eyes of the native population to the attributes of civilisation. It is, in fact, one of the features of imperialism that it ac-

<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Bradley, *Britain's Purpose in Africa*, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> David Hapgood, *Africa*, Boston, 1965, p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> David Hapgood, *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow*, New York, 1965, p. 76.

<sup>1</sup> Andrew Cohen, *British Policy in Changing Africa*, London, 1959, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Harry R. Rudin, "The History of European Relations with Africa". *Africa in the Modern World*, Chicago, 1955, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> *The Idea of Colonialism*, New York, 1958, p. 364.



celerates the development of capitalism in the most backward of countries, thereby expanding and exacerbating the struggle against national oppression.

There is nothing, however, to substantiate the conception of the West's civilising mission, so called, which has the socio-economic development of the Asian and African countries beginning only with the arrival of the colonialists. Now the question of the socio-economic development of the countries of Asia *before* their subjugation by the colonial powers was discussed by Soviet orientologists in recent years, and the proceedings of their discussion once again completely refute the thesis of "the West's civilising mission". While opinions may have differed on some aspects of the question among these Soviet scholars, they arrived at the important conclusion that this "lagging" of the East was not a question of subjective factors but one of an unevenness of development down the centuries, as manifested, for instance, by the fact that some of the states of Western Europe reached the capitalist phase of development earlier than many Asian countries that had faltered on the lower rungs of the ladder. They could have caught up by themselves, if colonialism had not interrupted their development; and they have resumed their progress now that they have won their independence, though in different conditions, domestic and external.<sup>1</sup>

Jean Chesneaux, the French historian, who studied the process of the formation of the Vietnamese nation, wrote as follows: "The French squadron that dropped anchor at Tourane on August 31, 1858, had no historic mission to accomplish in Vietnam. On the contrary, it cut short the real possibilities of development available to the Vietnamese people, and held up its evolution, rather than speeded it up."<sup>2</sup> Japan, which the Western powers did not conquer, is an excellent example of how an Asian country, by borrowing from the West, has been able to develop by its own efforts, without foreign interference.

If the European powers had really been embarked on a mission of civilisation, as the advocates of neo-colonialism never tire of repeating, why had they invariably encountered determined resistance on the part of the population of

the occupied lands? It took the French, for instance, something like fifty years to conquer Algeria, though "resistance did not stop even when the conquest had been completed".<sup>1</sup> The colonialists have been able, by force of arms and at great cost to themselves, to break down temporarily the resistance of Asian and African peoples; but they have been powerless to kill their will to freedom and independence. The oppressed peoples' struggle to throw off the colonial yoke never ceased: it may have died down here and there, but only to flame up anew with even greater force.

The partitioning of Asia and Africa among the colonial powers began back in the 15th century and continued into the current. It waxed into a particularly bitter struggle for territorial aggrandisement towards the close of the 19th century, when capitalism entered the phase of imperialism.

A stream of officials, bankers, merchants, planters, soldiers and diplomats began to pour into Asia and Africa. Expedition followed expedition. All sorts of deals were made in feverish haste, which were to "legalise" the title of colonial powers to conquered lands, especially after the fourteen-power Berlin conference on African colonies (1884-1885) decided that title to a territory may be confirmed by the fact of its occupation. The political map of Asia and Africa was drawn and re-drawn. In determining spheres of influence, ethnic considerations were completely disregarded: entire peoples were artificially dismembered.

In the struggle for the partitioning of the world, power was all that counted. The economically most powerful countries grabbed territory after territory, squeezing out all rivals. Britain led the race, for, as Y. V. Tarlé, the Soviet historian, puts it, she was the undisputed mistress of the seas, thanks to her navy, the world's leading industrial power, and the owner of the markets scattered over the face of the globe.<sup>2</sup>

After they were firmly entrenched in India, Ceylon and their other colonies in Asia, the British turned their attention to Africa, notably to its rich east coast and southern

<sup>1</sup> Marcel Egretaud, *Réalité de la nation algérienne*, Paris, 1957, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Y. V. Tarlé, *Ocherki istorii kolonialnoi politiki zapadno-yevropeiskikh gosudarstv (konets XV-nachalo XIX v.)* (History of the Colonial Policy of the West European States, Late 15th to Early 19th Centuries), Moscow, 1915, p. 409.

<sup>1</sup> See *Ueka neravnoi borby. XV-XIX vv. (Centuries of Unequal Struggle. 15th-19th Centuries)*, Moscow, 1962, p. 393.

<sup>2</sup> Jean Chesneaux, *Contribution à l'histoire de la nation vietnamienne*, Paris, 1955, p. 106.



tip. British penetration into the southernmost part of the continent was substantially facilitated by the British South African Company, founded in 1889 by Sir Cecil Rhodes, an active proponent of British colonialism and imperialism, whom Lenin characterised as "millionaire, a king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the Anglo-Boer War".<sup>1</sup> The Royal Charter, published in *The London Gazette* of December 20, 1889, granted the Company the right to use in its own interests the benefits derived from concessions and agreements and to enjoy all rights, including that of maintaining forces required for administration or maintenance of public order or for the protection of territories, land and property.<sup>2</sup> The territory open to the Company's activities was formally defined as "the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions".<sup>3</sup> Actually, however, its sphere of influence was far greater than the region thus defined. Its control extended over a vast area of 1,850,000 sq. km. (combined area of Rhodesia and Bechuanaland).

Still earlier, in 1882 to be precise, Great Britain had established her control over Egypt. John Strachey, a prominent ideologist of colonialism and Labour Party leader, wishing to justify the British conquest of South Africa and Egypt and stressing the special role of Sir Alfred Milner and Evelyn B. Cromer, British colonial officials, in that conquest, wrote as follows: "Egypt as Cromer found it in 1883 must have been one of the most miserable countries which have ever existed. As he left her in 1907 she had become not only solvent and easily able to pay her creditors (which was undoubtedly the original object of the exercise), but also on the road at least to modern development."<sup>4</sup>

The ideologists of imperialism are inclined to view the anti-colonial struggle as a matter of the self-determination of the remaining colonies in the foreseeable future. Quite a few books have appeared in Western countries, whose authors

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 257.

<sup>2</sup> "Charter of the British South Africa Company, October 29, 1889", see *British South Africa Company's Territories*, London, 1898, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> The British South Africa Company. Reports on the Company's Proceedings and the Condition of the Territories within the Sphere of Its Operations, 1896-1897, London, 1898, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> John Strachey, *The End of Empire*, London, 1959, p. 86.

have treated colonialism as well as imperialism as dead and buried.<sup>1</sup>

A colony or dependency may achieve political independence, dismantle foreign military bases on its territory, cause foreign troops to be withdrawn, tear up unequal treaties forced upon it in the past by the imperialists, and still that may not mean that colonialism has been done away with. Essentially, colonialism boils down to the exploitation and oppression of a people by the dominant class of another people. And the economic exploitation of the peoples of Asia and Africa did not stop after these peoples gained political independence: only the forms, techniques and methods of exploitation changed. Every stage of developing capitalism, as well as every antagonistic social structure, has its own peculiar forms of colonial exploitation, as Lenin pointed out.

Synonymous with the period of primitive accumulation was the outright plunder of material values in overseas lands by European powers; when capitalism was being established, subjugated peoples were robbed, typically, through the introduction of forced labour; industrial capitalism exploited the economically backward countries by turning them mainly into markets for its consumer goods; and, lastly, with the commencement of the period of imperialism colonies became important chiefly as sources of raw materials and a field for capital investment. As Lenin wrote, "To the numerous 'old' motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopoly profits and so on, for economic territory in general."<sup>2</sup>

This sequence of modes of colonial exploitation was determined by the sequence of stages of capitalist development in the metropolitan countries, reflecting, at the same time, the process of socio-economic development in the colonies and semi-colonies themselves.

Just because present-day colonialism must largely do without its colonies and is generally beating a retreat before the national-liberation movement, one should by no means jump

<sup>1</sup> John Strachey and other ideologists of modern colonialism insist that the nature of imperialism and imperialist policies in regard to the countries of Asia and Africa have radically changed and that modern capitalism and imperialism are essentially different conceptions.

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 299.



at the conclusion that it is no longer the menace it was. Sensing that they are losing their grip, modern colonialists resort, when in a tight spot, to the most brutal of methods, that is to say, to armed force. This makes the present-day colonialism a serious military threat not only to various regions of Asia, Africa or Latin America but to the world in general.

Faced with the continuing disintegration of the colonial system, colonialism created a ramified military and political organisation to combat the national-liberation movement. This organisation operates over the entire erstwhile colonial world. Its component elements are: multilateral military-political blocs; bilateral military alliances between imperialist powers and individual Third World states or regimes; a network of military bases (ground, air and naval) in Asian, African and Latin American countries, the stationing of substantial imperialist armed forces in some of these countries; the continuous presence of naval squadrons off the coasts of the liberated countries; and the transformation of the armies of some such countries virtually into imperialist mercenary armies.

The military objectives of colonialism are served by such international blocs as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation), SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation), ANZUS (short for Australia, New Zealand and the United States, known as the Pacific Security Pact); and OAS (Organisation of American States).

NATO may be regarded as the supreme colonialist league. Modern colonialism has at its disposal the tremendous military potential of all the member states: NATO bases have been used time and again in support of military operations against the national-liberation forces in Asia and Africa, as in 1958, for example, in connection with the movement of Anglo-American troops during the Near East crisis, or in backing the American and Belgian intervention in Congo (Kinshasa). But that is not the only point. While neither NATO forces nor bases are directly involved in punitive expeditions against the national-liberation movement in Angola and Mozambique, it is only thanks to the military and economic aid she receives from the NATO member states that Salazar Portugal is able to keep a 100,000-strong army in her African colonies and spend over \$120,000,000 annually on her war against the forces of liberation.

SEATO comprises, besides the United States, Great Britain and France, three Asian countries, namely, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The Treaty, which is in the nature of the organisation's charter, recognises the right of the members to interfere in the domestic affairs and re-establish law and order in any country of South-East Asia where a situation develops which may create, in the opinion of the imperialists, a threat to the peace. The countries of Indo-China have become victims of SEATO policy, thus formulated. Thailand is being widely used by the Americans as a rear base in their war in Vietnam. The continuous American bombing attacks against Laos are carried out by bombers from military bases in Thailand. Thailand territory is also used for military sallies into Cambodia. Periodically held manoeuvres of SEATO armed forces contribute to an atmosphere of tension throughout South-East Asia.

Inasmuch as its sphere of activity lies between those of NATO and SEATO, the CENTO bloc may be regarded as a link between those two imperialist military alliances. Centrally located, with NATO on the west and SEATO on the east, this bloc has been appropriately named the Central Treaty Organisation. It was known initially (1955) as the Baghdad Pact, but Iraq withdrew from the alliance following the national uprising of 1958, and CENTO headquarters were transferred from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. Other members of CENTO are Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Its functions in the Near East are similar to those of SEATO in South-East Asia.

By the middle of the 1960s, or about ten years after the creation of SEATO and CENTO, serious differences of opinion developed between the Asian member states, on the one hand, and the Western powers, on the other. Judging from the events, the Western powers had failed, for one thing, to win the Asian partners in the two organisations completely over to a policy directed against the socialist states. Thus, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan had taken action in the interests of promoting friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless both SEATO and CENTO, by continuing to be political and military instruments in the hands of colonialism, remain the mainstays of reaction, restricting the national sovereignty of their Asian members and constituting a menace to all the newly liberated countries of the regions concerned.



ANZUS, the Pacific Security Pact, showed its true colours when Australia began sending troops to South Vietnam to aid the American war of aggression.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) assumed the character of a military-political bloc through the efforts of the U.S.A., alarmed by the Cuban revolution and its effect on all of Latin America. The Second Havana Declaration, of February 1962, an important document of the Cuban revolution, calls the OAS "a military alliance, an instrument of oppression aimed against the liberation movement of the peoples of Latin America".<sup>1</sup>

In colonies, former colonies and sovereign states, American, British and French military bases appear like a sort of rash over the face of the globe. Britain and France have retained practically all their important bases on the territory of their former empires and some of these have been modernised and expanded. Most of the American bases have been constructed since the second world war.

According to available data U.S. military bases and installations on foreign territory (including that of other imperialist powers) alone run to over 2,200. In Asia, they are located mainly on Okinawa, in Japan proper, South Korea, on Taiwan, in the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The biggest U.S. bases in Africa are situated in Libya and Liberia. The British military bases are strung out along the old colonial trade routes: from Gibraltar via Malta and Cyprus to Aden,<sup>2</sup> where it forks: eastward towards Singapore and Northern Borneo and southward down the East Coast of Africa towards Simonstown, near Cape Town.

Of the numerous foreign military bases in Central and South America, the great majority belong to the United States, which frankly regards them as springboards for armed punitive operations against the national-liberation forces of the Latin American peoples.

These foreign military bases are well garrisoned. American troops quartered in the countries of Asia, Africa and

<sup>1</sup> Segunda Declaración de la Habana, *Cuba Socialista*, March 1962, No. 7, pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> Towards the close of 1967, following the liberation of South Arabia (including Aden) and the formation of the People's Republic of South Yemen, the British hastened to transfer their Near East military outpost from Aden to the Persian Gulf area.

Latin America appear to total over 500,000.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the imperialist powers are in control over the armies of these countries, for which purpose large numbers of instructors and advisers are brought in. West German army officers have now begun to arrive in growing numbers to take their place side by side with the Americans, British and French as instructors in the armies of some of the new independent countries. There are over 200 of these in the sovereign African states; and, successors of the Nazi Wehrmacht that they are, they are quite naturally active in behalf of modern colonialism.

The legal right to maintain military bases and armed forces on the soil of a new national state is usually obtained by a foreign power by concluding a bilateral agreement with the state concerned. On the surface, therefore, the arrangement might seem to be perfectly proper, creating, possibly, the illusion of "military co-operation on the basis of equality". Actually, however, all such agreements have been extorted by the modern colonialists either through pressure or by blackmail, or else by bribing the ruling clique to make it more complaisant.

Sooner or later, however, these new sovereign states come to realise all too clearly that the presence of foreign military bases and alien troops operates very much against their national interests. The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are beginning to insist with increasing vigour on the dismantling of these bastions of colonialism and on the abrogation of the treaties that sanction their existence. Thus in Libya, for example, the national parliament demanded, in 1964, revision of the agreements on American and British bases on Libyan soil. The naval base at Guantanamo, on Cuban soil, is maintained by the United States in rude violation of Cuba's sovereign rights. This case reveals with particular clarity the coercive nature of the imperialist policy of establishing and maintaining military bases as under the colonial system.

If one were to scan the history of the collapse of colonial empires, one would look in vain for any one year when there were no armed punitive operations, military expeditions, or cases of outright imperialist aggression against the national-liberation forces of some new sovereign state.

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the 500,000-strong U.S. army in Vietnam.



Let us take a look at the record—far from complete—of the military crimes perpetrated by the modern colonialists in Asia, Africa and Latin America over the past twenty years.

Between 1945 and 1949, Great Britain, France, Holland and the United States used armed force in their efforts to prevent the national liberation of Syria, Lebanon and Indonesia and to crush the patriotic liberation movement in Malaya, on the Philippines and Madagascar, and in a number of other areas in Asia and Africa. In 1946 the French imperialists unleashed their "dirty war" in Vietnam, which was to drag on for eight years at a heavy cost in life and treasure for both the Vietnamese and the French peoples.

In 1950 American troops invaded Korea. In 1954 the American imperialists used their armed forces to overthrow that country's lawful government, which had declared for the implementation of the people's demands. In 1954 France launched a punitive colonial war in Algeria, which lasted nine years. In 1952-1955 the British colonialists unloosed a reign of terror against the patriots of Kenya.

In 1956 Egypt became the victim of a triple Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression. When, in 1958, an anti-imperialist uprising broke out in Iraq, the neo-colonialists riposted by armed intervention in the Middle East: British and American forces invaded the Lebanon and Jordan, both bordering on Iraq, in order to create a base from which they could engineer a counter-revolution in the latter.

In 1961 Belgium landed her paratroopers in Congo (Kinshasa), practically the day after that former colony proclaimed its independence. In 1964 the American imperialists joined with the Belgian colonialists in armed intervention in Congo's internal affairs, in what was called the "Stanleyville raid".

In 1961 Salazar Portugal started her punitive campaign against the patriotic forces of her African colonies. In 1965 US marines invaded the Dominican Republic.

Great Britain, meantime, it should be added, had been trying for many years to crush by force of arms the national-liberation movement among the peoples of Southern Arabia.

The imperialists fly into a particular rage whenever, after a national revolution, a people embarks on a programme of radical socio-economic and political reforms. That explains, for example, the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967. There are those who would like to reduce that

act to nothing more than a conflict of national and religious feelings. That was not the case, however. The Israeli aggression, backed as it was by the United States and Great Britain, was aimed at the revolutionary democratic regimes of the United Arab Republic and Syria. That is the reason why the militarists from Tel-Aviv enjoyed the full support of Washington and London.

What really drives the modern colonialists into a fit of fury, is when a people that breaks the yoke of national dependence takes up at once the task of reconstructing its social life on socialist lines. We have only to look at revolutionary Cuba, which has been under incessant pressure and attack on the part of the United States ever since it toppled the Batista dictatorship in 1959. In April 1961, Washington sent a band of paid counter-revolutionary thugs to make an outright armed attack against Cuba. In October and November 1962, Cuba faced a new threat of imperialist intervention, this time by the armed forces of the United States itself. This was the Caribbean crisis, so-called. And if the Cuban revolution was saved and a global catastrophe averted, that was due to the confidence and intrepidity of the Cuban people, the support of progressive forces the world over, and the stand taken by the socialist countries, notably, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even now the United States does not refrain from occasionally rattling the sabre, and has not given up its intention to crush the Cuban revolution.

The most monstrous and shameful of all twentieth-century colonial wars is the war unleashed by the American imperialists against the heroic people of Vietnam. The crimes perpetrated by the American imperialists on Vietnamese soil go to show how a neo-colonialist policy that begins with "innocent" declarations of intention to support an anti-democratic, pro-imperialist regime often leads to full-scale military operations against a nation's patriotic forces and to the involvement of adjacent areas in the fighting, posing a threat to the security and peace of the world.

Thus we see that the modern colonialist military machine is frequently set in motion to spill blood on Asian, African and Latin American soil. The colonial wars started here and there by the imperialists are no longer, in our day, matters of purely local significance. Exposed as they are to imperialist aggression, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are closely linked to the socialist countries and the



international proletariat by a community of interests. That is why any colonial war is apt, today, to start a world-wide conflagration. From which it follows that the determined struggle being waged against colonialism is at the same time a struggle in defence of world peace and security.

Meanwhile, other forms of interference in the national affairs of newly-liberated countries and peoples and other forms of pressure upon the national-liberation movement are practised by modern colonialism in addition to outright aggression.

Thus, neo-colonialism often seeks to achieve its purposes by subjecting a new sovereign state to an economic blockade. This form of pressure was used by the imperialists in 1956 against Egypt, when its oil supply was cut off and purchases of Egyptian cotton were restricted in an effort to make that country give up its intention to nationalise the Suez Canal. In 1959, France established an economic blockade of Guinea, her former colony, which refused to join the new colonial organisation that was to replace the disintegrated French empire in Africa.

Grants and loans are yet another instrument used by the imperialists to influence the policies of the fledgeling sovereign states. Funds ostensibly advanced under an aid programme are frequently no more than political bribes given to the ruling circles of such countries. Around 80 per cent of the aid funds advanced by the United States to the developing countries over the past ten years has gone to those which are its military and political allies in virtue of bilateral agreements and membership in various blocs. These have been, primarily, the anti-democratic regimes of Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam and the ruling circles of CENTO and SEATO member states. When any of the new national states must be "punished", on the other hand, for pursuing policies contrary to the wishes of the modern colonialists, the latter cut off loans and grants and suspend deliveries under existing economic agreements. Between 1963 and 1965 such "punitive measures" were applied by the United States in respect of Ceylon, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic.

Wherever possible the colonialists set up obedient puppet regimes and put their own people in the presidential and ministerial chairs. Such puppets pursue profoundly anti-democratic policies in line with the wishes of their masters.

And sometimes, as a result, neither the bayonets nor the largess of the colonialists are able to save them from foundering, as in the case of Syngman Rhee's dictatorship in South Korea, overthrown in 1960, and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique in South Vietnam, which followed suit two years later. Thus the wave of popular anger swept away such imperialist creatures as Nuri as Said in Iraq (1958), Batista in Cuba (1959), Menderes in Turkey (1960), Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (1961), and Fulbert Youlou in Congo (Brazzaville) (1963).

Here and there, however, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the imperialists have been able to maintain their agents recruited among the local reactionaries, at the helm of government. The puppet Saigon governments in South Vietnam are a perfect example.

This colonialist policy of setting up puppet regimes has produced many reactionary *coups d'état*.

These acts of armed aggression, economic blockades, and venal puppet regimes all run counter to the national interests of the liberated countries; the interests of the local bourgeoisie, too, incidentally, and not only those of the working people. The gangster methods practised by the modern colonialists, in other words, are supported by only an insignificant segment of society. They can suit the tastes of but a sprinkling of the feudal-landlord or military-bureaucratic elements in the former colonies and semi-colonies.

This gives rise to doubt as to whether particularly violent forms of colonialism, such as armed aggression, etc., are a sign of its strength or its weakness. This, of course, does not imply any assession of the imperialists' military might; for we know that they dispose of great armies and navies equipped with the most modern of weapons. Our doubt concerns the strength of imperialism's positions in its former colonial empire.

We have already examined this aspect, and we have established that on a global scale and in the historical perspective colonialism is in retreat. We have also pointed out that the colonialists have recourse to armed force when they feel that the ground is slipping from under their feet. We can now be somewhat more specific about the meaning of this assertion, which concerns the social mainstay of colonialism in the countries that have achieved their independence or are in the process of doing so.



Whenever the imperialists attempt to find support in a small subservient group of local reactionaries, this provokes a storm of indignation truly national in scope which in turn brings a riposte in the shape of armed intervention on the part of the colonialists. Examining a situation of this kind in South Vietnam the American senator J. William Fulbright calls the Vietnamese action a hopeless gamble and urges his countrymen not to "undertake the cruel and all but impossible task of suppressing a genuinely nationalist revolution".<sup>1</sup>

Many other prominent bourgeois writers and statesmen of sober views share in this assessment of the military ventures launched by the modern colonialists. And it is not surprising therefore that a few big business men, and prominent senators and congressmen in the United States should have joined in the protest voiced by progressive and democratic elements everywhere against the American war in Vietnam, recognising that rash and hopeless gambles of that sort damage and weaken, rather than strengthen, the prestige and position of the United States in the world of today, particularly in the former colonies and semi-colonies.

We may settle our doubt, then, by stating explicitly that our modern colonisers have recourse to armed force and other forms of violence not because they are strong: the tendency to do so reflects a general weakening of their positions in Asia, Africa and Latin America and signals the inevitable doom of colonialism.

Quite a few politicians prominent in imperialist circles have long since realised the importance of expanding the social base in which their policies could find support in the liberated countries. In their view, that should be the main long-term or strategic aim of the Western powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America. That is the stand they take from time to time in their criticism of the "tough" methods of modern colonialism. They recommend dropping such overbearing dictatorial methods in favour of prolonged, quiet and methodical "courting" of the liberated countries. The aim of such a strategy should be to create in the long run large population groups and mass organisations within the former colonies and semi-colonies, whose ideologies and po-

<sup>1</sup> J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power*, New York, 1966, p. 119.

litical sympathies would be oriented towards the "Western way of life", that is to say, towards imperialism. In this manner the proponents of this strategy hope to be able to renounce their troublesome and shameful deals with various puppet regimes in favour of lasting alliances with responsible social strata in the liberated countries.

This strategy was elaborated very fully in Washington, during the term in office of the late President John F. Kennedy, into a programme for dealing with the new independent countries, which became incorporated in his so-called New Frontiers overall policy. Various aspects of this strategy were adopted by the ruling circles of Great Britain, France, West Germany and Japan.

If we wish to discover the true essence of this strategy, we must find out what social strata and political forces within the new independent countries neo-colonialism intends to lean on in order to build up its positions.

It is a matter of knowledge that in those countries where a big national bourgeoisie is to be found the imperialists rely precisely on that bourgeoisie. In the former colonial world, however, such countries are few in number, and the modern colonialists see a solution of their problem in building up a national bourgeoisie where it does not already exist. What they want to do, to put it differently, is to "graft" capitalist production relations on the former colonies and semi-colonies.

Such is the essence of the socio-economic strategy which the neo-colonialists have adopted. Its ultimate aim is to retain the liberated countries within the capitalist system, where they can be exploited by international monopoly capital, and to prevent their embarking on a non-capitalist programme of development.

The theoreticians who evolved this strategy are also ready to show how that aim is to be achieved. They recommend certain concessions to the countries in question, such as toleration of their policies of neutralism and non-alignment. They even go so far as to recommend wooing the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie of the former colonies and semi-colonies by abstaining from any attacks on the socialist doctrines these countries may have adopted. The most important positive feature of this neo-colonialist strategy is the "aid" to be extended to the developing countries.

This "aid" is regarded by the neo-colonialists as the best



method of influencing the profound socio-economic processes now taking place in the former colonial world.

One may wonder why it should be so regarded, for we have already seen that grants and loans are freely used by the imperialists to bolster the finances of the puppet regimes, fostering, therefore, alliances with the reactionary feudal and military upper crust, instead of with broad strata of the population, especially bourgeois and petty bourgeois, as required by long-range strategy. The truth is, however, that in addition to using its "aid" as a species of international bribery, imperialism has been increasingly making credits and grants available without imposing stringent political or military engagements on the recipient countries. This has been especially marked in recent years and is due in large measure to the growing participation of the liberated countries in co-operation with other states. The fact is that the imperialists are forced to curb their appetites and make concessions to their former colonies and semi-colonies because these latter, now sovereign states, can get the credits, machinery and equipment they need from the socialist countries on terms of equal rights and mutual benefit. The Western powers have, accordingly, frequently seen fit in recent years to advance longer credits at lower interest. In return, the imperialist creditor-powers set one condition, and one only. Here it is: the recipient countries must implement a programme of bourgeois reforms calculated to develop a capitalist economy and strengthen the local bourgeoisie.

These aims of the "aid" they offer are discussed by the imperialists themselves, at times quite frankly, occasionally in thinly veiled hints. F.R.G. President Lübke, for instance, says that West German "aid" seeks to build a basis for the creation of a middle class in the developing countries.<sup>1</sup> And this is what U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has to say on the subject: "... our own interest and our hopes for a better world compel us to share our resources with others. It is essential that we try to do so without the 'strings' which humiliate, offend, or impair the freedom of others. But we do believe that our investments should be good investments, that we should be given something to support..."<sup>2</sup> That

<sup>1</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jan. 9, 1962.

<sup>2</sup> *Highlights of President Kennedy's New Act for International Development*, Washington, 1961, p. 8.

"something" is the whole point. All commentators on the American "aid" policies agree that that nebulous "something" refers to a pattern of socio-economic measures of a bourgeois nature. It is no accident, therefore, that it is just the countries which exhibit the most marked tendency to develop capitalism that have been getting, over the past few years, an increasingly important share of American credits and grants.

The strategists of modern colonialism are focussing their attention on "technical aid" to developing countries. "Technical aid" is a camouflage for a form of imperialist ideological expansion in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which begins with the training of national cadres in the liberated countries and is followed up by sending experts, advisers and instructors from the imperialist states to the countries in question.

The latter are experiencing a truly critical shortage of technicians, physicians, teachers, economists and administrative staff. This is perhaps the worst of the legacies left them by the colonial regimes. The ratio of engineers in the developing countries is 1 or 3 per 100,000 population, for instance, as against up to 40 in the industrial capitalist countries.

Taking advantage of this situation the imperialists are endeavouring to establish their control over the training of a technical intelligentsia and civil service personnel in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the same time they are taking steps to put their own experts and advisers in key business and government posts in their former colonies and semi-colonies and to have their own agents worming their way into all spheres of their social and cultural activities.

For this purpose they are admitting young men and women from the countries in question to their colleges and universities. By the mid-1960s some 170,000 students from these countries were studying in various imperialist states. For the same purpose up to 300,000 experts are being sent to developing countries annually from the industrial capitalist states. Among the various organisations involved in these operations is the notorious Peace Corps, whose members are placed primarily as teachers in the secondary schools of liberated countries.

In this manner modern colonialism endeavours to sway the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, to incul-



cate upon the minds of as many as possible in the liberated countries the spirit of adulation of the bourgeois system and the Western way of life. Working through their advisers and experts they, the modern colonisers, are endeavouring to foist on the new national states bourgeois prescriptions for economic and political development.

"Technical aid", which we have already described as a form of imperialist ideological expansion, differs from the continuous flow of propaganda directed by the modern colonialists towards the liberated countries, which makes extensive use of literature extolling the Western, that is to say, capitalist way of life, radio broadcasts praising the policies of the imperialist powers, and other customary propaganda media. The trouble with this propaganda is that it is addressed to no one in particular, or, rather, that it is addressed simultaneously to all the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is never possible to say just who may be listening to, say, the Voice of America broadcasts, and who may be reading the pamphlets put out by the U.S. State Department Information Service. Not so with "technical aid": here the identity of the recipients is well known. And the purpose is not limited to the indoctrination of the liberated countries' young cadres: there is also the organisational function, which manifests itself in the creation here and there of all kinds of "associations", as of graduates of American colleges, or of engineers who have received practical training in the F.R.G., etc. This is calculated to provide the neo-colonialists with a stratum of supporters in the former colonial world.

We have seen, then, that the neo-colonialist strategy is designed to establish imperialist control both over the socio-economic processes in the liberated countries and over the spiritual development of their peoples.

The ultimate aim of this strategy, which is to establish the capitalist system in the liberated countries, is in profound contradiction with the national interests of their peoples, who, in the current phase of the national-liberation revolution, increasingly favour non-capitalist ways of development. Broad strata of the former colonial and semi-colonial population are joining in this movement for non-capitalist ways of development: not only the working people, but petty-bourgeois groups as well, including revolutionary-democratic elements of the intelligentsia, the officer corps, artisans,

etc. The imperialists have so far failed to find among these elements the reliable social support they are seeking. Time and again, therefore, their strategy has been found inadequate in the face of actual conditions. And when this has been the case the modern colonialists, lacking other means of achieving their purposes, have again had recourse to the rigorous methods of military pressure or political blackmail.

Hence the element of contradiction in the behaviour of our modern colonialists. In some cases they exhibit tolerance towards and even acquiescence in the demands of the new sovereign states. In other cases, however, they bear down upon these states with harsh repressions. Strictly speaking, there is nothing contradictory in this: both neo-colonialist strategy and day-to-day tactics presuppose intervention in the internal affairs of liberated countries: only the forms of such intervention change. Moreover, in those cases where modern colonialism does not shake a big stick, its potential threat to the liberated countries does not diminish. For the primary aim of neo-colonialism, even when it appears in a most respectable guise, is to put the yoke of capitalist exploitation on the peoples that have freed themselves from foreign political bondage.

Before we close our investigation of the nature of modern neo-colonialism, we should note that it constitutes a superstructure over a definite economic basis. We have examined, earlier in this study, the salient features relating to the inferior and exploited status of the economically backward countries in the world capitalist system. The exploitation of the manpower and natural resources of the African, Asian and Latin American countries by international finance and monopoly capital is precisely the economic basis on which neo-colonialism rests. It is the basis on which rests the superstructure of military blocs and alliances, outright intervention, the planting of puppet regimes, the onerous loans policy, the strategy of wooing the local bourgeoisie, etc.

Imperialism is still economically strongly entrenched in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Industrially developed capitalist states account for roughly two-thirds of the total foreign trade turnover of these countries, while foreign monopoly capital direct investments in the former colonies and semi-colonies run into eleven figures. The liberated countries' national debt in respect of credits advanced by imperialist governments is similarly vast. Using these



basic forms of economic expansion in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, imperialism has achieved success in its political, military and ideological offensive against its former colonies and semi-colonies.

Let us examine the effect that the neo-colonialist strategy has upon the destinies of the liberated countries. In the beginning of this chapter we pointed out that colonialism has been and continues to be the number one enemy of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. We can now establish how, specifically, that manifests itself. To begin with, it manifests itself, of course, in the economic exploitation that deprives the liberated countries of a substantial share of the natural resources so urgently needed for their economic development. The imperialist policy of military aggression is to continue another block on the road to national progress for the liberated countries, inasmuch as important appropriations are required to cover military expenditures. This is the case when direct demand is made by the imperialists upon a country involved in one of their military blocs; or, again, when a peaceable country is forced to bolster its defences in view of a menacing situation on its frontiers. Then, too, imperialism is an enemy of social progress for its former colonies and semi-colonies. In some cases it resorts to harsh measures of interference in their domestic affairs and brings into power reactionaries of a feudal-landlord milieu literally at the point of the bayonet; while in others it gives all support to private capital and spares no effort to reinforce it at a time when the by then implemented socio-economic reforms have begun to resemble a system of anti-capitalist measures. Colonialist ideological expansion aims at suppressing patriotic and revolutionary sentiments among the peoples of the liberated countries while fostering conviction in the "superiority" of the bourgeois system and the "Western way of life".

For the liberated countries, therefore, colonialism is synonymous with reaction, whatever form it may take.

Events have shown that the successes achieved by the modern colonialists have generally not been lasting. In our day, the long-range outlook for colonialism is distinctly poor, as we have repeatedly stressed. The present balance of power in the world tends to restrict the sphere of imperialist licence more and more. Gone are the days when the imperialists could shape the destinies of peoples at will.

Moreover, international conditions today are such that national-liberation forces are able to win victory after victory over the colonialists. This means that neither increasing their armed forces nor making further drafts on their financial and material resources in order to achieve their aims in Asia, Africa and Latin America can tip the scales in favour of the imperialists in their struggle against the national-liberation movement. On the contrary, the weapons and dollars modern colonialists mobilise are proving less and less capable of achieving the desired results, as may be seen from the numerous failures of their military gambles, such as their inability to cope with the patriotic movement in South Vietnam despite the vast concentration of American military power in that country.

"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft agley", wrote Robert Burns. It all depends on the determination and persistence displayed by the national-liberation forces in their fight for their just cause. Take, by way of example, imperialist "aid" to liberated countries. The neo-colonialist strategists expect that generous loans and grants will in the long run buy the favour of the new sovereign states and ensure their pro-imperialist orientation and development along capitalist lines. That is what the dollars, sterling and francs poured by the imperialists into their former colonies and semi-colonies are supposed to achieve. But that does not necessarily mean that they *do* achieve it. In order to protect their sovereign rights and national interests the liberated countries may find such uses for the funds advanced by the imperialist governments as will contribute to the strengthening of the national economy, rather than serve the purpose of neo-colonialist penetration.

Let us look at another fact. The imperialists willingly admit students from the liberated countries, expecting to turn them into their loyal agents. But they can never be sure that their expectations will be justified. It is an established fact that many African, Asian and Latin American students graduated from Western universities and colleges have subsequently turned into determined fighters against imperialism and colonialism. Political self-consciousness among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is growing, which means that this sort of situation will become increasingly frequent.

In the present historical setting, therefore, the national-



liberation movement is able—provided it acts in alliance with the forces of peace, socialism and the international proletariat—not only to stand up to the onslaught of neo-colonialism, but also to wage a successful struggle against it, culminating in final delivery from political oppression, military dictate and economic exploitation.

Today, bourgeois writers have to recognise the existence of neo-colonialism. Here is what one of them has to say: "Neo-colonialism, in its classical form, means that there are people who, while apparently willing to give up the old system of colonialism, seek to create new dependency relationships, usually of an economic kind—what is called 'colonialism by the back-door'."<sup>1</sup> The truth is that neo-colonialism is operating in Africa on the grand scale. Certain financial and other forces are achieving—or trying to achieve—domination. "Neo-colonialism is not just a fantasy of the Africans or an invention of Communism."<sup>2</sup> There are some bourgeois writers, of course, who insist, in the face of facts, that there is no such thing as neo-colonialism. Brian Crozier, for instance, calls upon the developing countries "to break away from the colonial past of bitterness and suspicion and to create a new and healthier relationship between the newly independent countries and the former imperial powers", and to call this relationship "interdependence".<sup>3</sup>

Neo-colonialism may be defined as a continuation of imperialist exploitation of economically backward countries, though with the employment of different means. Forms and methods of this exploitation have changed under the influence of both internal factors connected with the structural changes in modern capitalism, and external factors, the following two being decisive: the growing might of the world socialist system and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement. Using their neo-colonialist policy the imperialists intend to strip the democratic national-liberation movement of its social content and retain emerging states within the capitalist orbit without granting them equality of rights. They are striving desperately to set up capitalism in the developing countries and to prevent formerly oppressed peoples from embarking on a programme of independent devel-

opment. Modern colonialism's main bastion is the imperialism of the United States of America, which stands revealed everywhere as the international policeman and hangman of peoples fighting for their national liberation.

Advocates of American imperialism love to dwell on the special interests of the United States in Asia and Africa, which differ, allegedly, from those of the European colonial powers. They endeavour to show that U.S. activity in these regions, which has grown substantially since the second world war, is dictated solely by requirements of the so-called policy of "containing" communism, and "does not necessarily entail", so they cynically claim, "alliance with or even friendship for the United States", and "need not do so".<sup>1</sup>

According to the ideologists of American neo-colonialism, U.S. policy in Asia and Africa must choose one of two contradictory alternatives, namely, either to declare in favour of granting the colonies and semi-colonies political independence, which would promote favourable conditions and increase U.S. revenues, or to refrain from pampering U.S. appetites, so as not to provoke the displeasure of the old colonial powers whose economic interests would suffer, and not to endanger U.S. relations with its Western allies. The desire for greater profits wins out in the long run, however, and the American imperialists do not hesitate to shoulder out their chief rivals, Great Britain and France, and to establish wherever possible their exclusive domination in the liberated countries.

It must be recalled at this point that the United States had not competed with the European powers in the scramble for colonies in Asia (roughly in the 18th and early 19th centuries) and in Africa (mainly towards the close of the 19th century). In the first place, it had itself been a British colony until the 1790s; and, in the second place, its development as a capitalist and imperialist state had begun considerably later. It did finally embark on colonial conquests by annexing Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Hawaii, but these conquests were not comparable with those of, say, Great Britain and France; so that on the eve of the second world war the total area of U.S. colonial possessions equalled

<sup>1</sup> *African Affairs*, London, Vol. 63, No. 252, July 1964, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Brian Crozier, *Neo-Colonialism. A Background Book*, London, 1964, p. 112.

<sup>1</sup> See *The U.S. and the Middle East*, ed. by Georgiana G. Stevens, New York, 1964, p. 175.



perhaps one per cent of the British colonial empire and 2.5 per cent of the French.

To make up for this, American imperialism set out to create a so-called "invisible" colonial empire of its own. According to William Z. Foster, a prominent leader of the American Communist Party, "the United States perforce had to develop its own system of economic and political controls, which actually are more effective in subordinating peoples than the earlier, cruder methods of British, French and Dutch imperialism".<sup>1</sup>

The United States was the only great power to come out of the second world war unscathed. On the contrary, it earned tremendous profits out of that war. Britain and France, the two once mighty colonial powers, however, emerged from the war with their national economy in a state of stagnation which was to last for a number of years. After the war the United States became the bulwark of monopoly capitalism, strengthened its positions and made itself the leader of the capitalist world.

The American imperialists, who would not be averse to establishing their domination over the metropolises as well as over the colonies, would seem to be in a position to elbow out their old rivals and accomplish their cherished dream of repartitioning the world. Their aims are, in fact, the same as those of their European partners, only they would like to achieve them by new methods inasmuch as the old forms of direct colonial administration have outlived themselves. James S. Allen, a progressive American economist, wrote as follows about the policies of the American monopolies in Africa: "The Wall Street bankers now have a powerful vested interest in preserving the entire colonial structure of Africa, favouring only those changes which will increase their share of the spoils."<sup>2</sup>

The old, obsolete form of direct colonial domination could not be used by the American imperialists because conditions had changed: a world socialist system had come into being, which was exerting a growing influence on world events; and the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies was being pressed on a broader front than ever

before. New methods were required in these new conditions. And the United States began to apply in its relations with the countries of Asia and Africa the forms and methods of the neo-colonialist policy it had been pursuing in Latin America.

Bourgeois propaganda has insistently argued latterly that the political, and even more so the economic, difficulties currently besetting the liberated states are due to insufficiently active aid from the Great Powers. No difference is drawn between the Soviet Union and the imperialist powers, the former also being allegedly responsible for the lagging social and economic development of the countries in question. When this problem of lagging development is discussed in the capitalist West, or even in some of the developing countries, the opinion is expressed that all the advanced industrial states, both socialist and imperialist, should share equally in making good the damage sustained by the former colonies and semi-colonies as the result of the long years of ruthless imperialist exploitation. The socialist states, however, bear no responsibility whatever for the economic plight of the developing countries, which is the product of colonial domination and neo-colonialist policies. There are therefore absolutely no grounds to lump together all "rich" countries—socialist as well as imperialist—and make similar claims against them for rendering the developing countries assistance on the strength of bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Currently, as well as in the past, the differences in the level of economic development between the emerging countries and the advanced industrial states owe their origin to the capitalist economic system. The comparatively high standard of living in the advanced capitalist countries has been achieved and maintained largely by the exploitation of the economically backward countries, whose role within the capitalist system has been reduced to purveying raw materials and offering opportunities for profitable capital investments. The "aid" extended to these countries by the imperialist powers and endlessly talked about by the advocates of neo-colonialism amounts to but a small fraction of the imperialists' spoils.

One reason why some imperialist states have achieved relatively high rates of growth of their capitalist economies is that they have shifted to new ways of exploiting the peoples of the liberated countries. In a number of cases they

<sup>1</sup> William Z. Foster, *The Twilight of World Capitalism*, New York, 1949, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> See *Political Affairs*, September 1960, p. 2.



have deliberately accorded some of their colonies political independence while at the same time taking steps to maintain their hold on their economies.

The main aim of neo-colonialist propaganda is to justify colonialism, perpetuate the capitalist mode of production and way of life, and "prove" that only capitalism is capable of reviving backward nations. All sorts of neo-colonialist theories are used to achieve this aim and have found wide acceptance not only in the capitalist West but also among certain circles in the developing countries. The "stages of economic growth" theory advanced by the American economist Walt Rostow<sup>1</sup> has drawn particular attention, wherein it is suggested to the Third World countries to refrain from any action calculated to restrict or force out private entrepreneurial activities.

In their efforts to justify colonialism some bourgeois ideologists want to fix the blame for the socio-economic backwardness of the African, Asian and Latin American countries on the peoples themselves. Characteristic in this respect is the attitude of John Kenneth Galbraith, former American Ambassador to India, who attempts to prove that for India it was less important to develop her national industry than to improve public education.<sup>2</sup>

It would be wrong to say, however, that the imperialists are always against social progress as such for the liberated countries. Rather, what they want is to see such development effected by capitalist methods. And they have set themselves a double purpose: one political and the other economic. It will be recalled, for instance, that the U.S.-sponsored Alliance for Progress scheme provides for "aid" and credits for Latin American countries to facilitate certain progressive measures (such as an agrarian reform, improvement of the financial system, etc.). The idea back of this scheme was to steer the Latin American countries into a capitalist channel, secure domestic markets, and thus forestall any radical revolutions of the Cuban kind. Essentially similar schemes have been hatched for the countries of Asia and Africa. Special attention is focussed on the development of the private sector; the development of the state sector has gen-

erally produced strained relations, though the imperialists do not refuse to co-operate with it when that is profitable.

Imperialism may be powerless to halt social progress, but it does have a serious say in regard to the direction which the political and economic development takes in the backward countries. It is concerned above all not to let the liberated countries split away from the capitalist system, or at least to retard or delay their development in the direction of socialism. To judge by the record, the imperialists feel no compunction about using non-economic measures ranging all the way from setting up puppet regimes and inveigling them into their military blocs to coups d'état, punitive expeditions and colonial wars.

Colonial wars and military blocs, plots and terrorism, subversive activities and economic pressure and bribes—all means will serve so long as they ensure the imperialists continued domination over the liberated countries, or make the independence these countries have won merely formal, or simply deprive them of that independence.

We have now seen why one of the most important tasks which the new independent states must face is to carry on their struggle against neo-colonialism, which is, by the same token, a struggle to secure their independent development as well as national and social progress.

<sup>1</sup> See Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1960.

<sup>2</sup> See John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economic Development in Perspective*, Cambridge, 1962, p. 47.



## Chapter Four

### THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

#### 1. How Far Behind?

A closer look at the Third World reveals the sad but incontestable fact that the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America lag economically far behind the industrially developed states.

International statistics makes available a number of indicators which make it possible to measure the full extent of the economic backwardness of the liberated countries and of the deprivation of their peoples in respect of material things. The most useful of these indicators is the per head annual national income. According to United Nations data the average annual per head income in the advanced capitalist states, in the early 1960s, was \$1,037, and in the liberated countries \$83. A comparison of these figures shows that the former colonies and semi-colonies lagged behind in their economic development by a factor of 12 (1,037:83).

Descriptive as this indicator is, it has nevertheless all the defects generally typical of average statistical data. In specific instances its use may lead to perfectly absurd inferences. For example: Kuwait and Qatar, two minor Arab principalities, stand at the top of the list of countries with the highest per head national income in the world. Contrary to what one may expect, this does not mean that they are the world's wealthiest and economically most highly developed countries. Far from it. The simple fact is that their oil resources are being exploited by some of the biggest oil monopolies, which pay the governments of the two principalities handsome sums for that privilege. These sums go to the feudal upper crust, who are the possessors of truly fabulous wealth. As for the rest of the inhabitants of Kuwait and Qatar, the people at large, these live in abject poverty and misery.

The representative of Kenya, Minister for Commerce and Industry J. G. Kiano, speaking on the subject at the U.N.

Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva, in 1964, pointed out that "academic reports and economic textbooks keep on talking of \$30 per capita and \$60 per capita, or even \$100 per capita income per year in the developing countries, but these statistics do not bring home the cold facts of life facing millions of people in the developing countries. There are millions of people who just do not have any income at all. They do not know where their next meal is coming from or where they will lay their heads when the night falls. They do not have a share in the per capita income figures cited in the textbooks."<sup>1</sup> The speaker has drawn a very fair picture of the situation, inasmuch as it focusses attention on the real disparities which statistical averages conceal.

Let us turn to other figures, presenting a truer description of the economic chasm that separates the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America from the highly developed industrial states of the capitalist world. Let us take the figures which show to what extent man's most elementary requirement is satisfied in the liberated countries, namely, his requirement in food. Here we shall have to deal with the average daily intake of foods in terms of calories and proteins. The reader may object that here we shall again be dealing with averages. And so we shall; except that in this case there will be little room for statistical illusions, for even the wealthiest Arab sheiks cannot consume, day in, day out, quantities of food far in excess of a human being's requirements. Nature itself, we might say, ensures a greater precision of these statistical averages.

A man's daily requirement is between 2,500 and 4,000 calories, depending on the work he does. An average intake may be fixed at 3,000 calories. Keep this in mind when you examine the table given below. You will observe that the relative figures for the former colonies and semi-colonies are invariably less than the average and in a number of cases even less than the danger line of 2,200 calories, after which comes undernutrition, that is to say, starvation. The table includes data on protein intake as well; 80 grammes is considered an adequate daily intake.

<sup>1</sup> Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, March 23-June 16, 1964, Vol. II, Policy Statements, New York, 1964, p. 251.



Table 2

Food Consumption in Selected Countries in the 1960s  
(home-produced + imported foods: per head per day)

	Calories	Countries	Proteins (gm)
	3,510	New Zealand	109
	3,270	Great Britain	89
	3,140	Australia	90
	3,100	U.S.A.	92
	3,100	Canada	94
	3,000	F.R.G.	80
3,000 calories— average intake			80 gm—average requirement
	2,690	Brazil	65
	2,620	U.A.R.	77
2,500 calories— lowest safe intake			
	2,490	Venezuela	66
	2,330	Syria	78
2,200 calories— danger line beyond which follows under- nutrition			
	2,100	Lybia	53
	2,050	Peru	51
	2,040	India	53
	1,980	Pakistan	44
	1,830	Philippines	43

A look at the above figures shows right away that the populations of the former colonies and semi-colonies suffer from undernutrition, with tragic consequences in the shape of high morbidity and mortality. There are several diseases which are the direct result of undernutrition and deficient

nutrition, such as beriberi, rickets, scurvy, pellagra, and kwashiorkor. In the countries of the Middle East, for instance, these diseases kill one out of every three children in the 0 to 5 age group. In Africa, 96 per cent of children in the 6 months to 6 years group are affected with kwashiorkor, a disease caused by protein-deficient diets.

The weakened organism falls an easy prey to tuberculosis, intestinal diseases, and malaria. Epidemics of smallpox, plague and cholera occur to this day here and there throughout the former colonial world.

The figures given in the two tables that follow will give an idea of the gap between the advanced capitalist states and the backward countries in respect of two important indicators.

Table 3

Comparative Death-Rate in Advanced Capitalist States and Liberated Countries in the 1960s  
(per 1,000 population)

*Advanced capitalist states*

Western Europe	7.8-12.5
North America	7.7-8.4
Japan	7.3
Australia	8.6

*Liberated colonies and semi-colonies*

Asia	19-24
Africa	25.6-33.3
Latin America	6.7-17.0

Table 4

Mean Length of Life in Selected Regions  
in the 1960s

North America	70-73
Australia	70-73
Western Europe	68-70
Latin America	50-55
Asia	40-50
Africa	30-40

Note: In some African and Latin American countries longevity has remained at the same level as in Europe in the days of Ancient Rome: 30 years.



History will hold colonialism responsible for this shameful situation.

The share of the liberated countries in the non-socialist world's aggregate industrial output is just over 10 per cent. That, however, includes the extractive industries; for these countries account for only around 9 per cent of the total output of the manufacturing industries. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that the population of these countries totals somewhat more than half of the entire population of the non-socialist part of the world. These figures indicate that the liberated countries are industrially far behind the advanced capitalist states.

In our examination of the economic backwardness of the liberated countries we used the per head annual income as a criterion and discovered that the countries in question lagged behind the industrial capitalist states in respect of economic development by a *factor of twelve*. If we now take the volume of per head industrial output as a criterion we shall arrive at a *factor of eighteen*.

It would be wrong to attribute this industrial backwardness of the liberated countries entirely to a lack or insufficiency of industrial establishments, for there are quite enough of these in the former colonial world. More than that: the manpower engaged in industry in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is numerically the same as in the advanced capitalist states, that is to say, roughly 200,000,000. The trouble is that the overwhelming majority of these enterprises are equipped with obsolete plant and more often than not simply use manual techniques. The root of the evil, therefore, should here be sought in the low level of development of productive forces, as well as in low productivity of labour.

It is the same with agriculture. In India, for instance, productivity of agriculture is 1/25 that of the United States (and less than 1/50 in industry, for the sake of comparison). In short, productivity of labour is extremely low, in the liberated countries, not only in industry but in agriculture as well.

In the advanced capitalist countries a relatively small part of the economically active population is engaged in agriculture: from 4.5 to 20 per cent. This appears to be fully adequate to meet such a country's food requirements. The picture is altogether different when we look at the countries

of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Here between 60 and 80 per cent of the economically active population are either farmers or farm hands; and still their output is not enough to fully meet the food requirements of the population. We have already seen that there is systematic undernutrition among the people at large in the liberated countries. And we should recall that the figures we have quoted on the average daily calorie and protein intake include not only the home produce of the liberated countries but imported foods as well. Food products account for 12.5 per cent of all imports of India and Indonesia, for nearly 25 per cent of those of Malaysia and the U.A.R., and for over 33 per cent of that of Ceylon. This situation is quite obviously the direct result of extremely low productivity in agriculture in the former colonies and semi-colonies.

Thus we find that the countries that had been under the colonial yoke are unable, today, to provide themselves with enough to eat. The fact has a truly staggering implication. It is hard to believe it, but we are speaking of countries where the vast majority of the working population is engaged precisely in agriculture. Granted that England, too, imports a great deal of food products; but, then, only 4.5 per cent of her economically active population is engaged in agriculture. Whereas India, which had been under the British yoke for two whole centuries, is short of food when some 70 per cent of her working population is engaged in producing it!

All of this goes to show why we cannot regard the former colonies and semi-colonies merely as industrially backward. They are actually lagging in their agricultural development as well. In other words, they are lagging in the field of economic development as a whole.

While thus generally backward, the economies of the liberated countries remain preponderantly agrarian, inasmuch as agricultural produce accounts as a rule for from 60 to 70 per cent, and frequently even over 90 per cent, of their aggregate output. The ratio of their underproductive industry and their underproductive agriculture tends obviously to favour the latter. That is why those who wish to stress the agrarian nature of their economies refer to these countries as the "world farm".

The expression is all the more significant since it indicates the role of these countries in international trade. Most of



them sell farm produce in the world markets and buy manufactured goods with the proceeds. This type of trade has much in common with the typical urban-rural transactions in any country.

Let us now examine the nature of the exports of the liberated countries. The most important items of export will be found to be coffee, cocoa, bananas, pineapples, sugarcane, rice, cloves and other spices, tea, rubber, cotton, jute, sisal, ground-nuts, palm-oil, and other items of agricultural output.

There are, however, other items in the export list of the former colonies and semi-colonies, as for example, oil, copper, tin, iron ore, etc. This circumstance calls for a substantial revision of our description of the economic structure of the liberated countries, for in the economic activities of quite a few of them the extractive industries play as important a role as agriculture. They are often referred to in technical literature as raw materials and agricultural producers.

We may now state with greater precision that a characteristic feature of the economic structure of the Third World is an underdeveloped manufacturing industry, a predominant agriculture, and in some cases also important mining and extractive industries.

Let us, however, pursue our study further. Both agriculture and the mining and extractive industries have an internal structure of their own. Agriculture, for instance, may include crop production and livestock raising, while crop production may, in turn, mean the raising of industrial or food crops, the latter further including cereals, oil-bearing plants or pulses. This kind of analysis of the economic structure of the countries in question will reveal that in most of them the existing branches of agriculture and the extracting industries produce a very limited range of commodities, sometimes no more than two or three items, and occasionally even one single commodity.

The table which follows lists 24 countries: former colonies or semi-colonies. Shown for each of them is the commodity whose production figures with especial importance in its economy. Descriptive of its importance is its share in the country's exports, as also in its national income. Earlier we referred to such countries as raw materials and agricultural producers; the figures given in the table below will justify

the statement that their economic structure is monocultural, or one-sided.

Table 5

# One-Sided Specialisation of National Economy and Exports of Third World Countries

Country	Main commodity produced and exported	Receipts from sale of commodity in per cent of	
		total receipts	national income
Kuwait	Oil	99	97
Iraq	Oil	99	40
Senegal	Ground-nuts	92	—
Venezuela	Oil	91	55
Saudi Arabia	Oil	90	83
Niger	Ground-nuts	87	—
Iran	Oil	85	33
Colombia	Coffee	74	19
Burma	Rice	74	26
Haiti	Coffee	77	25
El Salvador	Coffee	73	—
Guatemala	Coffee	73	25
U.A.R.	Cotton	70	18
Panama	Bananas	67	12
Ceylon	Tea	66	41
Ghana	Cocoa	66	40
Chile	Copper	63	20
Malaya	Rubber	62	40
Liberia	Rubber	62	—
Brazil	Coffee	62	12
Pakistan	Jute	58	9
Uruguay	Wool	58	9
Bolivia	Tin	57	29
Equador	Bananas	56	25

These figures seem to suggest a kind of frozen pattern of current relations between the Third World countries, on the one hand, and the industrially developed capitalist countries on the other. Actually, however, these relations are in con-



stant flux, and we should therefore try to see what changes time has made in that pattern. If we turn to the facts, we shall discover that the economic gulf separating the Third World from the industrially developed West continues to widen. That process continues, despite certain shifts in the economic development of the liberated countries and despite all their efforts to promote national progress. The 1960s have been declared by the United Nations to be a Development Decade that should witness determined efforts to advance the national economies of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Unfortunately, the actual trends of the global economy are at variance with United Nations expectations.

In the developing countries, the gross national product grew, over the period 1950-1955, at an average annual rate of 4.7 per cent. Exactly the same rate of economic advance—4.7 per cent—was observed over the same period of time in the developed capitalist countries. There was this difference, however, that the per head increment in the advanced states and the developing countries was 3.4 and 2.7 per cent, respectively. These figures caused concern at the time. During the first half of the current decade, however, the situation grew much worse. The average annual increment of the gross national product, between 1960 and 1965, was 5 per cent in the advanced capitalist states and only 4.6 per cent in the Third World countries. The gap between the per head figures—3.7 and 2 per cent—had widened.

Turning now to the sphere of international trade, we find that the share of the developing countries in the foreign trade of the non-socialist world has dropped from 28 per cent in 1953 to 21 per cent in 1966. Their debts, meantime, have been growing, while their gold and currency reserves have been dwindling. To make a long story short, it is hard to find in international statistics an indicator that would suggest the possibility of a convergence of the development levels of the two non-socialist parts of the world.

Many economists peer hopefully ahead, but see no encouraging prospects. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, meeting in 1964 at Geneva, circulated documents containing forecasts for the year 1970. These warned, *inter alia*, that by 1970 the developing countries

would be from \$9,000 to 13,000 million short if they had to pay for their imports out of the proceeds of their exports. And they would need around \$8,000 million more to settle their debts, pay interest on their loans, and also pay the profits and dividends accruing to foreign companies. The authors of these calculations suggested that a certain part of this huge deficit in the balance of payments of the Third World might be covered by fresh foreign private investments and government credits. They were obviously rather optimistic, for they suggested that receipts from these sources might total \$12,000 million. Even if their estimate proves correct, there would still be a yawning gap of \$5,000 to 9,000 million. But there exist even more pessimistic forecasts: some U.N. experts predict that by 1975 the developing countries may face a dollar shortage running into *eleven figures* in respect of the money needed to pay for their imports alone.

All of the above-mentioned figures, whether referring to the past, the present or the future, lead to the basic conclusion that the economic machinery of the non-socialist world ceaselessly maintains and widens the economic gulf between the two parts of that world: the advanced capitalist states and the former colonial fringe.

We have been giving facts which will hardly be challenged by anyone, anywhere, on whatever grounds. It may be taken that there is general agreement on this point. But when it comes to interpreting all these various phenomena, wide disparities are to be discovered in the points of view of different schools of economy.

The issues which are discussed with particular sharpness may be formulated about as follows: Can the economic backwardness of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America be attributed to the redistribution of material wealth to the detriment of these countries and to the advantage of the advanced capitalist states? Does their backwardness imply an economic dependence on the latter?

Many theories have cropped up in the West, in recent years, which deem the gulf between the liberated countries and the industrial states to be quite natural. All of them subscribe to the apparently harmless "North-South" formula, which, however, must have been invented by economists lacking both in learning and experience, or still



more likely by some journalists given to compact and pithy description.

At first glance one might call it a very useful instrument, a kind of compass to help get one's bearings in the stormy seas of the world economy. It points North: that's where the rich countries lie. South is where the poor, economically backward, countries are to be found; never mind that wealthy Australia and New Zealand are in the Southern Hemisphere. Everyone will agree to overlook a few trifling inaccuracies, and no one will really deny that the great majority of the industrially developed countries belong in the Northern Hemisphere, while nearly all of the economically backward countries lie generally within the tropical zone.

Aside from being a rather obvious geographical fact, however, this North-South formula carries an extremely bellicose ideological and political implication, for its entire purpose is to combat a social-class approach to any analysis of the causes that deprive the developing countries of equal rights in the economic sphere within the world capitalist economy. There is room in this formula for all kinds of concepts reflecting the existence of international exploitation.

It embraces, for example, out and out racism, which preaches the natural supremacy of northern, that is, "white" peoples over the "coloured" peoples of the South; and the "climate" theory which remits the sins of the colonialists on the simple grounds that the tropical climate tends to debilitate whereas the harshness of the northern climate breeds a will to work, and thus explains why the northern peoples prosper and the southern peoples live in poverty; and Rostow's "theory of stages" inasmuch as it discounts the importance of a given country's socio-economic system of government while emphasising the importance of determining the stage of development that country has reached, and gives the same simple geographical classification, placing the northern countries on a higher level and the southern on a lower.

What all these various conceptions embraced by the North-South formula most certainly fail to do is explain the organic relationship between wealth and poverty *within the world capitalist system of economy*. The consensus seems

to be that North and South stand for two parallel, mutually independent, opposite trends in the world economy. It remains to see if that is really the case.

## 2. Backwardness, Exploitation, Dependence

The current economic relationships between the liberated countries and their former metropolies are clearly quite different from those that linked them in colonial times. It will be useful in this connection to recall some historical facts. Here is how L. H. Jenks, a British economist, describes the settlement of accounts between Great Britain and her Indian empire in the second half of the 19th century:

"The costs of the Mutiny, the price of the transfer of the Company's rights to the Crown, the expenses of simultaneous wars in China and Abyssinia, every governmental item in London that remotely related to India down to the fees of the charwomen in the India Office and the expenses of ships that sailed but did not participate in hostilities and the cost of Indian regiments for six months training at home before they sailed—all were charged to the account of the unrepresented ryot. The Sultan of Turkey visited London in 1868 in state, and his official ball was arranged for at the India Office and the bill charged to India. A lunatic asylum in Ealing, gifts to members of a Zanzibar mission, the consular and diplomatic establishments of Great Britain in China and in Persia, part of the permanent expenses of the Mediterranean fleet and the entire cost of a line of telegraph from England to India had been charged before 1870 to the Indian Treasury."<sup>1</sup>

There has been quite a change, we see, when we compare the cynical plunder and licence of colonial times as pictured by L. H. Jenks with our own day. It is hardly conceivable, today, that a country, no matter how small and economically weak, should be billed for the costs of a diplomatic reception in a metropolitan capital. Colonial tribute, as such, is no longer practised. National independence has put an end

<sup>1</sup> L. H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875*, pp. 223-24. Quoted from R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*, London, 1940, pp. 140-41.



to non-economic coercion as the most important method of international redistribution of wealth in favour of advanced capitalist states at the expense of economically backward countries.

Today, economic relations between the liberated countries and the advanced capitalist countries are carried on within the framework of proper business relations, mainly in the form of commercial transactions, capital export, international government credit and subsidising. Within their system of international economic relations the two sides are contracting parties enjoying equal rights—formally, that is. Whether they are actually such, remains to be seen.

Let us examine first the export-import operations of the liberated countries. What strikes the eye here is the fact, already noted above, that the share of the former colonies and semi-colonies in the foreign trade turnover of the non-socialist world has been steadily diminishing. In 1953 it amounted to 28 per cent, but ten years later it had dropped to as low as 22.6 per cent. That is not due to any shrinking of the trade turnover of the liberated countries: on the contrary, that turnover has been growing. The volume of their exports, for example, increased by 56 per cent between 1955 and 1964, while that of their imports increased, over the same period, by 37.7 per cent. In quantity, then, both their exports and their imports have increased. But if we use the *value* criterion we shall see a different picture. We shall discover that their exports have increased by only 45 per cent, over the same period of 1955-64, but that their imports have increased by 42 per cent. In other words, the unit value of the commodities exported by the liberated countries has dropped, while the unit value of the goods imported has increased.

An instructive indicator is the ratio between the export and import prices of a pair of countries participating in international trade. This is known as the "terms of trade". Given below are index figures showing the movement of the terms of trade for the developed capitalist states and the Third World countries, in which 1958 is taken as the base period to which is assigned the index number unity.

Increasing ratios indicate improving terms of trade, decreasing ratios—a reverse trend. Hence it will be seen that, despite certain deviations, the general trend is for an improvement of the terms of trade for the advanced capi-

talist states and a deterioration for the former colonies and semi-colonies. The industrial West, in other words, is making money in the world markets at the expense of the Third World countries.

Table 6

Terms of Trade  
(1958=1)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Advanced capitalist states	1.04	1.04	1.05	1.05	1.05
Third World countries	0.99	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.97

It will be enlightening to analyse this process and find out why some of the partners consistently gain and the others just as consistently lose in this system of international trade relations.

A number of causes are at work here, some belonging to the sphere of production, others to the sphere of distribution. Let us begin by looking into the first group of causes. We have already noted that productivity of labour is considerably lower in the liberated countries than in the advanced capitalist states, which means that in the former a greater input of labour is required to produce a like quantity of comparable goods. Increased input means increased cost; and the national cost of the commodities produced by the liberated countries is, accordingly, relatively higher. We are speaking of the national cost: in the world market they are sold at their international value, which is usually lower, being affected by the conditions of production obtaining in the advanced states. As a result, the ratio between the national cost and international value of the commodities produced in the liberated countries is not in their favour.

We have noted elsewhere that the commodities offered by the former colonies and semi-colonies in the world market are generally limited to food products and agricultural and mineral raw materials. These or comparable commodities or goods are produced, however, also in the industrially developed capitalist states, where productivity is



not only considerably higher but also grows more rapidly than in the liberated countries. This brings about (a) a decrease in the international value of the commodities produced in the former colonies and semi-colonies; and (b) so great is the flow of their goods and comparable goods produced by the capitalist states into the world markets, that these become glutted, causing a further decrease in the value of the goods in question.

Liberated countries find it more difficult to counteract this unfavourable trend because they cannot afford to reduce their export of the commodities that thus glut the markets. We have already seen that their economy is highly dependent on their ability to sell all of their output of coffee or cotton or ground-nuts or sisal. Yet the manufacture of synthetic stuffs is rapidly growing, and the demand for many kinds of raw materials produced by the liberated countries is consequently steadily shrinking. Besides posing the problem of their export of the former commodities, this circumstance tends to depress their prices.

All these processes now going on in the sphere of production and affecting the formation of national cost and international value result in a non-equivalent trade between the advanced capitalist countries, on the one hand, and the liberated countries, on the other. Non-equivalent trade is an exchange of non-equivalent national values or non-equivalent amounts of embodied labour. It is rooted in the great disparity between the levels of productivity attained. And it is a direct result of many years of colonial rule, which has been responsible for retarding the development of the productive forces of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

There are other factors, besides, which affect prices and which belong to the sphere of distribution. We know that powerful monopolies operate in the world capitalist market, which are perfectly capable of raising or cutting the prices of any commodities to suit their interests. They are part and parcel of the economic system embraced by the advanced capitalist states, and their operations are, of necessity, invariably detrimental to the interests of the liberated countries. It is quite usual for them, for instance, to buy up at ridiculously low prices minerals and ores mined by their subsidiaries in liberated countries, and any losses these subsidiaries may suffer are disregarded. The important thing

is that the parent firm in, say, the United States or England gets extremely cheap raw materials which it processes and sells as manufactured goods in the world market at the highest prices it can get. The loss inflicted in this way on the liberated country concerned lies in the low price fetched by the raw material exported by the foreign company, which is an item of its national export, and the resultant cut in its foreign currency revenue.

The monopolies are not all-powerful, of course, even if for the simple reason that they engage in cut-throat competition among themselves. They cannot invariably, and increasingly, deflect world market prices from the international value of commodities. The law of value is stronger than monopoly prices. Nevertheless, the influence exercised by the monopolies on the fluctuation of world prices is very great. As for the liberated countries, any loss of export revenues, even though temporary, makes itself keenly felt.

The combined effect of the two factors, non-equivalent trade and monopoly prices, means serious losses for the liberated countries. Some idea of the magnitude of such losses may be obtained by estimating what the export revenue of the liberated countries for any current year could have been if the prices had remained stable over, let us say, the preceding decade. Such estimates were submitted to the 1964 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva. Thus, taking 1950 as the base year, it was found that in 1962 the changed terms of trade meant a loss to the liberated countries in excess of \$3,000 million.

One specific example will reveal the meaning of the exploitation to which the liberated countries are subjected in the field of foreign trade. Each of the countries mentioned below shall be taken to be the buyer of one 30-35 h.p. tractor, these tractors to be supplied to the world market by Western firms. Let us assume that Ghana was able to buy such a tractor in 1955 with the proceeds from the sale of 3.06 tons of cocoa-beans. In 1962, to buy such a tractor, she had to sell 7.14 tons of cocoa-beans. Brazil had to sell 2.38 tons of coffee to buy such a tractor in 1955, and 4.79 tons in 1962. For Turkey the cost of the tractor was comparable to that of 1.77 and 2.9 tons of tobacco, in the respective years. Assessing the cost of the tractor in terms of the national output of a number of countries, we shall find that that cost increased, over the period 1955-1962, by 21 per cent for the



Philippines, 28 per cent for Zambia (then still Northern Rhodesia), 61 per cent for the U.A.R., 19 per cent for Venezuela, 70 per cent for Malaysia, 55 per cent for Ceylon, and 20 per cent for Uruguay.

That is the kind of operations that mean loss for the liberated countries and profits for the advanced capitalist states in their reciprocal trade. There is no question here of any collectors of colonial tribute: their functions have been taken over by the mechanism of the world capitalist market, by means of which the exploiting states appropriate, gratis, a part of the liberated countries' national product.

The developing countries are making every effort to offset their foreign trade losses by drawing upon other sources of foreign exchange. Two such sources are the international circulation of private capital and foreign government loans. The notion that private capital export and government grants and credits may be useful to offset the foreign trade losses of the developing countries is invariably present in both the theoretical schemes and practical recommendations offered by Western experts.

Thus, for example, this notion underlines the widely used Western method of estimating the foreign exchange requirements of the developing countries over and above their export revenues. Paul G. Hoffman, an American expert on the problems of developing countries, estimates that if there is to be a doubling of the per head income growth rate in these countries they shall have to pay, over the period 1961-1970, around \$440,000 million for their required imports. Their export earning during that decade might total \$378,000 million. Their balance of trade deficit might therefore total \$62,000 million for the decade. In addition, at least \$8 million would be needed to cover other costs such as debt service, transportation costs, and other services requiring foreign exchange outlays, bringing total additional requirements up to \$70 million for the entire period, or an average of \$7,000 million a year. That is the amount for which Hoffman estimates the developing countries shall have to be compensated by foreign private capital and government aid.<sup>1</sup>

Similar estimates, though with somewhat different indicators, were submitted in the spring of 1964 by U.N. Food

<sup>1</sup> Paul G. Hoffman, *One Hundred Countries, One and One Quarter Billion People*, Washington, 1960, p. 54.

and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) experts at the Geneva Conference on Trade and Development.<sup>1</sup>

These methods have become one of the principles underlying the economic policies of the European Economic Community (Common Market) toward the "associated" African states. The Common Market aid fund should make good, it is held, the losses suffered by the African states in their trade with their European partners.

It is further argued in the West that the funds received by the developing countries in the shape of foreign private capital investments present certain substantial advantages as compared with foreign exchange receipts from other sources. One study, for example, which contains practical recommendations for U.S. foreign economic policies, has the following to say on the subject: "... more important than the volume of private capital outflow is the fact that private capital is accompanied by technical and managerial skills and entrepreneurial activities, which are of the greatest importance in mobilising the human and material resources of the less developed countries for greater output."<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the arguments in favour of greater export of capital to the developing countries, its necessity, as such, is generally not questioned. Most Western economists are convinced that foreign private capital investments in the former colonies and semi-colonies is a blessing for the latter. That needs to be verified.

By way of a simple test, let us see how the inflow of foreign capital into the liberated countries compares with the relative profits earned by foreign companies. The table on p. 114 is based on official data.<sup>3</sup>

One may be inclined to take the figures in the first column as representing yearly increments to the national resources of the liberated countries in the shape of private capital investments of American companies. The figures in the second column, however, completely offset this inflow of

<sup>1</sup> U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. *International Commodity Problems*, Geneva, March 26, 1964, Document E/Conf. 46/61, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries*. Studies prepared by Raymond F. Mikesell and Robert Loring Allen, Washington, 1961, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Survey of Current Business*, August and September issues for 1960-1967.



Table 7

Direct Investments and Profits of United States Companies in the Liberated Countries (\$ million)

Year	Direct capital investments	Profits transferred to U.S.A.
1959	525	1,410
1960	229	1,469
1961	419	1,616
1962	203	1,882
1963	451	1,969
1964	523	2,289
1965	807	2,252
1966	519	2,344

capital, which, as a matter of fact, even produces net losses. The difference between the repatriated profits and the inflow of investment capital represents the net losses sustained by the liberated countries as a result of the methods used by private U.S. concerns.

It has been estimated that the losses suffered annually by the liberated countries as a whole average as much as \$3,000 million, repatriated as profits to the capital-exporting states. Thus it turns out that the export of capital to the former colonies and semi-colonies is just another method of their exploitation.

There are other normal international capitalist business practices that cause substantial losses to the liberated countries, such as the chartering of ships, insurance, fluctuation of exchange rates, etc.

On balance, the liberated countries find themselves, from year to year, unable to make both ends meet. In the early 1960s they were yearly \$6,000 million short, on an average, to settle current trade commitments, provide for profit repatriation by the foreign monopolies (effected in dollars and sterling, never in local currencies), cover government debts with interest thereon, etc.

This needs to be looked into closer, for it would be logical to wonder what would happen if, being short of funds, they were forced to suspend payments to their trading partners

in the advanced capitalist states or to the foreign monopolies operating on their soil or the Western creditor-governments. This would mean the break-down of the capitalism-created system of international economic relations; except that to save it the West has discovered another means in the shape of state credits and grants: "aid" is the preferred term.

If \$6,000 million is lacking to maintain the international system of exploitation, then the \$6,000 million will be produced. That will be the precise amount of the various monies paid to the liberated countries by the governments of the capitalist states in the shape of state credit and grants. These are eventually paid for by the tax-payer in the advanced capitalist countries, which means that the working people are chiefly the ones who are out of pocket. When the liberated countries make payments on these advances, however, whether on the principal sum or interest due, their money goes to the governments of the metropolies concerned and not to the tax-payers. In other words, to keep the system of exploitation of the former colonies and semi-colonies going it is necessary to exploit the working people in the capitalist states themselves.

If we were to assign all the material means used by the liberated countries in their business dealings with the advanced capitalist countries in the early 1960s the value 100, the total sum of the loans, foreign capital, and other financial and material resources under alien control would be found to equal 22.5. This ratio indicates the degree of dependence of the former colonies and semi-colonies on international monopoly capital. Some economists expect this indicator to reach 29.2 by 1970. And even more pessimistic predictions set the figure at 51. All these predictions, of course, are based on the assumption that the present trends of relations between the liberated countries and the imperialist states will remain unchanged.

If these trends are to be overcome, it is necessary to remove the consequences of non-equivalent trade, that is to say, to substantially increase the productivity of labour in the liberated countries. It is also necessary that the right of the monopolies to do as they wish in the world capitalist market should be restricted. Another task facing the liberated countries is to curb the predatory activities of foreign concerns which are repatriating enormous profits made out of the exploitation of the manpower and natural resources



of the host countries. Another problem is that of ending the monocultural nature of the economies of the former colonies and semi-colonies. And, finally, it is high time to bargain for better terms in regard to the loans and grants liberated countries obtain from the advanced capitalist states.

Action along these lines could be truly beneficial for the former colonies and semi-colonies. In the early 1960s the average annual increment of their gross national product amounted to \$4,500 million. If they were saved the necessity of paying off huge debts plus interest and turning over exorbitant profits to capitalist countries and international monopolies, this increment could be doubled, or, to put it differently, their rate of economic development could be doubled.

As things stand at present, however, so drastic a change in the economies of the developing countries is out of the question. They are forced to turn over part of the wealth they produce to the advanced capitalist states; and that is the measure of their economic dependence.

We must now determine what is actually meant by economic dependence. Would it be correct, for instance, to say that England is an economically dependent country? We know that England does not raise enough grain at home and must import nearly half the food products she requires: would it be right to say that she is more dependent than Kenya or Uganda, who are at least able to feed their peoples?

What matters, it would appear, is not so much that a country is interested in imports and, possibly, depends on them for her survival, as in what measure these imports are economically profitable. England imports foodstuffs in exchange for the output of her highly developed industry. Given England's high productivity, this exchange must be profitable for her. So far as England is concerned, therefore, this is a case not of dependence but of a rational utilisation of international division of labour.

Let us now examine the situation from the viewpoint of the economically less developed countries. If we take Ethiopia as an example, which is a producer and purveyor of coffee, we shall find that productivity of labour in that country is low. This means that she has to pay more, in terms of labour input, for the goods she buys from, say, England, than she receives in exchange. In this sense, the

exchange is not to her advantage. Such, however, is her need of imported goods, that she cannot afford either to do entirely without this import or even to curtail its volume. And inasmuch as she has to pay more than she receives in terms of labour input she must always strive to expand the production and export of her coffee, even at a loss. Ethiopia's case, then, is the opposite of England's: a case of economic dependence, rather than of a rational utilisation of international division of labour.

The same holds true of the international flow of capital. We have seen that the profits taken by foreign monopolies out of liberated countries are invariably greater than the influx of new capital into the latter. But there is nothing resembling international plunder about the export of capital between the advanced capitalist states, as will readily be seen from the following table.

Table 8

**Current Export of U.S. Private Capital  
to Advanced Capitalist States and Repatriation  
of Profits  
(yearly average; \$ million)**

Period	Direct capital investments	Profits transferred to U.S.A.
1953-1957	663	558
1958-1962	1,130	920

It will be seen from this table that the advanced capitalist states, unlike the liberated countries, incur no foreign exchange losses in their capacity as hosts to American private capital. On the contrary, they receive more than they pay out.

The main reason for this is reinvestment: the profits earned by foreign monopolies in the advanced capitalist states are channelled, on the spot, into production and expansion. In the liberated countries, on the contrary, they are mainly transferred back to the capital-exporting countries, because foreign capital finds there but limited opportunities for profitable investment and no inducement to build large plants whose output would not sell in the relatively restricted local markets. There are other obstacles besides, such as the heavy overhead expenses of building an infrastructure, that



is, roads, power plants, water mains, etc. In the advanced capitalist states the infrastructure indispensable for the profitable and efficient operation of industrial enterprises is generally already in existence.

In the given case, however, as in the sphere of foreign trade, the liberated countries are confronted with the hard necessity of inviting foreign private capital, even if this means fresh substantial losses. That is one more manifestation of their economic dependence on foreign countries.

The root cause of all these economic phenomena is, as we have seen, the general economic backwardness of the former colonies and semi-colonies. This may be formulated somewhat differently as follows: the basic economic factors underlying the dependent and exploited state of the liberated countries within the system of the world capitalist economy are a low level of productive forces and low productivity of labour.

These are the objective economic factors, of course. Actually, the situation is aggravated by the fact that the Western powers and their monopolies make it their deliberate policy to perpetuate this economic dependence of their former colonies and semi-colonies in order to continue their exploitation.

This policy is implemented in a variety of ways, as, for instance, by monopolising a certain sphere of world capitalist trade. Thus an oil cartel in which American oil concerns play a dominant role exercises important control over the economic activities of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.

The same purpose is served by all kinds of trade preference systems, that is to say, favourable terms in respect of exports and imports granted by Western powers to closed groups of liberated countries in order to tie them to their own market. That is the system used, for example, to keep the countries of the former British Empire economically largely dependent on England. The same method is used by the United States to strengthen their domination of the foreign trade of the Latin American republics. The European Economic Community has used the same method to establish its control over the economies of many liberated African countries. Over four-fifths of the export of the new African states "associated" with the Common Market are controlled by the latter.

Currency areas (i.e., the sterling area, etc.) are also important as a means of maintaining the economic dependence of former colonies and semi-colonies and are used by finance and monopoly capital to control the national monetary systems of such countries.

Another means of restricting the economic independence of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is the Western state loans and grants policy, which not only increases their national commitments but also serves to determine the structure of their economies and even the social processes going on within them. It is worth noting, for example, that only about a tenth of the funds made available to them by the West under economic aid programmes has been used for purposes of industrial development. This means that the Western aid policy tends to perpetuate these countries as producers of agricultural and mineral raw materials.

Additional specific elements of economic dependence may be stipulated in the bilateral relations between a former colony and its former metropolis, in which an important role belongs, as a rule, to the position held by the latter back in colonial times.

In sum, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America find themselves caught up in an intricate tangle of relationships which restrict their national economic independence. Still, it is the economic backwardness of the former colonies and semi-colonies that is the root cause of the prevailing situation.

We must now try to establish whether this low level of economic development leads to economic dependence invariably, that is to say, under all circumstances. So far as that goes, different levels of economic development are a feature which has been inherited by the countries of the socialist community as well. Here, too, we have less developed countries where primary-producing industries are quite important in their national economies. To settle any doubts on this score, we should consider the entirely different consequences produced by the disparities of the national levels of economic development in the socialist world as compared with the world capitalist system. In the world socialist system, characteristically, the more advanced countries lend a hand to help the less developed countries catch up. In the capitalist world, on the contrary, the eco-



economic gulf between the highly developed industrial states and the former colonies and semi-colonies grows wider and wider. And we don't have to look far for the reason: while the law governing economic relations among the countries of the socialist world is mutual assistance in accordance with the noble principles of proletarian internationalism, in the capitalist world, on the contrary, the usual relationships of exploitation characteristic of bourgeois societies are practised in international economic relations.

Thus we see that economic backwardness logically leads to economic dependence only in the presence of specific social conditions, namely, in the conditions of the world capitalist economy. This means that the dependent position of the former colonies and semi-colonies within the economic system of world capitalism has a social, as well as an economic, basis.

That being the case, they will never achieve economic freedom, unless they advance their national economy, develop their productive forces, and raise their productivity, and at the same time disembarass themselves of the machinery of foreign control and the dominance of foreign monopolies in their economies, and offer active opposition to international finance and monopoly capital. These are, in effect, two closely allied sets of tasks designed to rid the liberated countries of oppression at the hands of world capitalism and achieve economic independence. That is the supreme aim of the national-liberation movement of our day.

### **3. Struggle for Economic Independence**

Great as the historic significance of the disintegration of the colonial system may be, quite evidently it does not spell the complete end of foreign oppression of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nor does it mean that the national-liberation struggle is over. The crumbling of the colonial system is a turning point in that struggle, implying that it must set itself a new priority task. In the preceding stage that task was the achievement of political independence; in the current stage it is the achievement of economic independence.

It would nevertheless be wrong to conclude that the countries in question need no longer be concerned with political opposition to imperialism. On the contrary, practically all of them are being subjected, in greater or lesser measure, to political pressure at the hands of the imperialists, frequently to severe military pressure as well, while some become the victims of outright aggression. Some of these countries, as a matter of fact, are still bearing the yoke of colonial regimes; and for them the immediate and main aim of their liberation struggle is, naturally, not the achievement of economic independence, but the winning of political freedom and national sovereignty.

Inasmuch as we are now considering the world-wide national-liberation revolution, however, the main aim, today, is the achievement of economic independence, for most countries have by now won their political sovereignty.

In colonial times the political power wielded by the imperialists over the colonial peoples gave the international finance and monopoly capital free rein to loot and plunder. In our day, the economic backwardness and dependence of the former colonies and semi-colonies invite continuous foreign interference in their internal affairs and provoke political and military pressure upon them. Their economic dependence and inequality of rights serve as a species of basis for a superstructure of military-colonial blocs and alliances, overt aggression and intervention, subservient puppet regimes, imposed foreign commitments, etc.

In the prevailing circumstances, political sovereignty is an important achievement for the peoples that are waging a struggle against imperialism and colonialism. It is not, however, an end-in-itself of the national-liberation movement. Political sovereignty, once achieved by a nation, is used to press the revolution, to achieve economic independence, to win full freedom from all manner of foreign exploitation. That is precisely the view taken by many of the leaders of the present-day national-liberation struggle.

Political domination of colonies and semi-colonies by the colonialists created the illusion that one nation dominated and exploited another (or other nations). But that was merely an illusion for actually not the privileged nation as a whole but its financial-monopolist bourgeoisie exercised that colonial domination. If this fact was to be made more apparent, however, and if the oppressed peoples were to be made to



see more clearly that their main enemy was a specific social class, it was necessary to make an end of foreign political rule. Accordingly, today, the struggle for complete national liberation has become more definitely a class struggle, since it is waged not so much against some one metropolitan power but against the whole system of international oppression and exploitation, or, to put it differently, against the international finance and monopoly capital.

The nature of this struggle for economic independence is often entirely misconstrued. It is asserted to be a purely economic struggle, devoid of any political or social elements. A look at the facts reveals at once the fallacy of such assertions.

Let us go back to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, for instance. Here, no doubt, we have an act designed primarily to end the control of a foreign monopoly over one of Egypt's most important economic enterprises. Yet what did that act entail? That clash over the canal produced a political crisis. The imperialist powers resorted to open aggression. A dangerous international conflict flared up, in which the national-liberation forces, supported by the world of socialism, won an important victory. The net result was a substantial economic gain for the Egyptian people as well as an important political victory for the world-wide national-liberation revolution.

A very simple, truly primitive prescription for achieving economic independence has gained some currency in recent years among certain nationalist circles in Asia and Africa. It calls for breaking off all economic relations with foreign countries. In an effort to make their recommendation more attractive its authors expatiate upon the national pride of the Asian and African peoples and upon their ability to solve all their economic problems without outside help.

There is no denying, of course, that the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies must rely on their own efforts, first and foremost, to win their economic independence, but that does not mean that breaking off relations with all other countries will help them achieve that purpose. They should realise that they have friends in the world, besides enemies, and that closing their frontiers, while effectively stopping imperialist exploitation, would at the same time set up a barrier to their co-operation with the socialist world

and cut them off from the important economic and other aid it can make available. They should also foresee that in consequence of the lop-sided structure of their economy complete isolation would doom what productive forces they may have to a dismal collapse. For they would be forced to cut the production of those commodities which are today literally the mainstay of their economies. They will not be able to sell their bananas, coffee and ground-nuts, their oil, cotton and tin. Then, too, their economic development may take decades, if not centuries, during which they shall have to work, as best they can, through all the stages of technological progress that have long since been passed by the industrially developed countries. By withdrawing from international trade they would be giving up the prospects of getting from abroad the modern machinery and equipment and everything else that could help them build up economies of their own.

The outcome would be, needless to say, that the national independence of the liberated countries would suffer a setback instead of growing stronger, and they would, in the long run, find themselves less capable of resisting the pressure of the imperialist states.

It is to be hoped that these theories will not receive enough backing to bring about their implementation. There is danger, nevertheless, in such extreme nationalism, for it creates a propensity for risky policies which may exact a high price from the peoples concerned.

At the same time it is perfectly understandable that the peoples of former colonies and semi-colonies should be anxious to deal as rapidly as possible and in the most effective way with imperialist exploitation of whatever kind and with all forms of dependence upon international finance and monopoly capital.

The question is how, concretely, this can be achieved: what are the specific problems that the countries concerned must solve in order to hasten the day of their economic independence?

We have already spoken of two kinds of measures in this connection. There are measures which directly restrict economic control and exploitation on the part of international finance and monopoly capital. And there is a series of measures designed to remove the basic factors that create this dependent status of the countries in question within the



framework of the world capitalist economy. Measures belonging to the former class include: (a) introduction of state monopoly on foreign trade in respect of selected commodities of special significance for the country concerned, or, where more radical steps are required, monopoly on foreign trade as a whole; (b) conclusion of broad international trade agreements restricting the monopolies' licence to slash at will the prices of commodities produced by the former colonies and semi-colonies; and (c) creation of economic alliances or unions among liberated countries and the organisation of mutual co-operation, designed to strengthen their position in the face of the pressure brought to bear by the imperialist monopolies. Measures specifically designed to curb the predatory activities of foreign monopoly capital in the countries in question should also be included in this class. These comprise: (a) restriction of the repatriation of profits; (b) increased taxation of foreign companies' profits; (c) control of channelling of foreign investments into industries; and (d) nationalisation (as a radical measure).

The liquidation of economic backwardness, that is to say, the removal of the basic factors responsible for the liberated countries' dependent status, presents a more difficult problem. This is, essentially, a long-term process, in which workaday creative effort is more important than sporadic, even if highly effective, measures. The process can be speeded up or slowed down, however, depending on the economic policy that directs it. The experience of many of the liberated countries has shown that to increase the rate of economic development it is essential to concentrate an increasing share of production resources in the hands of the state, or, in other words, to create and continuously expand the state sector of the national economy. Their experience further proves that there can be no economic progress unless restrictions are applied in respect of the private capital element. And the obvious conclusion is drawn regarding the great importance of economic planning and organisation for the liberated countries. If there is to be a general upswing of national economies in the Third World, then agrarian reforms are the order of the day, because so long as relics of medieval times are still strong in the rural areas agricultural production will be at a standstill, the peasants who form the largest stratum of the population will stay poor,

and the domestic market for the products of the national industries will therefore remain restricted. To increase the economic efficiency of small-commodity production, urban and rural, steps should be taken to develop various forms of co-operation: production, marketing and credit.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the actual tasks and aims of the present-day national-liberation movement are closely linked and intertwined. We consider economic independence to be the priority aim at the current stage of the movement, and we wish to emphasise that the process by which it is achieved is, in itself, of a profound social and political meaning and is inextricably linked with the strictly political struggle.



## Chapter Five

### WHY SOCIAL REFORMS ARE INEVITABLE

In the preceding chapter we have outlined some of the problems which the developing countries must face in order to overcome their economic backwardness and achieve economic independence. Much has been done in the former colonies and semi-colonies since they won their political sovereignty, mainly in order to hasten the solution of their economic problems. Nor would it be fair to say that their efforts have been futile. Yet the great majority of the Third World countries are still confronted with very serious economic difficulties. And the greatest of these, for many of them, is, perhaps, the food situation and the constant menace of famine affecting millions.

In the conditions peculiar to the Third World this problem of providing food has many aspects, such as rapid population increase, insufficient domestic production of foodstuffs, growing dependence on imported foods, low productivity in agriculture, and, finally, obsolete and often even archaic systems of land tenure determined by the socio-economic relations prevailing in the rural areas.

As we take up these concrete problems whose solution will determine the measure of success the developing countries will achieve in their struggle for economic independence, we shall therefore begin with the various aspects of the problem just stated.

#### 1. Can the Third World Be Self-Supporting?

Despite the growing area under grain and despite the somewhat higher yields of grain crops, production of grain per head of population in the developing

countries was less, by 1960, than before the second world war, as may be seen from the following table.

Table 9

#### Index Numbers Relative to Food Situation in Developing Countries (1934-38=100)

Indicator	1948-52	1960
Area under grain	118	132
Grain yield	90	108
Grain production	106	142
Population size	123	146
Per head grain production	86	97

The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America used to export grain before the war. Their net export of wheat, rice, maize, etc., to the advanced capitalist countries used to average 11 million tons. Between 1948 and 1952 the situation had radically changed. During this period the countries in question imported annually 4 million tons of grain. From the mid-1960s on, their grain import topped 25 million tons. Experts have figured out that by 1980 population growth alone will have increased their grain requirements by 300 million tons as against the present level. Keeping this figure in mind let us recall that over the 25-year period 1935-1960 the production of grain in Asia, Africa and Latin America increased by only 134 million tons. How then, one wonders, will they ever be able to increase their grain production by 300 million tons in the short time left before we are in 1980?

That is one of the questions we cannot answer without a number of reservations. Purely theoretically, it may be argued that such an increase is quite consistent with the possibilities determined by the level of productivity in agriculture attained in this 20th century. North America, for example, produces 1,100 kg of grain per head of population, while Asia produces only 225 kg. And while North America has achieved a 109 per cent increase in yields over the past 25 years, in the countries in question that increase averaged only 8 per cent.



If the developing countries could match the North American figures in agriculture, our food shortage problems would not only vanish completely, but we would be faced with the converse problem of general overproduction of grain. We would then have nothing to fear from any demographic explosion or rapid population increase in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We shall be obliged, under the circumstances, to put our initial question somewhat differently: will the developing countries be able, in the next 10 or 15 years, to reach the level of productivity in agriculture that has been reached today by the highly developed states? Put so explicitly, the question shall apparently have to be answered in the negative manner.

In fact, however, our question need not be set forth in so categorical a manner. The problem is, to all intents and purposes, to increase grain production in the countries in question by 60-65 per cent. The experience of a number of developing countries shows that such a task is not impracticable. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when national economic planning was being put into practice, an average annual increase in grain production of 2.4 per cent was reached in India, 1.7 per cent in Morocco, 6 per cent in Pakistan, 1.9 per cent in the Philippines, 4 per cent in the United Arab Republic, and 7.4 per cent in Sudan. To reach a 60 per cent increase in grain production by 1980 (as from 1965) a successive average annual increase of 4 per cent would appear sufficient.

That would mean an adequate achievement for some of the developing countries: others would need to speed up the production of foodstuffs. We have stated the problem in a simplified manner, of course; for when we speak of 60 per cent, that figure should be taken as applicable to the Third World as a whole: some countries will require higher rates of production growth, while slower progress may prove adequate for others, depending, in each individual case, on such factors as rate of population increase, availability of foreign exchange (determined *inter alia* by the adequacy of exports), changes in industrial development, etc.

In setting targets for agriculture within the framework of national economic development plans and programmes, an effort is made to take all of the above-mentioned factors into account. Actually, however, grain production in the

developing countries has been falling distinctly short of the targets set, as may be seen from the following figures (the years in brackets referring to the plan period). In Morocco the annual increment fell 0.8 per cent short of the target (1960-1964); in India—3.1 per cent (1961/62-1965/66); in Sudan—1.1 per cent (1961/62-1965/66); in the U.A.R.—2 per cent (1961/62-1964/65); in Venezuela—6.1 per cent (1963-1966), and so on.

This serious failure of most of the Third World countries to fulfil their agricultural targets in their planning to date causes perhaps the greatest concern. In setting out to discover the reasons we must recognise right away that these will differ from country to country. In some cases non-fulfilment has been due to obvious miscalculation in planning, in others to natural calamities, in still others to a lack of funds caused, possibly, by a slump in prices on the commodities exported by the country concerned. On the other hand, it is clear that these causes, different though they are, may be seen as a manifestation of the socio-economic backwardness common to all the Third World countries. For, to be candid, this vulnerability of agriculture to changes of weather, to spring freshets, which may develop into floods, and to other similar factors, is simply evidence of the low level of agricultural technology, inefficient irrigation, or, in a word, of the overall backwardness of agriculture. And if the failure to fulfil a plan is due to an unexpected decline in export revenue, the implication is that the importance of foreign trade in the country's economy is unduly emphasised, which is one more indisputable indication that its agriculture is lagging behind and that the structure of its economy is lop-sided and typically colonial. Serious miscalculations in planning, too, stem from the same causes, for they point to a shortage of trained personnel to supervise the national economy and, specifically, to work out development programmes.

While we are still on the subject of the root causes of the deplorable situation in Third World agriculture, we should mention the inevitable conclusion that any serious advance, any sustained progress in the given sphere will require serious changes in the pattern of agrarian relations now prevailing in the countries concerned. There is no known way of telling to what extent agricultural development in the Third World is retarded by *technological* factors



or by *socio-economic* obstacles. It is undeniable, however, that no technological improvements, such as greater availability of fertilisers or improved farming practices, will do much good in what is virtually a medieval milieu, where those who produce—the farmers or farm hands—may not in fact use the fruits of their labour. The need for agrarian reforms and a radical revision of the entire system of agrarian relations that originated in colonial times is so acute and so obvious, that an evolution in this direction has been going on over nearly all of the Third World for the past twenty years.

We shall attempt to outline below, briefly of necessity, some of the agrarian reforms and their consequences in a few selected developing countries.

In *India*, agrarian reforms were initiated as soon as the country gained independence. As a result of these reforms the wealthiest and most influential elements of the feudal-landlord class found their economic and political positions badly shaken; a limit was set on private landownership; land rent was reduced, and tenant peasants were ensured greater security of property rights, including the right of redemption and ownership. These changes led to a contraction of the total area under landlord ownership and a corresponding increase of the area owned by the peasantry.

The Indian agrarian reforms had a long prehistory of peasant struggle against the landlords. H. D. Malaviya, a prominent student of rural India, describes the political situation in the countryside on the eve of the Indian Government's agrarian reforms as follows: "Indeed, things seemed to be heading towards a show-down. For a time it appeared as though nothing will stop a bloody and violent conflict in the countryside. In the months preceding India's Independence on August 15, 1947, and in the period following it, the entire countryside in India witnessed ceaseless agrarian conflicts."<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of fact the agrarian reforms have continued to be the focus of struggle ever since Indian independence. The struggle goes on even today.

First to be abolished—and most effectively—was the *zamindari* system of land tenure based on the feudal rights

and privileges of landlords who had received their lands from the British colonialists mainly back in the 18th century. The *zamindars* have been allowed to retain individual plots and were paid compensation for the expropriated lands, in many cases far in excess of their sales value.

This entire operation with the abolition of the *zamindari* system contained definitely progressive elements. Unfortunately, it was associated with a measure which inflicted hardships on the Indian peasantry, for in order to set up paying economies on a new, non-feudal basis the former landlords had to "clear" the lands they were allowed to keep of their tenants. They were, accordingly, allowed by an obliging government to drive out their tenants. As a result, despite the changed situation, the contradictions between the landlords and the peasants remained as acute as before.

Fighting for their land rights, the peasants finally forced the government to pass laws regulating owner-tenant relations and drew a promise to reduce land rent to between 1/4 and 1/5 of the crop yield. By 1961, however, when the third quinquennial plan was initiated, this reduction had been implemented only in a number of states covering around one half of the country. So far as securing the tenants' property rights and the right of redemption was concerned, the situation was even worse. Inquiry showed that where the tenancy laws had been enacted they had remained in the majority of cases a dead letter. Rents have remained unchanged, except where they have gone up. The right of redemption, the amount of which has been fixed for the tenants in several states at sales prices on land, is hardly ever used, except by the wealthy tenant stratum. The peasantry at large are not only unable to acquire ownership of their holdings but are actually ruined and lose what land they had been tilling before the reform went into effect. Indian economists estimate that more peasant tenants were dispossessed while the reforms were being put into effect than over the entire nineteenth century.

Restriction of the size of holdings ran into even greater difficulties. By 1959 only four states out of all sixteen had enacted the relative laws. Between 1951 and 1964 roughly 1,700,000 acres of land were expropriated from the landlords on the strength of these laws, of which less than 1,200,000 were redistributed. But in the state of Bombay

<sup>1</sup> H. D. Malaviya, *Village Panchayats in India*, New Delhi, 1956, p. 207.



alone, in the space of two years, peasant tenants lost nearly 3,000,000 acres to the landlords.

Some visible progress in legislation designed to restrict landlord ownership was observed only after January 1959, when the Indian National Congress, driven to action by widespread peasant unrest, adopted, at its 64th session, a resolution directing all state governments to enact the necessary laws before the end of the year. Such laws were subsequently enacted, and maximum holdings have now been established in all the states, varying from several tens of acres to several hundred. This does not mean, however, that there has been any substantial distribution of land in recent years among landless and land-poor peasants. Abolition of the *zamindari* system has merely changed the status of the peasants in regard to the land they till: instead of renting their land from the landlords they have become either tenants of the state or owners in their own right.

If we were to try to sum up the results of the agrarian reforms in India as of today we would arrive at the following conclusions. In the first place, they have not ended extensive feudal landownership, because many landlords managed to distribute their lands among their relatives in time, each of whom became the owner of a land lot within the prescribed limits, so that the family as a whole continued to own the former estate. In the second place, they promoted stratification among the peasantry and stimulated the development of rural capitalism. The more or less wealthy peasants have been able to increase their holdings, since they had the necessary cash. As for the indigent peasants, these gained nothing. By the early 1960s around 30 per cent of all land belonged to about 2.5 per cent of all of the peasant households, while somewhat less than 30 per cent represented small and tiny holdings owned by about 80 per cent of the peasant households.

The two most prominent features of India's agrarian system today is the survival of pronounced feudal relics and a somewhat accelerated development of capitalist relations in the rural areas. A factor apart is the existence of large tea, coffee and rubber-tree plantations, many of them organised on the lines of capitalist big business, producing for export, and maintained by harsh exploitation of hired labour. Foreign capital is strongly entrenched in this sector of Indian agriculture. In certain areas, on the other hand,

where tribal social relations have persisted, the cutting and grass-fallow system of land tenure prevails, based on community cultivation of the land. This is simply subsistence farming, in which whatever is produced is consumed by the farmers, and there is no barter trade with outsiders. The great majority of small peasant holdings (around 80 per cent) are also run, essentially, on a subsistence basis, with crops barely able to ensure the peasants' food supply, leaving nothing for sale.

Thus we see that the changes that have taken place in the sphere of social and economic relations in the Indian village have not removed many of the obstacles blocking agricultural development in this important Third World country. The agrarian problem remains substantially unresolved, to the detriment of progress in the sphere of agriculture. These obstacles are so serious that the organisational and technological measures taken by the government to aid the rural population, their impressive scope and scale notwithstanding, have had little effect.

With the Indian village what it is today, in the grip of the relics of feudalism and most of its population landless or land-poor, the vast funds invested in agricultural development are as good as scattered to the winds.

Things came to a head in 1966 when India was hit by a mass famine and faced possible disaster on a national scale. It must be said in all fairness that the immediate cause of the grave deterioration of the food situation in the mid-1960s were the extremely adverse weather conditions in 1965. But it remains true, as we have noted elsewhere, that causes of such a nature can do so much damage only when agriculture is backward. And the reason why, in India, all the measures which had been taken to catch up in this sphere have been of little effect is that they have never gone beyond organisational and technological improvement and never helped, as much as they should have, solve the agrarian problem, which is the cardinal economic and social problem of the Indian village.

Let us now turn our attention to another continent and survey the approach to agrarian reform in Latin America. Here, it will be recalled, the agrarian problem is unique in that the prevailing system of landownership here is what is known in Spanish as *latifundismo*: the ownership of *latifundia* or great landed estates occasionally covering an area



larger than some of the countries of Europe. Half of all the registered lands of Latin America comprises latifundia of over 6,000 hectares each. It is estimated that some 3-8 per cent of the landowners hold 60-80 per cent of all arable land. As for the tiny plots left to the main mass of the land-owning peasantry, they are, to quote a Latin American journal "more fit to be burial plots for their owners than sources of livelihood".<sup>1</sup>

The owners of estates rent out their land to the peons, who are burdened with truly feudal duties in return. In some of the Latin American countries the so-called *mata por mata* system is in use, which means that the tenant undertakes to till for the landlord, without remuneration, a field equal in area to the land he rents. The peon is never out of debt to the owner, which imposes on him a kind of servile dependence: he may not leave without paying off his debt, and that is something he can never hope to do.

In a Bolivian newspaper we read the following advertisement: "FOR SALE: Highland farm, thirty minutes' drive from La Paz. Five hundred heads of sheep. Plenty of water. Twenty peons." Twenty peons the prospective buyer is offered along with the sheep! And we are well into the second half of the 20th century! The newspaper ad shows only too clearly the medieval spirit that permeates the continent's system of landownership.

Many latifundia, especially in areas of industrial crop production and cattle-raising, are operated in the manner of large capitalist enterprises. This is especially true of the estates belonging to United States monopolies. One such monopoly, the United Fruit Company, is the leading landowner in Central America, where it controls to all intents and purposes the entire production and marketing of sugar-cane, cocoa and bananas. The United Fruit Company's lands in Central America are estimated to total one million hectares.

Certain reforms in the sphere of agrarian relations have been introduced in some Latin American countries under the pressure of the peasantry and the growing national-liberation movement. One of them is *Venezuela*.

In Venezuela, the agrarian problem centres around the

<sup>1</sup> *Panorama Económico Latinoamericano*, Havana, 1962, Vol. 4, No. 51, p. 4.

extreme polarity exhibited by landownership: a small group of owners of vast estates is offset by a mass of peasants who are either land-poor or entirely landless. The following table is based on official statistical data.

Table 10

# Landownership in Venezuela 1956

Total holdings	Distribution by size (per cent of total)	
	5 ha or less	500 ha or over
Number	397,800	66.9
Area (ha)	29,590,000	2.3

When the reactionary dictatorship of Perez Jimenez was overthrown in Venezuela, in 1958, the situation took a definite turn for the worse for the owners of big estates while prospects brightened for the masses in their fight for agrarian reforms. The new government of Romulo Betancourt was compelled to make certain concessions to the peasants. Soon after the *coup d'état* the peasants' movement was activated. A "first front" was opened at Rigual when peasants occupied the estate belonging to the former defence minister and began to till it without paying any compensation. The movement gained momentum and, a few days later, the estates of Jimenez's other supporters were divided up. When the law on agrarian reform was enacted on March 5, 1960, the number of such seizures multiplied, even in the face of troops dispatched by the government into the areas where the peasant movement was going strong.

The Venezuelan agrarian reform embodied the concept of the "social function" of land, proposed by the local bourgeoisie, according to which land should produce within the framework of the national economy. No distinction should be made between vast estates tilled for the landlord by hundreds or even thousands of farm hands and tiny plots belonging to working peasants: it was important that the land should be tilled, not left idle. More than that: this concept excluded such types of land tenure as renting, for instance. In short, the Venezuelan agrarian reform stressed



the necessity of using land for *production purposes*, and completely ignored the *social aspects* of agrarian relations while proclaiming its concern precisely for the *social functions* of land.

As soon as a landowner fails to implement the "social function" of land his estate becomes subject to the reform law and is confiscated and distributed by the government among the peasants. According to data supplied by the national Agrarian Institute over 66,000 peasant families had received land under the agrarian reform law by 1964.<sup>1</sup> The country's peasantry numbers 2,500,000; assuming an average family to consist of five members, the total number of peasant families may be put at 500,000; so that the number of families that received land would not exceed 13 per cent.

Significant as this direct distribution of land is, the fact that the agrarian reform law of March 5, 1960, recognises the seizures operated by the peasants has even greater significance. This recognition of peasant ownership of the lands thus taken over was largely in the interests of the estate owners, who were to be paid important compensation therefor. While giving official recognition to peasant ownership of such lands (which made their status considerably more definite), the agrarian reform law held the peasants liable for compensating the former owners.

Thus we find that in Venezuela, as in India, the agrarian reforms so far implemented do not resolve the land problem, inasmuch as even after these reforms the upper crust of the rural population continue to enjoy their very real privileges while the majority of the peasants are landless as before. In Venezuela, again as in India, the small peasant economies are not in a position to properly effect the land's "social function", that is to say, they are insufficiently productive, in fact barely able to support themselves and completely unable to produce any marketable surplus.

In both Venezuela and India, as well as in many other Third World countries, agrarian reforms came as the direct result of vigorous peasant action and insistence on finding a solution to the agrarian problem. In a number of states, however, the ruling circles undertook reforms in advance of any such peasant action. *Iran* is a good example. Here

the Shah himself took the initiative and made the following pointed comment to explain why he had decided to introduce reforms: "Almost from the first day of my reign, I started to warn the nation's leaders to prepare for an evolution from the top before there was a revolution from below."<sup>1</sup>

The first draft of the agrarian reform law, published towards the close of 1959, provided for a maximum ownership of 300 hectares for irrigated and 600 hectares for dry-farmed lands. No limit was set for fruit orchards. The draft was vigorously opposed by the landlords, and their representatives in the majlis, who formed a majority, forced the government to make certain concessions, the most important of which was a higher ceiling on landownership, now fixed at 400 and 800 hectares, respectively, for irrigated and dry-farmed lands, as reflected in the law of April 1960.

Landlord opposition continued, however, and implementation of the law of 1960 as well as of that of 1962, which replaced it, was for a long time virtually suspended. In a few cases officials sent to enforce the law were killed. There was discontent among the peasants, too, who claimed that the reforms would not improve their situation. The opposition reached such a pitch that the Shah was compelled to dissolve the majlis, which was obstructing implementation of the reforms. An agrarian reform is at present being implemented, which is based on the law of January 9, 1962, and that of January 17, 1963.

The new laws give the landlords the choice of either renting any excess lands to peasant tenants for a period of not less than 30 years, with the amount of rent subject to review every five years; selling such lands to their tenants on terms mutually agreed upon; or transferring to their tenants free of charge a part of the land they till commensurate with their traditional share of the crop yield, the remaining part to be tilled by hired labour. When the third alternative is chosen the Agricultural Bank is required to provide the necessary credit to the landowner. In 1964 the law was amended to require peasant co-operatives to guarantee the landlords payment by their members of rent and redemption price in respect of lands thus acquired.

<sup>1</sup> *Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*. Instituto Agrario Nacional. Caracas, 1964, p. 122.

<sup>1</sup> *Life*, July 29, 1963, p. 46.



The new Iranian law contains a number of articles forbidding any land deals that may lead to parcelling. Moreover, peasants acquiring land under the reform laws are required to join a co-operative. These and other similar measures are intended to ensure the formation of sufficiently large economies, capable of more efficient production and the creation of surpluses to meet the urgent needs of growing urban populations.

Nevertheless, it is as true of Iran as of the other countries we have reviewed, that the "revolution from above", the "white revolution" in the sphere of agrarian relations has failed in achieving its main purpose: that of bridging the gap between the privileged landlord upper crust and the indigent, land-poor peasantry.

In the *United Arab Republic* a series of agrarian reforms was introduced in a radically different setting and with different results. On the eve of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 the plight of the peasants was truly frightful. The feudal landlords, who accounted for but one per cent of the population, held 35 per cent of all arable land and collected up to 70 per cent of their peasant tenants' crops. The Egyptian peasant's average length of life was 27 years.

The decree on reform was published right after the revolution. At the time, however, the reform concerned only 5 per cent of the peasants and only 6.4 per cent of all lands (as compared with the 35 per cent owned by the landlords).

Extension of the Egyptian national-democratic revolution produced, in 1961, a new agrarian reform, containing the following provisions: (a) a 50 per cent reduction of the maximum size of the plot to which a family was entitled, set by the law of 1952 at 80 hectares; (b) expropriation of 125,000 hectares of landlord-owned lands for distribution among the peasants; and (c) complete expropriation of all lands belonging to 2,614 foreigners. These provisions were to go into effect parallel with the development of new lands, which were also to be turned over to the peasants. It was estimated that these two sources would supply each peasant household (out of a total of 266,000) with from 0.8 to 2 hectares of land.

A movement in favour of co-operation was started on the newly-developed lands and those distributed by virtue of the reform. Co-operatives are currently being organised

under government control. A popular type of co-operative is the so-called "joint crop-rotation co-operative", designed to counteract extreme fragmentation and the open-field system, which is detrimental to rational farming. In these co-operatives the land is divided up into several large fields, each comprising the plots of several owners and planted to some one crop. Each peasant thus grows one kind of crop instead of several. And after the crops are gathered in they are bartered. The system has already substantially raised both productivity of labour and crop yields. The government has provided the peasants with credit by making interest-free loans available to the co-operatives.

These reforms gave the green light to genuine progress in the sphere of agriculture, for they actually made an end of feudal landownership and placed the nation's main land resources at the disposal of those whose labour ensured their productive use. That is the fundamental difference between the agrarian reforms of the U.A.R. and those in other Third World countries as outlined earlier. It may appear that there is no difference in this respect between the U.A.R. and Iran, for in the Nile Valley the reforms were also introduced "from above", by means of decrees issued in Cairo. That, however, would be a wrong approach; it would mean considering the outward, non-essential aspect of the reforms. Their real meaning can be ascertained only by taking into account the nature of the government that undertook to introduce them. In the U.A.R. we have a revolutionary-democratic government representing the interests of the so-called intermediate strata of the population, that is to say, neither the feudal elements nor the bourgeoisie. Characteristic of these intermediate strata is their social status, which resembles both that of the working people and that of the proprietor class. The peasant, of course, may be viewed as a typical embodiment of both these elements, for he is a toiler, inasmuch as he toils in the fields from dawn to dusk, and a proprietor—real, if his miserable plot is his property, or in spirit, if he is still only dreaming of making it his and must be satisfied with renting it in the meantime. The revolutionary-democratic regime now in power in the U.A.R. may thus be rightly viewed as one that stands up for the peasantry at large, so that it might have been assumed *a priori* that any agrarian reforms introduced here would take into reasonable account the interests of the peasants,



an important element of the regime's social foundation. Succeeding events have generally shown that such an expectation would have been right.

It is particularly important to note that the U.A.R. revolutionary-democratic leadership has made repeated efforts to stimulate the peasants to greater political activity and to draw their direct representatives into the work of the various state and public bodies. Thus, of the 6,912 local (primary) organisations of the Arab Socialist Union 4,000 have been set up in the villages. There is a rule that workers and fellahs (peasants) shall be entitled to at least 50 per cent of the seats. This rule was applied, to cite an instance, in the 1964 elections to the U.A.R. National Assembly.

The general domestic situation together with agrarian reforms of the nature described thus laid a foundation for a revival of Egyptian agriculture. That should not be taken to mean, however, that all of the problems facing agriculture in the U.A.R. were thereby resolved. For, as a matter of fact, many difficulties remain, which prevent any rapid progress in this sphere. One such difficulty is that the country is actually short of land: arable land constitutes only 4 per cent of its total area, whereas 70 per cent of its people live by farming. There is only one way out, and that is to develop large tracts of virgin land. Unfortunately, most of the country is desert. The only source of irrigation is the Nile. While the use of its waters for irrigating the desert has long been the Egyptian people's dream, nothing had been done to make it come true until the present revolutionary-democratic regime launched the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which is being carried on with the technical and financial aid of the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the project, when completed, will increase the area of arable lands by about 30 per cent. There will probably be substantial changes in the structure of agriculture, too. Rice-growing, for instance, will become practicable on a large scale, whereas it has been out of the question owing to the dearth of water. When all the projects associated with the building of the Aswan Dam are carried out, productivity of labour in U.A.R. agriculture will increase by 40-50 per cent, and the country's income by 45 per cent.

The U.A.R., to sum up, like many other Third World countries, approaches its agricultural problems from both

the socio-economic and the organisational and technological angles. These two approaches are adequately co-ordinated and, between them, constitute a reliable base for the development of the country's agriculture. We have already noted that the necessity of thus co-ordinating the two approaches in order to advance the rural economy has been recognised in one way or another everywhere (as in India and Iran, for example). At the same time the view is widely accepted throughout the Third World—as indeed, in many countries elsewhere—that rural socio-economic reforms in the developing countries should not be too radical, lest they prove detrimental to the effective use of modern production techniques in agriculture. The argument is that if the ownership of large estates is abolished and the lands in question are turned over to those who till them, extreme fragmentation would result, and individual holdings would dwindle in size to a point where they would cease to be paying commodity economies. Experts of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimate that if the present average size of holdings in the Third World is to remain unchanged it will be necessary to increase the total tilled area in the developing countries annually over the period 1965-1985 by 1.5 per cent. There are no actual prospects of doing this, however, and the conclusion is therefore drawn that the inevitable growth of the rural populations over the above-mentioned period (totalling from 170 to 500 million) will produce serious overpopulation.

At the same time the FAO experts note that the institutional, i.e., social structures of rural life prevailing over most of the Third World "are a formidable obstacle to modernising agriculture. Often the cultivator has no rights of security tenure in land; he has to pay an exorbitant rent or tithe, which may exceed 50 per cent of his total production; he is in the power of a trader-cum-moneylender to whom he turns for credit at usurious rates and to whom he has then to sell part or all of his produce at prices which would not prevail if he were not in an inferior—possibly defenceless—bargaining position. These constitute serious disincentives to capital investments and current expenditures on inputs."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, *Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development*. A Progress Report, CAEP. 3/B. 15, November 6, 1967, p. 13.



This excerpt shows that the experts consider substantial agrarian reforms necessary if the level of productivity in Third World agriculture is to be raised. The very same document from which the excerpt has been taken, however, advances another proposition of a different nature. The governments of the developing countries will have to solve, it is asserted, an insoluble dilemma: should they put up with all the social consequences of extreme rural inequality or should they reject the idea of economic progress in the rural areas?

How necessary, one is inclined to ask, is such a juxtaposition of rural social progress and economic development? Is it right to say that radical agrarian reforms mean the collapse of a rural economy rather than the laying of a foundation for its revival?

The two questions are essentially concerned with more than merely agricultural problems. They are concerned with the cardinal problems discussed in various economic theories. Since, however, we are dealing with the needs and problems of the rural areas of the Third World, we must try to answer them in so far as they have an actual bearing on conditions in these particular areas.

It should be evident that a large farm will generally enjoy greater advantages than a small one in regard to the possibilities of organising an efficient, highly productive economy. That is virtually axiomatic. On the other hand, in certain specific conditions this proposition may be completely erroneous. A small Danish farm, for example, will probably be found to be more productive than a great Latin American latifundia or an Iranian landlord's estate that has escaped the reform. Here a decisive role will be played by such a factor as the economic concern of the immediate producer, which might be unlimited in the case of the Danish farmer and approximating zero in the case of the Latin American peon. Then, again, inasmuch as there is a very wide area of agreement regarding the need for abolishing estates of the feudal type, let us assume that the agrarian reforms have passed that stage and that from the socio-economic angle the agricultural sphere now comprises only large economies of the capitalist type and small peasant holdings. The question will now be: Which type of economy will be more productive? Whose marketable output will be greater? The former, of course. But we mustn't jump at any

far-reaching conclusions. Our answer must not lead us to assert that the Third World countries are interested in the greatest possible development of precisely that kind of capitalist economies. Such an assertion would not hold true even in the more than improbable event that these large capitalist farms could actually meet a country's requirements in foods. For that would still offer no solution for the problems of the main stratum of the rural population: the small peasants, who, incidentally, make up the vast majority of the populations of the Third World countries. We would be even closer to the truth if we said that the development of the rural socio-economic structure along those lines would mean a miserable future for the peasants; for capitalist entrepreneurship in the sphere of agriculture can prosper only by ruining the peasantry. If more land is needed, more land will be purchased from neighbouring indigent peasants. The inevitable pauperisation of the rural population might well cause another mass famine, this time not because of a general shortage of food supplies in the country, but because a large part of the population will not have the money to buy them with. And it will be the same poverty, the same misery and unemployment. That is the price the developing countries are asked to pay for an agricultural revival. But is there really any need for them to do so?

Such social consequences are bound to follow in many of the Third World countries with limited land resources if private ownership of large tracts of land is retained, regardless of what type of economies are organised; and these consequences, in turn, will bring new serious economic problems. The only way to avert such sinister consequences is to introduce radical agrarian reforms providing for a transfer of land to those who till it and setting a limit on landownership. That, however, poses the question of how to avoid the disastrous consequences that would follow the inevitable fragmentation of land. The right answer would seemingly lie in the association of small producers in co-operatives. Peasant associations of varied kinds and purposes could be created. In many Third World countries co-operatives are even now instrumental in arranging credit for peasant farms, in supplying them with seed, fertilisers, instruments and equipment, and in marketing their produce. And the most efficient type of co-operative is the production association.



Our brief review of the agrarian problems which beset the Third World countries leads us to conclude that their solution lies above all in the introduction of serious, truly radical reforms in agrarian relations. It goes without saying that the social elements that thrive on the systems of land tenure currently in use (the landlord class, for instance) will vigorously oppose any changes in the present agrarian systems. They will probably be able, in many cases, to exercise no small influence on the ruling circles of their countries and to stall agrarian reform with the aid of the machinery of state, by bribing officials, etc. Anything that stands in the way of change in land tenure or agrarian production relations will thereby stand in the way of the process of reconstructing the national economy along new lines. A very difficult choice must be made: either to satisfy the interests and selfish desires of a privileged few or to meet the vital needs of the masses. Back in the colonial days these vital needs of the peoples could be overlooked for the time being: they were a matter of no concern to the alien regimes. Nowadays, however, the government of a country that has won its national independence may not postpone agrarian reform indefinitely if it intends to remain in power for any length of time. As a matter of fact, agrarian reforms, while varying from country to country, are now being introduced practically throughout the Third World; and there seems to be no reason why the process should not go on.

In the long run, of course, agricultural problems cannot be solved out of context with the trends of a national economy as a whole. Rural production in its relation to urban markets and urban production of manufactured goods in its relation to rural requirements are but two of the many other problems directly bearing on the prospects of agricultural development. There exist besides, however, relationships reaching out farther afield, those, for instance, that weave the agrarian economies of many Third World countries into the intricate web of relationships in the world market.

And this brings us to a new topic: the general reorganisation of the economic structure inherited by the developing countries from the colonial system.

## 2. Diversification of the Economy on the Agenda

Earlier in this study, when we examined the economic dependence of the developing countries, we dwelt on the low general level of productivity in these countries as one of the principal causes of such dependence. We shall now have to go back to this problem and try first of all to give a more precise definition of the concept of productivity, i.e., productivity of labour. It has been established that productivity indicators acquire specific meaning and describe different economic processes and phenomena in accordance with the methods of statistical measurement adopted.

We may be concerned with productivity in specific branches of the national economy. Or, again, as in the present context, we may be concerned with productivity in the developing countries' export industries. It will be perfectly apparent that progress here will reduce unit cost and, given constant prices and constant volume of export, will ensure the country concerned the same foreign exchange earnings with lower input of national resources.

Such progress is actually taking place. Its results, however, have been far from beneficial for the economies of the developing countries. Instead of effecting a saving of national resources, higher productivity of labour produces an output in excess of export possibilities, which, in turn, brings down the prices on export goods. A paradox results: the more you work, the less you get.

The productivity indicator, however, may cover either the entire population of a given country or only its economically active part. As such, it may reflect the growth of productivity either in non-export industries or in both the export and non-export industries simultaneously. If, for instance, a growing output per worker in an export industry yields the required quantity of export goods with less labour input, then the workers thus released can be transferred to some other sphere of production, thus raising, on balance, the level of national productivity with the volume of production for export remaining constant.

The problem boils down to whether or not the national resources (labour, domestic capital, transport, power facilities) released in consequence of growing productivity in the



export industries can actually be transferred to and find productive employment in other spheres of the national economy. It is thus a *problem of actual achievement and possibilities in the sphere of diversification of the national economy.*

Diversification of an economy makes for higher productivity of labour both in individual industries and on a national plane. It increases the fund of machinery and equipment and produces a wide network of inter-related industries. In sum, it works to change the lop-sided, *colonial*, structure of a country's national economy. In consequence, that economy gradually comes to depend less on the external factors that exercise their influence mainly through foreign trade, international movement of capital, and the like.

Diversification, successfully pursued, can put an end to a situation where the state of a country's economy as a whole is virtually determined by the state of those of its sectors which produce for export. There is a gap, as a rule, between the export industries of the former colonies and semi-colonies and the other industries, the width of which is determined, *inter alia*, by the great disparities in productivity.

The table given below gives figures which may be regarded as indirectly indicative of these disparities. In studying the table the following should be kept in mind. The level of productivity in individual industries will be found in all cases higher than for the national economy as a whole because we are taking the size of the national product per head of population as our indicator of national productivity; and population, for the purposes of our table, means the entire population, including its economically inactive part. Furthermore, we apply the term "export industries" to the manufacturing industries with reference to the advanced capitalist countries and to the mining and extractive industries with reference to the developing countries. The degree of diversification is measured by the national-to-industrial productivity-level ratio: the less the disparity, the higher the degree of diversification.

One consequence of this situation is that the low productivity characteristic of industries other than export prevents the developing countries from extending the range of commodities that they could sell in the world markets, since here they must face the competition of the industrial states

Table 11

Productivity in Advanced Capitalist States  
and Developing Countries  
(U.S. \$)

Groups of countries	Productivity		
	National <sup>a</sup>	Export industries <sup>b</sup>	Ratio <sup>c</sup>
Advanced capitalist states	1,250	4,437	1:3.5
Developing countries	123	3,350	1:27

<sup>a</sup> National product per head of population.

<sup>b</sup> Newly created value per head of economically active population.

<sup>c</sup> National-to-export industries.

(Computed on the basis of the U.N. publication *Patterns of Industrial Growth, 1938-1958*, New York, 1960.)

with their higher productivity, unless special agreements are arrived at.

Owing to their low productivity the developing countries are unable to make such use of their national resources as they might wish, just as a small producer cannot, in conditions of a market economy, keep pace with dropping prices on his goods: he is not in a position to give up his trade and take up the production of some other line of goods, for which he has neither the know-how nor the money. Unable to get the former price per unit of his output, he must accept diminishing takings, unless he is ready to work more and more to keep them on the former level.

Diversification, then, is a necessary step on the road to economic independence.

Inasmuch as the developing countries are, as a rule, predominantly agrarian, with a supplementary extractive industry in some cases, diversification is often thought to imply obligatory and urgent development of all possible branches of the manufacturing industry. As a matter of fact, however, the problem of diversification is much more complicated.



To begin with, conditions in the Third World are actually such, as we have already seen, that a sudden switching of its limited resources into industry might have grave consequences, at least for certain countries, because it would probably make the food problem increasingly critical. Industrial development in fact calls for a proper equilibrium between the growth of industry and progress in the sphere of agriculture. Any deviation may create bottlenecks in a country's national economy, produce excessive strain, and in the long run generally impede the process of development. This has actually happened in a number of developing countries as a result of insufficient attention to agriculture, particularly to the social aspects of agricultural development, and as a result also of an explosion of population and accelerated urbanisation unaccompanied by a corresponding development of agricultural production. The consequences have been particularly grave in countries with a considerable population density and limited land resources. In some of these, as in India, for example, lagging agricultural production has largely been the result of inability to deal effectively enough with socio-economic obstacles impeding rural progress. In others, as in the U.A.R., for instance, this has been the result, according to President Nasser, of somewhat excessive haste in pressing industrialisation.

The dependence of industrial development on the situation in agriculture is manifested in other ways as well. Thus it has been definitely established that lagging agricultural development slows the formation of a domestic market for the output of a growing domestic industry and contributes to inflationary tendencies. Agriculture is moreover a valuable source of raw materials for the growing industries of developing countries. And equally important, of course, is the reverse relationship, for an effective solution of such problems as supplying agriculture with machinery and equipment, fertilisers and pesticides, and processing food-stuffs depends on the level of industrial development.

Similarly, there is no simple approach to the problem of changing the current equilibrium between the industries serving the domestic and the foreign markets. It may seem at first sight that the rational plan would be to abandon all export and import operations which, as we have repeatedly noted, have been causing the developing countries no

small losses. If this were done, the sequence of events might be pictured as follows: the export industries gradually discontinue production; production facilities thus released turn to producing for the domestic market; and the creation of a national industry and a revived agriculture make it possible to dispense with any imports from abroad. The trouble with this line of thinking is that if it is not pure fantasy it has much in common with irresponsible and reckless theories. Foreign trade is an essential element of the national economy of any country. As for the Third World countries, to suggest cutting export is to neglect their interests, considering their dire need of export earnings as a source of foreign exchange, while to suggest cutting and gradually discontinuing imports is as good as to suggest that the countries in question should dispense with the use of the efficient machinery and equipment produced by the industrial states.

The term "diversification", therefore, when applied to the foreign trade of the developing countries means precisely that that trade should be diversified, not that it should be discarded. In regard to export, diversification may mean extending the range of goods supplied to foreign markets to include not only raw materials but also semi-finished commodities, to begin with, and, later, manufactured products of local make. There is a difference between exporting cocoa beans and exporting chocolate: chocolate means greater earnings per unit of output. In regard to import, diversification may mean that when certain items, such as foods, textiles, luxuries or raw materials are dropped, and many other goods, in due course of time, as their production is organised at home, emphasis will be shifted to the import of more complex manufactured goods in the production of which other countries have, at present, greater experience and know-how.

Thus broadly stated, the thing looks rather simple. In practice, however, the difficulties are innumerable no matter how clear the tasks a developing country must face when it undertakes to diversify its national economy; and the success of the enterprise depends on how these difficulties are overcome.

Diversification of exports, for example, offers so many obvious advantages that many of the Third World countries have long since begun to extend their lists of exportable commodities. Yet they have met with less than mod-



erate success. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that foreign trade is a sphere in which the developing countries are by no means masters of the situation. Two-thirds of their export goes to the advanced capitalist states, chiefly the U.S.A. and Western Europe. Here, however, these exports generally run into customs tariffs designed specifically to prevent export diversification by the developing countries. As a result, reference to official U.S. data, for instance, will reveal that unprocessed primary commodities account for 88 per cent of U.S. imports from the developing countries (1966 data). In other words, Third World exports to the United States consist almost entirely of primary commodities.

It might be thought that the developing countries have nothing else to offer for export. That, however, is not the case. The reader will probably draw the right conclusions after noting the high customs duties imposed by the United States and other capitalist states on imports not only of finished but also of semifinished products from the developing countries, as shown in the following table.

Table 12

**Average Customs Duties (%) Charged on Semi-Processed and Pre-Processed Manufactures Imported into Advanced Capitalist States**  
 ND—nominal duty  
 AD—actual duty

Manufactures	U.S.A.		United Kingdom		Common Market States		Sweden		Japan	
	ND	AD	ND	AD	ND	AD	ND	AD	ND	AD

Semi-processed	8.8	17.6	11.1	23.1	7.6	12.0	3.0	5.3	11.4	23.8
Pre-processed	15.2	28.6	17.2	34.3	13.3	28.3	8.5	20.8	16.6	34.5

The table should be studied in the light of the fact that unprocessed raw materials are accepted in the markets of the advanced capitalist states duty free, as a rule, with no restrictions. It is as if the governments of these states had said to the Third World exporters: We'll take your primary

commodities; but if you build up an industry to process them don't expect that your processed commodities will have an easy access to our markets.

Whenever the Third World countries take steps to speed up their economic development international difficulties arise and resemble something in the nature of a political conflict.

If we examine another aspect of diversification we shall arrive at much the same conclusions. Whatever industry-to-agriculture ratios may be established in the developing economies of the Third World countries, it is apparent that on the whole the trend should be towards a greater share of industry in their economic activity. In this connection it may properly be asked: Are the foreign exchange resources of the developing countries in fact being used in the interests of diversification and, more specifically, in the interests of increasing the share of industry therein?

To answer this question it will be necessary to analyse its two components, namely: (a) the use of a given country's *own* foreign currency assets; and (b) the use of *borrowed* foreign exchange or such as is subject to a certain amount of external control. In other words we must distinguish between a country's export earnings and the loans and grants it obtains abroad. If we trace the expenditure of export earnings on imports we shall find that they are actually and increasingly used to acquire the kind of goods that have been earmarked for building up and expanding national industries.

We see a very different picture, however, when we proceed to compare the structural changes in the economies of the Third World countries and in foreign private capital investments therein. We find that the structure of such foreign private investments changes much more slowly on the whole than the industrial pattern of the economies in question.

The broad conclusion seems to be that foreign private capital is not the motive force so far as the industrialisation of the developing countries is concerned. At best, it may be said to adapt itself to that process. Generally, the structure of foreign private capital investments in the Third World tends to repeat the old colonial pattern, whereas the creative energies of the developing countries are applied to the diversification of their national economies.



Gravitating towards the traditional, colonial branches of the economies of the Third World countries, foreign capital deflects a considerable share of local assets from actively participating in the diversification of the national economies concerned. Still, in regard to the behaviour of foreign private capital it can at least be said that it is largely, if not overwhelmingly, influenced by the forces that sway the market, so that the results of its activities cannot be viewed as the manifestation of someone's malice. That, however, is more than can be said about government credits and grants received by developing countries from the advanced capitalist states, though structurally they are just as unsuited to the requirements of the recipient countries, which are determined by their plans of industrialisation and diversification.

The channelling of the government credits and grants flowing today into the Third World countries from the advanced capitalist states practically repeats the pattern established back in colonial times.

There is nothing surprising, to be sure, in the fact that the developing countries, in their efforts to achieve economic independence, through the diversification of their national economies *inter alia*, keep running into obstacles set up by the economic policies of the advanced capitalist states. The trouble is that diversification must surmount other difficulties: those arising out of the current social and economic conditions prevailing in the developing countries themselves.

In discussing diversification with regard to Third World imports we spoke of luxuries as an item that might be dropped from the list. This would obviously be a matter of concern for the propertied strata of the population and might therefore provoke social conflict. But it would be only a minor incident in the general process of growing social contradictions associated with an economic reorganisation in line with the nation's interests. In any event, diversification will mean further drafts on public resources, and the question will inevitably arise: what social groups will foot most of the bill? If the propertied, privileged strata will be called upon to do that, they will in all probability organise a reactionary opposition. That will result in a situation where these reactionary forces will challenge the interests of the masses, and there will inevitably follow political ex-

plosions, with consequences which will, of course, vary from case to case.

From a purely economic viewpoint, diversification will bring out problems for which there will be no simple solutions. If, for example, domestic industrial production is organised in such a manner as to reduce dependence on import, diametrically opposite results might follow unless the creation of such "anti-import" industries is paralleled with the creation of corresponding complementary, related industries. Without such a complex approach to the development of "anti-import" industries there may be unjustifiable excessive expenditure of foreign exchange on imported raw materials, semi-finished goods and other components of industrial production. The share of such expenditure in total imports over the period 1950-1965 increased from 44 to 52 per cent in Argentina, from 34 to 46 per cent in Brazil, and from 22 to 29 per cent in Venezuela. In India, under the third quinquennial plan, foreign exchange expenditure on import goods required in the process of domestic industrial production was, according to preliminary estimates, nearly twice the amount spent on imported new capital equipment. Non-complex industrial development, moreover, is less economical from the viewpoint of an overall expansion of production and the domestic market. Thus, again, we face the problem of maintaining a rational equilibrium, this time between import and the "anti-import" industries.

Another difficult problem that the Third World countries must solve in connection with the diversification of their national economies is that of the ratio between capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries. An enterprise, or a complex of enterprises, is typically called capital-intensive when it is equipped with modern plant of exceptionally high productivity. Inasmuch as raising national productivity of labour is the prime concern of the developing countries in their efforts to achieve economic independence, it would seem that they should be especially interested in building up precisely that kind of industries. Conditions actually prevailing in the Third World countries, however, are such that a policy giving priority to the creation of highly productive, capital-intensive industrial plants, the channelling of all the national resources into the construction, equipment and exploitation of such plants, might aggravate the already distressing problem of unemployment. There is a



certain amount of overpopulation even now in both the urban and rural areas of the developing countries. Millions are in search of work: in the rural areas many able-bodied peasants have been made "superfluous" by the dearth of land and its irrational distribution, and in the cities the backward or primitive industries offer few opportunities for employment, so that a great many urban dwellers remain out of work and must rely on occasional chances of making some money.

Let us, for the sake of clarity, examine a hypothetical case. Let us suppose that a factory has been built and furnished with ultra-modern equipment which it will take 200 workers to run to produce a given quantity of goods. Now if somewhat less modern machinery had been installed a force of 2,000 workers would have been required to produce the same quantity of goods. Thus, the installation of ultra-modern equipment made an important contribution to national industrialisation and but a nominal one to the alleviation of unemployment. In the alternative case the results would have been the reverse: a significant alleviation of unemployment, but only a modest improvement of national productivity.

No, this is not a vicious circle. There is a way out, but only if we reject extremes and seek solutions that would take into account both the trends involved in industrial development: the trend towards higher productivity of labour and the trend towards alleviating unemployment. That is what is actually being done in India, for example, where in parallel with the construction of modern highly productive industrial plants many forms of aid are made available to the so-called home industries, which give employment to large numbers of workers in the production of yarn, textiles and a wide range of other goods.

Viewed from a somewhat different angle, it is a matter of maintaining a proper ratio between heavy and light industry in the process of diversification. Modern science and technology doubtlessly make it possible, in certain cases, to build up, at the very outset, both light industry and heavy. Such a solution would help modernise plant in other branches of a national economy. For most developing countries the problem would seem to boil down to finding an optimum ratio between the two groups of industries for each successive stage of the diversification process, taking into account

the limited resources available, on the one hand, and the structure of demand, on the other.

Many light industries are employed in the processing of locally obtained agricultural raw materials, thus contributing to the development of agriculture. As light industry develops consumer goods import can gradually be reduced, helping to economise the scarce reserves of foreign exchange. Light industry requires, as a rule, comparatively modest capital investments, and personnel training is simpler. Moreover, such investments are repaid sooner, thus ensuring the growth of the accumulation fund. And, being relatively highly labour-intensive, light industry also increases employment. Light industry enterprises can therefore pay for themselves even if their markets are restricted.

While the development of light industry is within the means of most Third World countries, light industry is not, in itself, sufficient to ensure a rapid increase of national productivity levels.

The driving force behind technological and economic progress are the industries that produce machinery and equipment. Consistent rapid economic development is feasible only if production of the means of production is given top priority, if not in every country then at least within a group of countries bound by mutual economic co-operation agreements. According to experts of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a decision, for whatever reason, not to develop production of the means of production "means to lose some of the most dynamic opportunities for economic growth".<sup>1</sup>

Developing heavy industry is, of course, no simple or easy matter. It requires heavy investments with deferred returns, costly imported equipment, many highly-skilled specialists, and extensive markets. As scientific and technological progress picks up momentum the optimum size of industrial plants generally tends to increase, and a need develops for industrial complexes, that is, groups of inter-related industrial enterprises. Heavy industry is decidedly more capital-intensive than labour-intensive and therefore less able, initially, to alleviate unemployment than is light industry. These problems, however, in no way detract from

<sup>1</sup> Trade Expansion and Economic Integration Among Developing Countries (TD/B/85, Aug. 2, 1966), p. 10.



the beneficial influence of heavy industry on economic progress. Rather, they simply point up the necessity of closely comparing requirements and possibilities at every successive stage of development.

It would seem that actually none but a few big developing countries could build up a basic modern heavy industry complex and make the desired effective use of it. It is very important to pick out the key industries at every successive stage in the light of the actual pattern and trends of international division of labour. In the early stages of the diversification process much depends on the availability of natural resources. In the oil-rich countries, for instance, rapid industrial progress could be ensured by creating petrochemical industrial complexes. At later stages natural resources will no longer exert so strong an influence on the industrial structure. Greater influence will be exercised, instead, by such factors of industrial progress as a country's growing economic potential and market capacity, the skill of her labour force, and so on.

As for the smaller countries, here the feasibility of heavy industry projects will largely depend on the development of regional and sub-regional economic co-operation.

Our review of diversification of national economies in its various aspects leads us to the following general conclusions:

First, this problem implies more than change and reform for the national economies of the developing countries: it necessarily involves the sphere of relations between the developing countries and the advanced capitalist states.

Second, diversification, being essentially an economic problem, inevitably sets in motion social forces and exacerbates social and class contradictions and conflicts within the developing countries.

The two points made above mean that the Third World will have to make, in the process of diversification, not only economic decisions but also decisions in the social and political spheres, both on a domestic and on the international level.

And third, in its strictly economic aspect diversification requires a particularly cautious approach. No universal, standard prescriptions will do. It must be preceded by careful and thorough economic calculations in the light of the totality of prevailing conditions.

### 3. Planned Economy Versus Free Market

We have already noted repeatedly the close, causal relationship existing between economic dependence and a generally backward economy. We have pointed out that the most important factor contributing to a country's economic dependence is a low national productivity level. It would be no exaggeration to say that from the viewpoint of productivity of labour most of the Third World countries are today on the same level that the states of Western Europe, for example, were a hundred, if not a hundred and fifty years ago. However, in the Europe of those days no one worried about catching up economically or striving after economic independence. The formulation of such tasks and the recognition of their national importance are generally a feature of the 20th century, a feature—more precisely—of the era ushered in by the Russian Socialist Revolution of October 1917. While the impact of that revolution on the destinies of mankind has been very diverse and broad, one of the lessons it taught was that these destinies are amenable to conscious direction.

Until the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917 capitalism and private enterprise ruled throughout the world and national economies were subject to the free play of economic laws or forces. If one country outstripped another in the field of economic development, it was owing to the uncontrolled play of these laws or forces. Socialist Russia was the world's first country to deliberately undertake the task of radically reorganising its economic system. She set herself the task of pressing her economic development, and overtaking and eventually outstripping the leading capitalist countries. The success of the early Soviet five-year plans of the 1930s had a startling effect on millions and millions of thinking people the world over. While the capitalist West was struggling in the throes of the Great Depression the Soviet state pressed rapidly ahead, with no curtailments of production, no idle capacities, no unemployment and no slowdowns to worry about. It was in those 1930s that bourgeois political economists began a guarded re-examination of their thinking. Leading authorities among them began to argue the necessity at least of regulating in one way or another, if not planning, economic processes. Anarchy in



economic activities, which capitalism had viewed as one of the manifestations of freedom, suddenly revealed its unseemly side. And the aureole of sanctity which had surrounded "free private enterprise" faded and fled.

Planning, as a concept, began to percolate into Western economic thinking, for a long time in the face of frantic opposition on the part of Big Business. To declare for planning in the United States or Western Europe meant in most cases being labelled a communist, and that entailed risk.

These facts out of the recent past are worth noting, because there is hardly a country nowadays on the face of the earth that does not have some sort of programme of economic development, mostly referred to as a national plan. These vary greatly, each having its ardent proponents engaged in ceaseless, often very heated, argument. Without going into the substance of their debates we must note one important fact about them: the point at issue is not whether there should or should not be planning, but what such planning should be like.

As for the Third World, planning was borne into its economic life on the crest of the victorious independence movement. It was one of the items in the programme of the struggle for political independence. A good example is the well-known Bombay Plan (1943), which was a programme of economic actions which influential circles in the national-liberation movement in India intended to take after independence.

Planning as the embodiment of the principle of conscious direction of economic processes is the exact opposite of the traditional capitalist principle of free enterprise. Nevertheless, today we see the former colonies and semi-colonies turning to planning when facing a choice of methods of economic development in conditions of political freedom, recognising the importance of planning to national progress, which is a sign that capitalism has significantly lost prestige in their eyes. It is also a sign of the general crisis to which the world capitalist system has been a prey for the past fifty years.

So far as the Third World countries are concerned, the following questions must be answered. Can the solution of the intricate economic problems, bequeathed to them, so to speak, by the colonialists, be left to the mechanism of a free market? Is private enterprise, which is subject to neither

restraint nor regulation, capable of developing their national economies? To both these questions most of the Third World countries have answered "No". The emphasis, of course, varied from case to case. Sometimes it was an emphatic "No!" Sometimes it was toned down to a "No, but still..." or a "No, unless...".

It will be readily understood that these nuances in the attitudes of the various social and political forces towards planning are associated with the differences that mark their class interests. As a general rule, feudal circles and big capitalists lead the opposition to planning or any other form of state interference in their economic activities. Their class interests are at odds with the aims of national progress, and very understandably so, for it is they who control most of the material resources of which the nation as a whole stands in such urgent need. It is they who, logically, will be deprived of some of their riches when these are expropriated in the interests of national development if the state actively interferes in the nation's business. But there would naturally be no such menace to the privileges of the propertied upper crust if victory should go to the principle of free market and unrestricted private enterprise.

It must be said, however, that such fervent foes of planning are not so many in the developing countries. The necessity of definite measures to regulate the national economy is very widely recognised even among the national bourgeoisie, because, in the Third World, by far the greater part of the national bourgeoisie has neither the strength nor the means to ensure economic development at a sustained pace. The bourgeoisie of the developing countries is simply unable to cope with all the difficulties in the way of economic progress without turning to the state for assistance. That is why in those countries where the bourgeoisie are at the helm the state is entrusted with the task of channelling the required financial and technological means into the priority sectors of the national economy.

Planning, in the developing countries, means above all state control over a major part of the national production resources. These resources are channelled by the state, in accordance with a national development programme, into the construction of key industrial projects and into increased production in those branches of industry which are considered to be particularly important.



For the developing countries, the most important problem of planning has long been the working out of economically sound programmes of national development. Experts have applied science and effort to the solution of this problem, and in many cases substantial success has been achieved. Experience has shown, however, that working out an economically sound programme is not enough. Experts of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East believe that many developing countries in Asia have done a very thorough job in elaborating large-scale, realistic, detailed and well-grounded plans. However, their implementation is proving slow, ineffective and incomplete. This might well lead to consequences much more serious than those that might have been expected in the absence of any such plans. Experts attached to other U.N. regional bodies as well as specialists in various countries have been commenting more and more in the same vein.

Let us see if we can trace the sources of this situation. It has been frequently mentioned in international discussions of planning in developing countries that the decisions of planning bodies were in no way compulsory for the private sector. The only way to influence the private sector, even though indirectly, was to use prices, taxes, interest rates and other similar levers of the economic mechanism.

Would even that be enough, however, to assure success? A definite answer, seemingly, is contained in the following extract from the writings of an Indian economist: "Monetary and fiscal inducements would have some hope of being sufficient if there were in the country a sufficiently large middle class, an entrepreneurial group of the required vitality in that middle class, and the necessary financial and economic institutions. But these conditions are not satisfied by India; otherwise, she would not have been an underdeveloped country."<sup>1</sup> The writer hits the nail on the head: indirect methods of state regulation could affect only a very restricted sector of the economies of developing countries, namely, that small part of a national economy which is held by private capital and has been modernised by it to an adequate degree.

In most of the developing countries by far the greatest

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from an article by S. K. Nath in *Planning and Growth in Rich and Poor Countries*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966, p. 161.

part of human resources and potential productive forces are to be found outside this modernised sector. The economic activities of millions, or rather tens and hundreds of millions, of small urban and rural producers are not amenable to state regulation, either direct or indirect. So far as they are concerned the national plan is as good as non-existent.

The upshot is that a great part of the society can disregard the plan and its provisions. More than that: as the ECAFE working groups have repeatedly noted in respect of many Asian and Far Eastern countries, it is still hard to say just how far the governments of such countries consider themselves bound to adhere to the plans they themselves have adopted. Under such circumstances it is only natural that planning should actually determine economic activity only within the state sector and not beyond its confines.

We must therefore conclude that the one way to introduce economic planning on a large scale and bring under control the spontaneous forces that sway the market is to build up and strengthen the state sector of a national economy.

In the imperialist states, state-monopoly capitalism is a product of the concentration of production and the growth of the economic and political power of the monopolies. In the liberated countries, state sectors developed in compliance with entirely different natural laws in the process of the formation of national economies. The progressive, anti-imperialist nature of this new economic system in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries becomes quite obvious when we recall that an important contribution to the creation and strengthening of state sectors has been made (in a number of countries) by the nationalisation of foreign enterprises.

The question now is whether this development is in line with the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In so far as it means eliminating foreign economic domination, the answer, apparently, should be that it is. This conclusion is borne out by numerous instances of nationalisation of foreign-owned industrial plants, railways, shipping, commercial firms, banks, and other financial enterprises in several Asian as well as Latin American countries, where political power is wielded by the local bourgeoisie. In Ceylon, for instance, the government nationalised the port facilities of Colombo and the sales agencies of the American petroleum concerns.



In India, important British-owned banks and financial concerns were nationalised, along with British-owned gold and diamond mines. In Bolivia, tin mines belonging to three large foreign companies were taken over by the state. A state monopoly on the extraction of petroleum was established in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In fact, in several Latin American countries the national bourgeoisie, after coming into power, amended their constitutions to confer upon the state the right to nationalise foreign-owned property.

Nationalisation of foreign enterprises is but one of the measures designed to build up the state sector and ensure it a continuously growing role in the economies of developing countries. Other such measures comprise: construction of new enterprises at the expense and on behalf of the government; transfer of local private firms to state ownership; barring private capital—domestic and/or foreign—from operating in specific spheres of production reserved exclusively for the state sector; licensing; price control; and other ways of regulating private enterprise.

Among all these measures nationalisation of property belonging to foreign monopolies or local financial and industrial capital is the most radical. It implies total prohibition of activity in specific spheres of the national economy, rather than merely some restrictions.

All these measures, originating as organisational and economic reforms, subsequently pass into the sphere of social reforms. The process of organising a state sector, described above, can obviously be quite contradictory. For example, the state may launch a broad programme of new road, power-station, coal-mine, and even metallurgical works construction, though all these facilities and plants would operate to supply transport, power, fuel, and metal to privately-owned concerns. This would be a manifestation of a state-capitalist trend. Similarly, nationalisation of foreign companies may be undertaken exclusively in order to transfer them to local private firms. And, similarly, state interference in such a case would not mean any infraction of the bourgeois system of production relations. Measures designed to regulate or restrict private enterprise may be directed against a particular group of the bourgeoisie while being, at the same time, in line with the interests of other representatives of private capital.

These various phenomena related to the creation and operation of the state sector accuse the bourgeoisie of inconsistency. Moreover, the state sector becomes the arena in which national interests and the interests of the local bourgeoisie as a whole or some particular group—come into collision.

When national interests prevail the development of a state sector assumes the character of an offensive against private capital, which is forced out of its key positions in the national economy. Henceforward, the new system of production relations will be based on the nationalised foreign and domestic enterprises, the newly-built state industrial plants, the government banks, commercial concerns, and transportation organisations. At this point the state sector will develop a tendency to evolve from state capitalism into national ownership.

The implementation of national development plans necessarily requires active interference by the state in the activities of the private sector. The establishment of state control over foreign trade, which may involve the institution of full or partial state monopoly of export and import operations, also contributes to the restriction of freedom of action of private capital.

The record of independent development in the former colonies and semi-colonies shows that whenever a local bourgeoisie begins to disregard the interests of the nation as a whole and is governed exclusively by class interests in its behaviour, dangerous socio-political situations inevitably develop, whose ultimate outcome depends on the conditions actually prevailing in the country concerned. There are countries where such critical situations have ended in defeat for the bourgeoisie and victory for the revolutionary-democratic forces, and a study of such cases will reveal the logical development of the social contradictions arising out of the "Planned Economy Versus Free Market" problem.

In Egypt, for instance, the revolution of 1952 wrote finis to the monarchy. King Farouk fled the country, carrying away a part of his riches, but a considerable part of these riches remained in the country and was duly confiscated. There was his luxurious cabin cruiser valued at \$5,780,000, a fleet of eighty motor-cars, a dozen palaces, coin and stamp collections, a gold and diamond Easter egg valued at \$20,000, expensive furniture, including a desk valued at



\$75,000, and other items. Under the confiscation law in regard to the property of the members of the dynasty (besides Farouk), property valued at \$500,000,000 was subject to confiscation by the state.

The direct economic consequences of the fall of the monarchy in Egypt was thus the confiscation in favour of the state of something like \$1,000 million in the shape of various tangible values belonging to the royal family and their followers. There, conceivably, the matter might have ended. Let us suppose that the new government had succeeded in converting the precious Easter egg and the royal Cadillacs into foreign exchange and acquired therewith right away machinery and equipment and built a number of industrial plants, power-stations and roads. Undoubtedly, that would have given industrial development in Egypt a certain impetus. The question, however, is: who would have been the beneficiary? What essential changes would that sequence of events brought to the ancient land on the banks of the Nile?

It can easily be imagined that with the structure of Egyptian society what it was at the time, this unexpected financial injection could have benefited none but the foreign monopolies operating in the country, the local money-bags, the cotton-market profiteers, and the Big Business bourgeoisie. In a short space of time the gulf between these wealthy strata of society and the millions of fellahs (peasants) and urban proletarians would have widened. An aggregation of "mini-Farouks" would have appeared on the scene, who might not have been titled kings but who could easily have afforded luxurious motor-cars, cabin cruisers, and palaces. And the revolution would have petered out half-way.

The possibility of such a calamity was very real. The fact is that in the early years after the overthrow of the monarchy the ruling circles of the U.A.R. granted the bourgeoisie substantial prerogatives and privileges, in the expectation that the local capitalists, aided by the government, would embark upon large-scale entrepreneurial activities and thus promote the desired economic progress. These expectations, however, were never realised.

Despite all the encouragement the government could offer, private capital was reluctant to invest in industry. Instead of building factories the bourgeoisie bought real estate. The

outflow of money abroad assumed disastrous proportions: rich Egyptians were losing no time in transferring their money into the vaults of Swiss banks. Profiteering flourished.

It was natural, in the circumstances, that two diametrically opposite trends took shape in the country's socio-political life, one reflecting the development and strengthening of the revolution, the other aiming at consolidating the privileges of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and presenting them with all the gains won by the Egyptian people in their struggle against the monarchy and foreign imperialism. The country's leaders had to make a choice. Some, as General Neguib, for instance, elected to join the bourgeoisie.

The crisis broke in the spring of 1954. The people at large were for pressing forward with the revolution. There were workers' demonstrations and a general strike. Backed by the people's will thus unmistakably expressed, the revolutionary forces won out, and in April 1954, the revolutionary leadership, headed by Nasser, were in complete control of the situation.

Work was begun on socio-economic reforms. However, the land reform, for instance, launched back in 1952, affected only 6.4 per cent of all lands, while 35 per cent of all arable land belonged to the landlords. The privileged strata, urban and rural, continued to live in luxury. Though representing only 1.5 per cent of the population they accounted for 35 per cent of the national income. The masses lived in dire poverty.

Even then, however, there was dissent among the bourgeoisie and talk of ending all government control. A new conflict was in the making between the broad democratic measures demanded by the nation and the narrow interests of the exploiting classes. With this conflict taking shape, the revolutionary leadership took, in the second half of 1961, drastic measures to curb private capital.

The decrees of 1961 were intended primarily to secure much greater state participation in the national economy. The state established its control over 95 per cent of the industrial concerns, banks, insurance, transportation and export and import companies, and domestic wholesale dealers. Private enterprise was virtually reduced to the sphere of retail trade and minor industries and crafts.



Expansion of the state sector and restriction of private enterprise were accompanied by an "anti-millionaire campaign". Property valued at almost \$1,000 million belonging to the one hundred families who controlled the country's economy was expropriated by the state. In addition the property of 700 leading capitalists was seized by the state and many of the owners were arrested.

In 1963 the revolutionary government struck still another blow against the local capitalists by nationalising a wide range of food, chemical and other industries, import and export concerns, and construction firms, many of which were already under government control. The National Charter adopted by the National Assembly declared all nationalised concerns public property.

All members of the propertied exploiting classes whose privileges had been abrogated by the socio-economic reforms were additionally prohibited from any participation in political activities.

These developments, as might have been expected, provoked the reactionary elements to a new outbreak of wrath. The Moslem Brotherhood, an extremely reactionary religious and nationalist organisation operating underground and connected, incidentally, with imperialist circles, made several sorties against the revolution and organised an unsuccessful attempt on the life of President Nasser.

The national leadership retaliated by initiating, in 1965, further administrative and political reforms designed to draw the broad masses into direct and increasingly diverse and active participation in the country's revolutionary activities. It was decided to set up within the Arab Socialist Union a political organisation exercising the functions of a party, which was to play the important role of a politically conscious socialist vanguard of the people.

Thus we see that it took the revolutionary forces of the U.A.R. slightly over a decade to implement step by step their democratic, revolutionary programme and start the country on a road of development leading to socialism. According to President Nasser himself, the leaders of the 1952 revolution had no detailed and far-reaching plan of action that could warrant the conclusion that the events in the U.A.R. were, from beginning to end, an embodiment of their revolutionary aims. Far from it. The Free Officers and the masses whom they mobilised for the struggle chal-

lenged the imperialists and feudal landlords in battle first, and only later, in the process of the conflict, saw the necessity of challenging the local capitalists as well. Their political attitude crystallised as they waged the battle. As they analysed their mistakes and their successes, the revolutionary-democratic leaders of the U.A.R. swung increasingly over to socialism. And their decision to follow a non-capitalist road of national development was the result of the consistent implementation of a broad democratic programme.

The important social change that has come to pass in the U.A.R. may be attributed, among other causes, to a *definite rejection of a free market, private capitalism*, as well as the Egyptian bourgeoisie, which could not overcome its class selfishness in the name of national progress.

In Burma, thousands of miles away, events, in recent years, repeated very closely the pattern of the Egyptian revolution.

After throwing off British colonial rule in 1948 Burma entered upon a confusing period of political struggle at home. The efforts of the local bourgeoisie to swing the country over to capitalism brought it to the brink of economic disaster. By 1962 its gross industrial output was down 15 per cent as against the pre-war level, as was also the yield of rice, Burma's staple food crop and most important item of export. The extraction of petroleum and tin had dwindled to one-half and one-fifth, respectively, of the output of colonial times. Nothing was done to implement the agrarian reform promulgated earlier. Concessions to local and foreign private capital followed one after another. The working people faced growing hardships. Government officials lived by graft. As General Ne Vin was to describe it later, "corruption pervaded the administration, the army, business, and politics, the entire country, in fact".<sup>1</sup>

In March 1962, General Ne Vin, at the head of the country's military forces, brought off a *coup d'état*. A Revolutionary Council seized power, with a membership including patriotically-minded officers.

During a year or so after the coup the Revolutionary Council sought a way out of the economic impasse on the basis of co-operation with the local capitalists. However, the

<sup>1</sup> Ne Vin, *Birma na novom puti* (Burma Takes a New Road), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 48.



new revolutionary-democratic government soon realised that this policy would get it nowhere. "Our initial intention had been to let private industrialists continue running a number of plants which the government could not operate," wrote Ne Vin. "But what did that get us? The owners began bribing government officials in order to increase their profits. We saw that if we allowed new private industrial concerns to be formed we would have to deal with foreign subversive activities.... A private sector is not in line with our aims: the principle of socialist economics is nationalisation. We shall let the existing private industries operate, but we shall nationalise them eventually."<sup>1</sup>

Wherever national interests clash with the narrow class interests of the bourgeoisie, a choice must be made. Burma is no exception. Her revolutionary-democratic government had either to forego the general remedial aims for which it had made the *coup d'état* or else work to achieve them by implementing increasingly drastic measures. The building of a socialist society had been proclaimed the national aim immediately after the *coup d'état*. In this respect the Burmese Revolutionary Council had ready, when it challenged the local reactionary forces, a long-range social programme based on an appropriate political ideology. And the moment the revolutionary leadership met with sabotage and subversion on the part of the local bourgeoisie it went ahead determinedly with a radical reorganisation of social relations in town and country.

Within a couple of years the biggest foreign enterprises were nationalised. Foreign capital soon lost essentially all its positions in the country. All the leading branches of production, all trade, domestic and foreign, transport, and the credit system, were taken under control by the state. Private capitalists were forbidden to launch new enterprises.

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We have called this section "Planned Economy Versus Free Market". Offhand, this may seem to mean a discussion of the relative merits and drawbacks of two abstract concepts of political economy. Actually, however, as the reader will have seen, very real socio-political forces stand behind

<sup>1</sup> Ne Vin, *Birma na novom puti*, pp. 42-43.

both concepts, which are drawn by force of circumstances—willingly or unwillingly—into the maelstrom of social conflict. The outcome of this conflict will not necessarily be the same as in the U.A.R. or Burma. What we want to emphasise most strongly is that the problems facing the Third World countries in their struggle for economic independence are not always solved in the tranquil atmosphere of a ministry. In so far as such problems concern the vital interests of the various classes, strata and groups of people, they cease to be "purely economic" problems and become the object of social debate and conflict.

We have seen the national-liberation movement pass from the stage at which its main aim had been to win *political freedom* into a new stage, where the main aim is to achieve *economic independence*. Now this struggle for economic independence logically leads to still another stage of the national-liberation revolution, at which the main accent is increasingly on *social reform*.



## Chapter Six

### CHOICE OF A ROAD

If we examine the life of any of the Third World countries in all its complexity, we shall find its every aspect related to the problem of choosing a road of development. That problem, today, is of vital importance to these countries. Whether we consider the devious peripeteia of the political or socio-economic or ideological processes or class conflicts going on within them, or of their relations with the capitalist or the socialist countries, we shall find them facing that crucial problem sooner or later, and on the ultimate choice they make—as between capitalism or socialism—will largely depend both their own welfare and the balance of power in the international arena.

#### 1. Period of Transition

Right now the emerging countries of Asia and Africa are going through a period of transition. In the long view this should be understood as a transition from capitalism to socialism. At a shorter range this period may be seen as comprising several stages of the road from a backward colonial structure to a modern developed society. A colonial society, incidentally, need not necessarily mean a capitalist society. It may be a society where capitalist relations are dominant; but it may also be one in which pre-capitalist forms of ownership dominate.

Because capitalism never developed in the former colonies and semi-colonies beyond an early stage, their class and social structure differs markedly from case to case, which, in turn, explains the immaturity of their social relations. Tribal, feudal, capitalist and many transitional forms of social relations can often be found existing side by side within a single country. In most Asian and, particularly,

African countries the process of class differentiation is incomplete, and a peculiar situation has resulted, where no single social class is capable of guiding alone their socio-economic and political development: the working class—because it is numerically weak, insufficiently organised and politically immature, and the bourgeoisie—either because, in most of the countries in question, it has not yet fully developed into a class, even though some of its elements (e.g., merchants, money-lenders) may already be in existence, or else because though it exists as a class its coming to power has not generally been followed by an economic and political stabilisation of the states concerned.

While it will probably take an entire historical epoch, owing to such objective circumstances, to complete the transition in question, the economically backward countries need not feel doomed to wait passively until conditions are ripe for a new society, until capitalism takes deep root, for instance. The notion that capitalism must necessarily precede transition to socialism in the colonies was resolutely rejected by Lenin.

It is a matter of general knowledge that imperialism has hastened the development of capitalism in the colonies and dependencies, though twisting and distorting it in the process. The level of capitalist development determines the scope and force of national-liberation movements. Now the Third World comprises mainly countries at a low level of capitalist development. Such states as India or Turkey, for example, where capitalism is comparatively developed, are an exception rather than the rule.

Let us see if we can discover in what way conditions bearing on the development of capitalism in the countries of Asia and Africa have changed since their political independence: have the opportunities for the development of national capitalism increased or diminished since these countries achieved the status of independent states? The answer is important to us if we want to study the characteristic features of their socio-economic structure and the ways, forms and rates of their social development.

To begin with, the developing countries of Asia and Africa have remained even after independence within the sphere of the world capitalist economy. That does not mean, however, that the conditions bearing on the development of national capitalism have remained unchanged, or that its



nature and structure have not undergone substantial change. The formation of independent states can never *ipso facto* immediately cut short the development of national capitalism: it can only endow it with certain specific features. Perhaps the most notable of these is that national capitalism has nearly everywhere assumed the form of state capitalism, owing to the economic weakness of the national bourgeoisie which has come to power, as well as to the limited opportunities for capital accumulation. A state sector blocks the unrestricted penetration of foreign monopoly capital and therefore checks the growth of important private enterprise, whose development is directly dependent on foreign monopolies. K. Mathew Kurian, the Indian economist, very rightly points out that "the role of private foreign capital in India during the period since independence has been to facilitate the drift towards monopoly and concentration of economic power in the hands of the few".<sup>1</sup>

Although its development in the emerging countries is fraught with all sorts of difficulties and contradictions, the state sector constitutes that sphere of economic activity which, by the very fact of its existence, acts as a brake on the growth of national capitalism generally and, notably, that of big capital. For the truth is that the political administration, representing as it does not only the interests of the national bourgeoisie but also those of petty-bourgeois elements and, to a degree, the working people, finds itself constrained, in the interests of national independence, to promote the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist tendencies that are inherent in the state sector. That is precisely the reason why the role of the state sector may be said to be socially progressive even in those countries where political power is wholly in the hands of the national bourgeoisie. On the other hand, in some countries (e.g., India and Turkey) the ruling bourgeoisie occasionally finds ways of using the state sector to accelerate the development of capitalism. Here, too, however, the bourgeoisie shows rather marked tendencies to prevent the development of the state sector or to restrict its sphere of activity. One reason why the state sector draws bourgeois criticism, notably charges of

"inefficiency", is that it carries within it the germs of new social relations.

For the Third World countries as a whole, growth rates of private enterprise are typically below average. Most national private capital investments are channeled into agriculture, commerce (other than important), and public utilities. The expansion of big capital in these spheres of activity is restrained, as a rule, by the government's fiscal policies and other economic measures.

Petty economy remains, as before, the mainstay in the countries in question, which are, economically and socially, the least developed among those comprising the world capitalist system. Their economic structure had taken shape against a peculiar historical background, at a time when capitalist relations were feeling the strong influence of pre-feudal and feudal modes of ownership and therefore lacked opportunities for development. In our day, capitalist development has run into fresh obstructions, notably in the shape of the new sovereign states, whose political activities restrict, in a measure (greater or lesser, as the case may be), the sphere of activity open to private enterprise. Unlike in the industrially developed capitalist countries, where the system of state-monopoly regulation begins to operate in the highest stage of capitalist development, here capitalism turns into state capitalism before it has had time to acquire a sufficiently strong and durable economic and social base. This situation has its progressive and its unfortunate aspects. The nationalisation of foreign and important local assets and the creation of a state sector on the basis thereof is its progressive aspect, even if under the prevailing capitalist regime the privileged strata are the greatest gainers, for it prepares the ground for the transition of the emerging countries to the road of social progress. With the state sector as their mainstay, the enlightened elements are in a position to develop their latent progressive tendencies and thus save the backward peoples the necessity of going through all the successive stages of the long and painful process of capitalist development.

As for the unfortunate consequences of a low level of national capitalist development, these are manifested in the inability of the colonies and semi-colonies to make adequate use of the creative forces of capitalism to pull themselves out of their medieval morass, owing to the imperialist powers'

<sup>1</sup> K. Mathew Kurian, *Impact of Foreign Capital on Indian Economy*, New Delhi, 1966, p. 273.



deliberate policy of maintaining and perpetuating pre-feudal and feudal relations in these lands. "Capitalism is a bane compared with socialism. Capitalism is a boon compared with medievalism, small production, and the evils of bureaucracy which spring from the dispersal of the small producers,"<sup>1</sup> wrote Lenin. The inadequate development of capitalism in the colonies and semi-colonies was also reflected in the membership, the class-consciousness of the members, the aims, etc., of the national-liberation movement.

Two economic sectors—the national and the foreign—coexisted, with but limited mutual relations, for a long time in the former colonies and semi-colonies, and, as a matter of fact, survive here and there to this day. Pre-capitalist relations prevailed in the national sector, which comprised agriculture, mainly subsistence, and the crafts and home industries; while in the foreign sector production relations were patterned on those of the developed capitalist states. The first industrial plants created in the former colonies and semi-colonies were owned entirely by foreign monopoly capital. Indigenous inhabitants, often natives of back-country regions where patriarchal customs prevailed, on taking employment in such plants may be said to have skipped several historical epochs. Continuous contact with the economic system of the imperialist powers led them to accept political and ideological conceptions considerably more progressive than those that reflected their own national basis; so that the formation of the political superstructure in the lands in question was subjected to the strong influence emanating from the foreign sector. This situation produced a serious impact on the former colonies and semi-colonies and engendered certain phenomena in their political superstructure, which subsequently determined their political demands, structure of political administration, system of government, etc.

Analysing the relationship of the basis and superstructure in the developing countries, some bourgeois authors note that, unlike in the European countries, where social change followed economic development, here social demands typically *outdistanced* economic development. Albert Meister, the French sociologist, writes, for instance: "In the new countries, on the contrary, social change precedes [econom-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 350.

ic) development: current thinking and aspirations outdistance the production possibilities that could satisfy them."<sup>1</sup> The author admits that such aspirations are not intentional but are aroused by contact with the way of life in foreign lands. We could go along with this opinion, if it were not for the author's obvious stubborn wish to prove that the developing nations are doomed, that they must realise how poor they are and must therefore cut to a minimum their expenditure on public health, which, he writes, results in "increasing the number of people, those squanderers of the national product".<sup>2</sup>

In the capitalist West and in certain circles of the new national states the current stage of development through which the latter are going is often referred to as the Third Road. According to some ideologists of neo-colonialism these countries are thinking of a road of their own, which, ideologically, would lie somewhere between communist theory and that of the Western industrial world.<sup>3</sup> Another author, Mario Rossi, holds that the developing countries of Asia and Africa form a Third World "not only because the other two preceded it, dominating the scene of history, but also in so far as it possesses a personality of its own, just as the others do. It is not a world waiting to choose which side to join, because it has already chosen to be itself."<sup>4</sup>

The idea of a Third Road is rather popular in the developing countries because the conditions prevailing in these countries are really very different and unique, frequently unlike the already familiar ways and patterns of social development. This uniqueness of the Third World is often identified with a distinctive road of development.

Marxists-Leninists have always held that it is necessary to take into account all the specific characteristics of each country and to recognise the irrefutable fact that each nation will make, in its transition to socialism, its distinctive contribution to the form of democracy or rates of socialist reform it adopts.

<sup>1</sup> Albert Meister, *L'Afrique peut-elle partir? Changement social et développement en Afrique Orientale*, Paris, 1966, p. 335.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 411.

<sup>3</sup> See Richard Löwenthal, Ernest Halperin, Jürgen Domes, Franz Ansprenger, *Entwicklungsländer zwischen nationaler und kommunistischer Revolution*, Hannover, 1965, p. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Mario Rossi, *The Third World. The Unaligned Countries and the World Revolution*, New York, 1963, p. 4.



In this connection Lenin wrote: "Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions than the Russian revolution."<sup>1</sup>

The Marxist theory of the non-capitalist development of backward countries is based precisely on an objective analysis and careful consideration of all the peculiar and unique features of the Third World.

## 2. The Non-Capitalist Road

The notion that the backward countries might bypass the capitalist stage in their transition to socialism was broached by Marx and Engels and subsequently elaborated and refined in the works of Lenin. In his report on colonialism and nationalities problems, made to the Second Comintern Congress of 1920, Lenin formulated the case as follows: "... are we to consider as correct the assertion that the capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the road to emancipation and among whom a certain advance towards progress is to be seen since the war? We replied in the negative."<sup>2</sup>

The theory of social progress for backward countries was in complete agreement with Lenin's conception of the world revolutionary process as an alliance of the three basic revolutionary forces, namely, Soviet Russia, the working class of the developed capitalist countries, and the national-liberation movement of the oppressed peoples. Lenin regarded the subject as extremely important and considered that it should be amply substantiated from a Marxist viewpoint.

The term "non-capitalist road" was coined somewhat later. It was first used in the documents of the Sixth Comintern Congress in connection with the discussion of the revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial lands. O. W. Kuusinen mentioned in his report to the Congress the necessity of accomplishing the very important theoretical

task set by Lenin, namely, that of "producing the theoretical substantiation of the possibility of non-capitalist development in the backward countries. This important theoretical substantiation is not given in the present draft Theses, neither has an attempt been made to produce it. We have not had an opportunity to make a serious enough study of this question."<sup>1</sup> The debate revealed that opinions differed, but on the whole the speakers agreed that non-capitalist development was feasible only in those countries where an indigenous bourgeoisie was non-existent and those where an imported capitalism existed but not a bourgeois regime. As to countries like India or China, which were going through the bourgeois-democratic stage of their revolution, non-capitalist development was completely out of the question.

The concept was later confirmed by the experience of certain peoples of the Soviet Union as well as by that of the Mongolian People's Republic. Today, with the imperialist colonial system crumbling rapidly all around and with the choice of a road of development becoming the crucial problem facing the emerging countries, the theory of social progress has again acquired urgency from both a scientific and a political viewpoint.

It would be premature to consider all the aspects of this complex problem already fully clarified and scientifically substantiated. In the main, three points are currently being debated: (a) How adequately does the term "non-capitalist development" describe the meaning of the process in question? (b) Is it proper to put a broad construction on this concept or should "non-capitalist development" be construed solely as the possibility for a backward country to build socialism *bypassing the capitalist stage of development*? (c) Is there actually any point in drawing a strict distinction between the two stages of development of emerging countries, that is to say, the non-capitalist and the socialist; or are the two essentially the same?

The Algerian newspaper *El Moudjahid* of July 12, 1968, published an article which contained what was virtually an appeal to drop the term "non-capitalist road" which "was being used indiscriminately to indicate systems often completely unlike both as to their nature and their operation".

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 480.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

<sup>1</sup> VI kongress Komintern, Records, Issue 4, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p. 6.



The newspaper's main objection to the term was that "the term 'non-capitalist road' is negative in its very wording. It presupposes a system following a road that leads to 'non-capitalism', that is, to something other than capitalism, though not indicating what that 'something' is. If we assume that this 'something' is not socialism, either, inasmuch as there is no mention here of a socialist road, then does not the term in question refer to a third road?"

The author of the article quoted is quite right in considering terminology important for the process of cognition. Inaccuracy and inconsistency in terminology breed confusion of opinion and frequently lead to distortion of the substance of the problem in question. Precise terminology is therefore of the greatest importance in science. It is possible in this sense that the term "non-capitalist road" does not describe sufficiently exactly and fully the process that it is used to describe. However, what the author of the article quoted considers to be a defect of the term in question (i.e., that "the term 'non-capitalist road' is negative in its very wording") is just what we consider to be its merit; for the term correctly reflects the essence of the transitional process, in which it is precisely the aims of negation that are predominant.

When we take up the problem of non-capitalist development we must take into account the following three all-important factors:

(a) the economic backwardness of the Third World countries and the inadequate development of social relations therein;

(b) the possibility that current national-liberation revolutions may develop into socialist revolutions; and

(c) the existence of a world socialist system that exerts a growing influence on world events.

The socio-economic backwardness of the emerging countries, which usually leads to suggestions of a "third road", cannot be an obstacle to social progress. Lenin vigorously rejected the notion that the introduction of capitalism in the colonies was an essential prerequisite of their transition to socialism. From an economic point of view, admittedly, the advanced capitalist states are closer to socialism than the industrially backward countries, since "state-monopoly capitalism is a complete *material* preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a rung on

the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism *there are no intermediate rungs*".<sup>1</sup> In this sense "socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly *which is made to serve the interests of the whole people* and has to that extent *ceased* to be capitalist monopoly".<sup>2</sup> Pertinent also is Lenin's remark that "we would hardly have succeeded without a definite degree of capitalist development".<sup>3</sup>

These quotations from Lenin warn against any oversimplified or hasty inference that the socio-economic development of the new national states and their transition to socialism can be achieved with ease, without tremendous effort, which, moreover, will have to be exerted chiefly by these states themselves.

But that does not mean, of course, that the economically backward countries are ordained by fate to wait in idleness until all the material prerequisites of socialism are ripe, and, specifically, until a state monopoly capitalism has been established in them. Marxism rejects such an approach as incapable of assuring success. Lenin, it will be recalled, challenged all those who suggested adopting a wait-and-see attitude in the matter, which meant giving capitalism a chance to take firm root in the colonies.

The emerging countries vary, notably, in regard to their level of capitalist development. Some have reached an average level. Others may be said to be semi-capitalist, with marked feudal and often even tribal relics. Still others are on the lowest rung of primitive capitalist accumulation. Sometimes yet another group of countries is identified, namely, those whose development has stopped at the feudal or even pre-feudal stage. Among the new independent countries there is not a single one with a purely feudal economy, without an admixture of capitalist relations. They differ in respect of their level of capitalist development, in respect of their capitalist maturity, but none have bypassed the capitalist stage. It would be hardly proper therefore to assert that only a certain group of the new independent states faces the choice of a road or the possibility of development along non-capitalist lines. This crucial problem is the focus of strife in all of the developing countries: those that have opted for the non-capitalist road, those that are following

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

<sup>3</sup> *Leninsky sbornik XI (Lenin Miscellany XI)*, p. 397.



the capitalist road, and those that have still to make a final decision.

A broad interpretation of the problem of non-capitalist development is motivated by the fact that the Third World countries, including those where capitalism has taken rather firm root, lag socially and economically way behind the advanced countries. This socio-economic backwardness renders the various processes at work in these countries more complicated and their transition from a backward colonial system to an advanced society susceptible to frequent loss of political stability, abrupt turns, unexpected cataclysms, and sharp class conflicts.

It is characteristic of the developing countries that they are starting out independently on the road of development in an era when capitalism has outlived itself as a social system and cannot aid them effectively in building up their economies.

While capitalism has no future in the countries in question as an economic system, it is also the object of attack in the political sphere. Even representatives of modern capitalism are forced to admit that "the national leaders, with the exception of some Latin Americans, are in agreement in rejecting the capitalist method of development as slow, inefficient, and unsuited to their conditions".<sup>1</sup>

The non-capitalist road is suggested by the very nature of the national-liberation revolutions of our day, which cannot be viewed as bourgeois-democratic revolutions that merely clear the way for the capitalist development of imperialism's former colonial fringe. In our day, the two types of revolutions, national-liberation and socialist, are drawing mutually closer. The former are often initially directed not only against imperialism and feudal regimes, but, in a measure, also against capitalism, that is to say, against the same foe as are the socialist revolutions headed by the working class. It would be wrong, however, to identify, for that reason, the current stage of the national liberation with the socialist stage, inasmuch as the former pursues chiefly aims of a general democratic nature.

Modern national-liberation movements may, apparently, be said to be transitional-type revolutions, which, while

retaining some features of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, gradually acquire those characteristic of socialist revolutions. Lenin used to ridicule those who "reduced Marxism to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution, and even this antithesis they interpret in an utterly lifeless way".<sup>1</sup>

What, then, are the common features of national-liberation and socialist revolutions and in what respects do they differ? The question has a direct bearing on the meaning of non-capitalist development.

The period of transition from capitalism to socialism, through which mankind is now passing, comprises many different types and kinds of revolutionary and democratic movements having a common ultimate goal but differing in respect of their current tasks. It is therefore just as dangerous to classify the various revolutionary movements and trends into artificial categories as to make no distinction among them.

The two types of revolutions in question are similar not only as to their ultimate goals but also to certain methods and techniques used in the implementation of socio-economic and political reforms.

Modern national-liberation revolutions set themselves—and often carry out—tasks which are usually carried out by socialist revolutions. Lenin foresaw this possibility when he told the Third Comintern Congress that "in the impending decisive battles in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism".<sup>2</sup>

There are nevertheless substantial differences between them. For example, after achieving a socialist revolution a given country takes up at once the task of building a socialist society. It is able to do so because existing socio-economic prerequisites are supplemented by the presence of political factors essential to socialist construction, notably the direction of the revolutionary process by the working class and its political party.

<sup>1</sup> *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, New York, London, 1963, p. 12.

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 482.



As to national-liberation revolutions, socialist reforms are not their immediate aim. They are taken up only after the lapse of sufficient time for the necessary socio-economic and political factors to mature. Between the achievement of the national-liberation revolution, therefore, and the actual initiation of socialist construction by the liberated country there intervenes a certain historic period, which will probably differ from country to country in respect of length and characteristic features.

A feature in common, on the other hand, is that non-proletarian strata are, during such a period, in charge of the socio-economic and political processes that are to prepare the ground for the eventual initiation of socialist construction in the liberated countries. A socialist revolution is accomplished when a proletariat has taken shape, which is conscious of its identity as a class, which represents a political force capable of heading a revolutionary movement of the working and exploited masses, and which has a political party fully aware of the aim of the struggle and provided with a sound programme of socialist construction. None of these important political factors are so far present in the countries that have achieved their national-liberation revolutions. Their political parties, which had headed the liberation movement and which represented the national bourgeoisie and to some extent the petty-bourgeois non-proletarian strata, had no clear-cut positive programme for the reorganisation of the society. Their basic aim was to end imperialist colonial rule. None of these countries have so far actually begun building socialism. They are currently at the stage of a gradual *accumulation of the prerequisites* of a socialist development yet to begin.

It would therefore be wrong to identify the period of transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by socialist revolutions with the period of transition which in most liberated countries follows national-liberation revolutions. This latter transitional period comprises two stages. The first, through which the liberated countries are now going, is a period of the growth, formation and organisation of social-class and political forces, the accumulation, that is, of the socio-economic and political factors needed to undertake subsequently a socialist reorganisation of society. The second period is that of actual socialist construction. These two stages must therefore never be confused, nor the two

concepts of "a non-capitalist road" and "socialist development". To underestimate the elements of socialism is as dangerous as to overestimate the positions of socialism in the advanced liberated countries, both are liable to create the false impression that they have reached a final decision on the road to follow. The events that have come to pass in Ghana and several other countries should serve as a warning against any hasty or biased conclusions in regard to this important problem.

Non-capitalist development, considered as a necessary stage in countries with plural economies and immature social relations, means above all the development and a more clear-cut differentiation of social and class forces, their gradual regrouping in such a way as to give the direction of the various socio-economic and political processes to those classes and political forces which could ensure the transition to socialism and the successful building of a socialist society. The important thing is to strengthen the positions of the working class and the worker-peasant alliance. The political and ideological thinking of the progressive non-proletarian elements will increasingly lean towards scientific socialism, though this process will undoubtedly take time, possibly several decades. The less time it takes the shorter will be the period of non-capitalist development; that, however, will depend on internal rather than on external factors.

The relationship of internal and external factors in the development of national-liberation revolutions has an important bearing on the proper understanding of the problem of non-capitalist development. It is a matter of common knowledge that external factors, above all such as the expansion and strengthening of the world socialist system and the growing democratic movement, have exceptionally influenced the development of the national-liberation movement. With the world power balance shifting in favour of peace, democracy and socialism even a small country, enjoying the support of the socialist states, can stand up to the imperialists and choose a road of development that is in line with its interests.

A favourable international climate does not, however, automatically ensure the solution of all the problems of the national-liberation movement, those of internal policies least of all. The earliest and strongest influence on the develop-



ment of the new independent countries is exercised by internal factors, such as the relative strength of class and political forces, the degree of activity of the masses, the successful mobilisation of all available material and human resources in the service of the national revolution. External aid is effective only when there exists, in the recipient country, a strong foundation in the shape of an efficient political and economical structure to ensure a rational interaction of the internal and external factors of social progress.

The Third World countries cannot, admittedly, do without external aid, as provided by the industrially developed countries. But it should also be admitted that external aid, no matter how extensive, cannot be effective unless it is seconded by serious efforts on the part of the recipient country. It is not enough for the entire people to join in an all-out creative effort, though a new society will never be built without that. It is necessary that the working people as a whole should be made aware of the results of the revolution.

It should be added that Marxists-Leninists worked out and developed the theory of a non-capitalist road in the expectation that the socialist revolution in Russia would start a victorious march of socialist revolutions in the West and so make it possible for the backward countries to bypass the painful capitalist stage of development. Certainly it would have been much easier for the backward countries to catch up with the advanced states if socialism had won out in the leading industrial states. The expansion of the world socialist system does not, however, depend on the victory of socialism in the advanced capitalist states alone: the economically backward countries also contribute to its expansion. It is possible that in the foreseeable future it will expand through the falling away of economically and socially backward countries from the world capitalist system. That possibility calls for a more sober examination of the problem.

It is occasionally suggested that the progressive forces of the new independent countries will never be completely masters of the situation and able to steer them towards socialism until the world socialist system wins a decisive victory over capitalism. It is usually pointed out in this connection that whenever revolution-minded national-demo-

cratic forces attempted to introduce radical reforms that would have set a country on a non-capitalist road of development, the national revolution faltered and the local reactionaries won out. The case of Ghana would seemingly support this argument. Hence the conclusion that inasmuch as the socialist countries cannot fully assure the liberated countries' development on non-capitalist lines, there can be no practical solution of that problem, which consequently must remain purely theoretical. Some even argue that the progressive elements should not force events, under the circumstances, but simply wait for the world socialist system to arrive at a level of development where the transition of the liberated countries to a non-capitalist road would be effected almost automatically without provoking any domestic complications, either political or economic. Meanwhile it will be enough merely to propagandise the non-capitalist road, while refraining from any more or less visible practical efforts.

If until recently the accent in discussions concerning non-capitalist development has been made almost entirely on the external factor and the solution of that problem has been described as easy and simple,<sup>1</sup> nowadays, especially since the events in Ghana and Indonesia, opinion has swung to the opposite extreme. There are even attempts to prove that developing countries will find it impossible to follow a non-capitalist road, at any rate not in the foreseeable future. It is suggested, for instance, that it would be more realistic and more in line with their present level of socio-economic development to strive for "democratic" capitalism, rather than to follow a non-capitalist road.

The difficulties and complications that often accompany the transition of the new independent states to non-capital-

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<sup>1</sup> There have been occasional attempts to apply the experience of certain peoples of the U.S.S.R., which had entered the socialist stage of development bypassing the capitalist stage, to the liberated countries of Asia and Africa, forgetting that in the case of those peoples social development took place within the framework of a single state and single economic system under the direction of a single Marxist-Leninist party at the helm of government. It is one thing to bring a backward people up to the level of advanced peoples within a single state, and quite another thing to effect the transition to a non-capitalist road of countries thousands of miles away from the states of the socialist system and existing in entirely different social conditions. Unfortunately, these basic differences have not always been taken into account.



ist development are no proof that the concept as such is unsound. More often than not these difficulties can be laid to failure to take proper stock and make proper use of external and internal factors, to a disregard of the time element, to the impatience of those who are quick to tag as socialist any progressive reform in the developing countries.

Most of the tasks that have to be carried out during the period of non-capitalist development are of a negatory nature, associated with tearing down the old, in most cases pre-capitalist, system of economy and social relations, and with some measure of restriction of capitalist ownership. That, perhaps, is the source of the difficulties, mainly of an economic nature, which some of the advanced emerging countries experience before passing on to the next, socialist stage of development associated mainly with problems of creation and construction. This second stage will probably be longer, since the task of socialist construction will have to be carried out in conditions of extreme economic and social backwardness. It is a fact that the more backward a country is before gaining independence and the more onerous the heritage left it by the colonialists, the more complex will be the problems that its people will have to face upon embarking on a programme of social progress and the greater will be the effort required to build a new society.

Today, the class struggle in the developing countries and their relations with the socialist and imperialist states may be said to hang upon this problem of the choice of a road of development. The choice the developing countries ultimately make will largely determine not only their own fortunes but the relative strength of class forces in the international arena as well.

### 3. Role of the State

During the period of transition the role of the state, whose function is to unite all forces taking part in the national-liberation revolution and the fight for social progress, acquires extraordinary importance. It must be guided in its activities by a profound knowledge of the unique social conditions prevailing in the emerging country concerned. Let us take a closer look at these conditions.

In the first place, the vastly preponderant element of the population is the peasantry, whose influence on the formulation of state policy is sometimes decisive.

In the second place, the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism remain as sharp as ever, pushing the former into participation in the united national anti-imperialist alignment not only during the period of struggle for political independence but also when socio-economic reforms are being put through.

In the third place, the formation of a proletariat proceeds here more rapidly than the development of a national bourgeoisie and its struggle is directed mainly against the foreign monopolies that gather in the national riches of the emerging countries.

In the fourth place, during the period when a colonial people wages a struggle to achieve national independence a spirit of nationalism is kindled, which rallies all the patriotically-minded elements. This national spirit and national traditions had long been trampled underfoot by the colonialists, who had tried to depersonalise the vanquished people, imposing alien ways and ideas upon it. It should not be surprising, therefore, that nationalism has become a driving force in many of the countries carrying on a struggle for independence.

During the period of transition one of the state's most important functions is to achieve a proper integration of national and social aims. The state is not, at this stage, a dictatorship of any one class. In many cases it strives to ensure the co-operation of all nationalist and patriotic forces, such as the peasantry, working class, national bourgeoisie, intermediate strata, and intellectuals, which, forming a bloc, would be its mainstay. That does not mean, however, that the state seeks to reconcile the classes or their antagonisms. We have seen how in Asia and particularly in Africa a state comes into being not only where class contradictions are objectively irreconcilable but also where such contradictions have not yet matured into sharp antagonisms, and class differentiation takes place after a national state has been formed. This lends a new aspect to the problem of the state and the nature of class struggle in the countries in question. In many cases a national state was formed before class antagonisms became aggravated.

Sometimes it is asked to what extent the Chinese leaders' old



and still current theory, which holds that class conflict grows sharper as socialism draws nearer, may be applicable to developing countries, particularly and especially to those that have chosen a non-capitalist road of development. So far as the socialist countries are concerned, their experience disproves that theory. Given a right policy even abrupt shifts in a socialist revolution do not necessarily lead to an aggravation of class struggle.

As for the developing countries, here the applicability of the theory appears to be even more doubtful. Countries which had started out on the road of capitalist development even before winning political independence and in which capitalism had taken still firmer root after independence, are in a class by themselves, for in them class contradictions and class conflict have grown sharper as capitalism developed. But as for the countries that have rejected capitalism or have not yet definitely decided which road to take, here the differentiation of social and political forces that invariably follows political independence is not necessarily accompanied by an aggravation of the class struggle.

Theoretically, the progressive national forces in power in the advanced liberated countries might feasibly use the concrete contributions of all or nearly all the various classes in the interests of national independence without the class struggle becoming aggravated. In such countries aggravation of the class struggle comes when any one class attempts to overstep its prerogatives, dominate the other forces, and turn the national independence won by the united effort of the people to its own selfish advantage. This can be prevented, however, by an alliance of all progressive forces. Hence the concept of a united national-democratic front, which should not be regarded as merely a tactical move at variance with the overall strategic plan. Some countries may find an acceptable pattern for the political union of all progressive national forces for the joint construction of a new society. Lenin, it will be recalled, did not exclude the possibility of compelling the capitalists "to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organised fashion, provided they were paid well".<sup>1</sup> The fact that the Russian bourgeoisie turned down the idea of constructive co-operation with the working

classes during the period of transition to socialism does not mean that bourgeois elements might not take a loyal stand in other countries, under different circumstances. On the other hand, of course, it is also possible that a local bourgeoisie, on getting on its feet economically, might attempt with the aid of the state to establish its political dominance over the other classes and social groups and set the country on the capitalist road of development. That is why the struggle for a national-democratic state that would promote development along non-capitalist lines, waged both inside and outside the government apparatus, reflects at any given moment the balance of class forces and the pitch of class conflict.

The greater role of the state is attributable also to the fact that economic considerations are of primary importance in the establishment of new relations in the socially and economically backward countries. The national bourgeoisie being weak both numerically and economically, it falls upon the state to ensure higher rates of economic progress and organise production in keeping with modern science and technology.

As the national-democratic state gets increasingly involved in virtually all spheres of social, political and economic activity, it becomes especially important to clarify its status and functions in the new independent countries. Economics and politics have become closely integrated and interdependent. That this is so may be seen from the rapid development of the state sector, which is becoming increasingly important in the national economy, as well as in the creation of various bodies in charge of political, ideological and cultural development, etc.

In view of the greater autonomous powers of the state in the Third World countries after political independence, the old apparatus of government is not liquidated; instead, the old functions and offices are dropped, gradually as a rule, and depending on the nature of the state and the power ratio of class and political forces, and replaced by new ones. The less democratic the state had been during the colonial period, the more thoroughly it is apt to be scrapped, and, conversely, the more democratic it had been, the greater the number of its functions and offices that can be used in the new conditions.

The process of scrapping the old apparatus of govern-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 339.



ment and its various offices, and that of setting up a new system of state machinery varies from country to country, depending on many different historic and social factors, as well as on the national and democratic traditions of the countries concerned. However, the greatest importance attaches, possibly, to the growing influence of the progressive forces on the state, which gradually work a change in its nature by changing its class basis, developing democracy, and winning key positions for the revolutionary-democratic forces within the apparatus of government. Given specific conditions, they may force the development of the advanced national-democratic states into states of the socialist type. The struggle for the transformation of a national-democratic state into a tool of the revolutionary forces that stand for far-reaching socio-economic reforms holds forth the prospect of a peaceful transition of national-liberation revolutions to socialism.

Progressive forces in the developing countries are coming to realise more and more the need of setting up a state that would actually ensure the implementation of radical social reforms. They view the basic objectives of a national-democratic state in the economic sphere as comprising: (a) the liquidation of the colonial and feudal heritage; (b) the solution of the agrarian problem in favour of the peasantry; (c) the ousting of foreign monopoly capital from the national economy; (d) the expansion and strengthening of the state sector; and (e) a considerable improvement of living standards.

While the alliance of democratic forces may be the political basis of a national-democratic state, its economic base is the state sector. Only the state sector, which is based on a form of ownership higher and more progressive than private ownership, can hold its own against foreign capital, continue building up a national economy, and draw elements of the working class into participation in the management of the nation's industry. When conditions are right the existence of a state sector may well become the material prerequisite for the transition of a liberated country to a non-capitalist road of development leading to socialism.

In the political sphere the basic objectives of the state in a national democracy are a broad democratisation of the system of government and the social system and the implementation of a peaceful foreign policy.

The domestic and foreign policies of the new independent states bear the impress of various socio-economic and political factors, such as the level of industrial development; the dependence of the economy on foreign capital; the survival of feudal relations; the political maturity and consciousness of the working people; the scope and intensity of the national-liberation struggle; etc. Some countries may pursue independent domestic and foreign policies, while others continue to be actually dependent on the imperialist states and play second fiddle in their aggressive policies, even though they may have been granted formal independence. The governments of these latter, protecting the interests of the ultra-reactionary bourgeois upper crust and to a certain extent those of the feudal-landlord elements, follow pro-imperialist policies contrary to the national aspirations of the people, whom they deprive of even the elementary freedoms. Countries belonging to the first group mentioned above are naturally in a better position to set up a progressive national-democratic state.

In some of the new national states where progressive bourgeois and petty bourgeois are in power the people at large are granted political rights and in some cases working people are admitted to participation in government administration.

Where the big bourgeois and landlords are in power, however, an anti-democratic policy is followed, to the detriment of national unity. The reactionary elements of the national bourgeoisie resort to repressions in order to remove progressive personalities from participation in the work of national development. Such a policy is designed to draw the attention of the people away from any current difficulties and to suppress their anger and indignation over the government's dictatorial methods and one-man rule. Dictatorships and despotic methods of government backed by imperialist bayonets express weakness rather than strength on the part of the bourgeoisie.

A state is strong when the broad masses participate in policy-making. In a national democracy the state, by rejecting dictatorial and despotic methods of government, offers an opportunity for such participation.

Such a state cannot, being what it is, follow any other than a peaceful foreign policy. It is a force for peace, and logically so, for a country that struggles against colonialism



in whatever form or guise thereby rejects the threat of war that lurks in that system.

The identification of one or several characteristics should not warrant classing a state with the progressive national democracies in the process of transition to states of the socialist type. All the characteristics of such a state will not appear simultaneously, of course. They will appear one by one over a certain period of time. That being the case it may be said even now that some countries have approached closer to becoming such a state than have others.

A national-democratic state will apparently pass through a number of intermediate stages in its development, which will differ in respect of the nature and importance of the objectives or functions of the state. The external function will probably be dominant in the first stage, that is to say, defence against imperialist encroachment aimed at restoring the colonial system. In a national democracy priority will be given to such tasks as expanding and intensifying the anti-imperialist struggle, strengthening political and winning economic independence.

As the national democracy develops through revolution and evolution the state will gradually mould the society, creating the conditions required for a step-by-step transition to a society in which socialist production relations will predominate. Therein lies the main task and historic function of the state in a national democracy.

Using parliamentary and other forms and methods of struggle, as well as mass demonstrations, the working people should be able to isolate the ultra-reactionary elements and bring pressure to bear on the state, so that state power would gradually be taken over peacefully by the most progressive elements capable of achieving the final aims of the national-liberation revolution.

In the process of their development the national-democratic states increasingly rely on the growing power of the socialist states and their wealth of experience in the revolutionary reorganisation of societies.

As things stand at present any country that has thrown off the colonial yoke should be able, regardless of the level of its socio-economic and political development, to undertake the building of a national-democratic state and follow the road to social progress. In the long run everything will depend on the political power balance, the pitch of class conflict

in a given country, and the vicissitudes and outcome of the competition between the two world systems: capitalism and socialism.

#### 4. Armed Forces and Politics

In many of the new national states of Asia and Africa the military have recently found themselves in the forefront of political events. This objective development poses a number of problems, the theoretical analysis of which is of great practical significance in working out the ways and means of uniting progressive forces in the struggle against imperialist reaction at home and for national and social progress. These problems concern, for example, the role of the army in the national-liberation movement and its influence on the political activities of the developing countries, and the significance of the struggle waged by the masses and their various organisations.

Views differ in regard to the role of the military in the national-liberation struggle. Some authors deny them any progressive role and label any government set up by military putsches reactionary and militarist. Others endeavour to represent the military as almost the only national force capable of heading a national-liberation revolution. The opinion is sometimes voiced that they are capable of taking sole charge of the political and economic development of a liberated country without the support of the masses and in the absence of a progressive political party.

None of these views is warranted, because their proponents are content with a superficial apprehension of events without heeding the socio-economic and political processes going on deep down in the Third World countries and apparently forgetting that the nature of a social movement is determined not only by the identity of those in charge but also by its *objective* achievements and the *objective* purposes it serves.

An assessment of the role of the military in national-liberation movements, as of any other social phenomenon, requires a class approach. Their status within a society depends on the nature of the society concerned, the relationship of the class and political forces, and the scope and pitch of the revolutionary movement. In any class society the revolutionary struggle of the working people inevitably draws the military



into the political maelstrom. Lenin wrote, "The troops cannot be, have never been, and will never be neutral."<sup>1</sup>

The development of the national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa shows that armies, far from remaining neutral, are drawn into active participation in the political activities of their countries and often play a decisive role in the development of events. Several factors contribute to this.

In the first place, whenever the basic classes of a bourgeois society are inadequately developed there occurs objectively a growth of the intermediate strata, such as the civilian and military intelligentsia, which become relatively more independent in respect of classes than do similar strata in countries with a more highly developed class structure.

The officer element in the countries in question are as a rule little related to the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. Officers come mainly from petty-bourgeois families, urban and rural, that is to say, from social strata whose social status, in the economically backward countries, is much nearer to the working people than to the upper-crust bourgeoisie. That is why patriotically-minded officers are hostile to capitalism as well and not only to imperialism and colonialism.

In the second place, unlike a developed society where the military are the most staid and inert constituent, in industrially underdeveloped countries they are the most enlightened and dynamic force. That is because here the military have to do with modern battle materiel the mastering of which calls for frequent trips abroad to meet fellow-officers in advanced countries. They begin to realise, in advance, perhaps, of any other groups, the disadvantages of their countries' economic and technological backwardness. "Hence," as Keith Hopkins, British professor of sociology, aptly remarks, "the modernising fervour of the military and its willingness to intervene and take over from politicians who lack or neglect such a perspective."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> Keith Hopkins, "Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries", *The British Journal of Sociology*, London, 1966, Vol. XVII, No. 2; June 1966, p. 170. It is difficult to agree with the author, however, when he asserts that "in its role as defender of the nation, then, the army may see itself and be seen by others as standing above the self-interested vagaries of political polemic; and this image may serve as a legitimisation of its interference in politics 'in the national interest'" (*ibid.*, p. 171).

Contact with modern production methods means contact with progressive thought for the officers. And when they return home they become particularly keenly aware of the crying need for political and socio-economic change, even though they may not always have a clear-cut programme ready for constructing a new society.

In the third place, the military have not remained aloof from the peoples' struggle for national liberation and became susceptible to ideas of freedom at an early stage. In many Asian and African lands national armies were formed as the national-liberation movement developed, and they were thus a progressive, anti-imperialist force from the very beginning. Such was the case in Algeria, where the National-Liberation Army composed of indigent peasants, workers, and petty bourgeois fought an anti-colonial war and reflected the interests and aspirations of the entire Algerian people. The nucleus of the Burmese Independence Army, which played an important part in clearing the country of the Japanese invaders and British colonialists, was also composed of peasants, workers, and the lower urban strata.

In the fourth place, finally, in many of the liberated countries, both during the war of national liberation and even more so after political independence was won, political parties appeared to be structurally too vague to take charge of their countries' development. There were no bourgeois parties strong enough to govern in virtually any of the liberated countries, with the possible exception of India. As for communist parties, these were either non-existent in most of the countries in question or else were the object of ferocious repressions, driven underground, and therefore unable to exercise a sufficiently active influence on the course of events.

In most cases the parties that came to power could be regarded rather as organisations on the National Front lines, uniting socially, politically and ideologically heterogeneous forces and insufficiently prepared to tackle the incomparably more complicated tasks faced by peoples that had achieved a sovereign status.

The factors we have mentioned go to explain to some extent why political developments in many Third World countries brought the military to the forefront as the society's most highly organised force.

It would nevertheless be a mistake, in theory as in practice, to disregard the fact that the army's functions and status in



the society change substantially as the national-liberation movement develops, as socio-economic problems acquire priority and economics become increasingly important for the new national states. The military leaders who had come to power with the aid of the army begin to realise that the army, where orders and instructions underlie all activities, is no substitute for a society's democratic institutions, without which no national revolution can make good headway.

Many of these military leaders become increasingly convinced, on coming face to face with the realities, that an army, lacking a definite political and ideological platform and being inexperienced in the sphere of political organisation of the people and economic development, cannot substitute for a party as the society's guiding force; and that to build a new way of life and wage a victorious war against imperialism and colonialism it is necessary to secure the active participation of the working people and its most progressive elements.

It is possible for a revolutionary movement to develop even in the absence of a progressive political party. But if the victory of a revolution is to be made secure and a new society is to be built there must be a party that reflects the ideology of the working classes and bases its activities on a knowledge of the objective laws of social development. An army cannot serve as a substitute for such a party, because armies have their own specific tasks to perform, relating above all to the safeguarding of revolutionary gains from encroachments on the part of foreign imperialist forces and domestic reactionaries. Moreover an army, lacking social and ideological unity, will find itself split into two opposing camps as soon as it comes to choosing the road of national development, for the process of class differentiation, exacerbated after political independence, will not have passed it by.

In these circumstances the patriotic officer element, reflecting the frame of mind of the masses and enjoying their support, will unhesitatingly elect to carry on the national-liberation revolution, and put through radical socio-economic reforms that would pave the way for the subsequent advance of their respective countries along the road of social progress. Other officer elements, however, being under the influence of imperialist and domestic reaction, will either assume a wait-and-see attitude or openly challenge the revolution. The experience of military *coups* in a number of Asian and African

countries has shown that while the army can play a progressive role in a national-liberation movement it can easily become a tool in the hands of the forces of reaction if the influence of democratic ideas shrinks.

In certain cases the army serves to accelerate the progressive development of a newly-independent state, while in others, on the contrary, it acts as a check on such development. The army is an institute within the framework of a society, in which democratic ideas coexist reasonably peacefully with reactionary views, engendering the danger that individual partisans of these views may attempt to use the army or a part of it against the revolution. Just which one of these latent tendencies within the army—the democratic or the reactionary—will predominate at a given historical stage, depends on many factors, but above all on the scope and pitch of the revolutionary movement in a given country, which can create mental ferment in the army and win all or a considerable part of it over to the revolution.

Sometimes the leaders of a military *coup d'état* are motivated less by political considerations than by a purely career-inspired desire to seize power. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the imperialists follow the development of any such tendencies among the military with great avidity, ready to use them in their colonialist interests.

It is impossible not to see the connection between the military putsches in certain African countries and the subversive activities of the imperialist powers in Africa, which count strongly on the military. They are ably taking advantage of the fact that the character and structure of the armed forces of many African countries have changed but little since the colonialists made their exit. Most continue to be mercenary armies trained by Western instructors. There is a marked trend here and there towards an activation of the rightist military, which had been temporising for quite some time but have now taken advantage of the situation to strike a blow at the democratic forces of the countries concerned. In Indonesia, for instance, state power is actually in the hands of the army, within which a struggle, not always clearly observable, is going on between two tendencies: the rightist and the leftist. It is quite characteristic, incidentally, that efforts to reconcile these two tendencies and effect even a temporary unification of the army are being made by military leaders not under



anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist slogans, as before, but under the slogans of anti-communism.

Underestimation of the value of political propaganda in the army and the tendency to treat it as a force alien to politics may have lamentable consequences for a national revolution, as leaders of the national-liberation movement increasingly point out. In some of the Arab countries, as in Syria, for instance, the army's political activity had resulted from the instability of the regime, which had failed to implement the promised programme. It was in these circumstances that the patriotic officers challenged the regime in power, using the army as the most efficiently organised force. These events were essentially revolutionary for they set the country on the road of social progress in the interests of the masses. Notwithstanding this seemingly favourable circumstance, however, the Syrian leaders did not confine themselves to the army, whose support they nevertheless used with good effect, but sought to draw the working people into the sphere of public and political activities, even going to the extent of organising and arming volunteer detachments when the fate of the revolution hung in the balance. And in spite of the fact that the army played an important part in altering the political situation in Syria, as in several other Arab countries, it is hard to believe that it was precisely the army, as some assert, that pushed the Baas party to the left, hastened the differentiation of forces within it, and set the country on a new road of political development, and that it was this swing to the left that caused radical shifts within the Baas party. Only a careless observer will gain the impression that in the progressive Arab countries the army stands above classes and political parties.

As a matter of fact the situation is more involved. From the viewpoint of class allegiance state power in the countries in question is in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie. The state reflects the interests of broad petty-bourgeois strata, notably the peasantry, even though it largely regards the army, and especially the patriotic-officer elements, as its mainstay. Bourgeois authors occasionally assert that the army's role in the developing countries of Asia and Africa consists largely in its constituting a so-called intermediate class, whereas in the advanced capitalist countries the army strives to identify itself, so to speak, with that class. This is the viewpoint, for instance, of William R. Polk, an American author, who writes

that "where new state organs have been established, they are often staffed by men who were recently army officers. For example, in Egypt the Suez Canal Authority and the Petroleum Authority are staffed by many former officers. Similarly in Sudan, Turkey and Iraq officers have assumed civilian functions".<sup>1</sup> Hence the author's conclusion that the army constitutes a special so-called intermediate class. Excessive stress on the army's independent role can be found in other writings. An assertion with which it is hard to agree runs as follows: "When classes, in the modern sense, are embryonic and unorganised, in the emerging states, and class organisations are weak, the army can act objectively as the most important stable, broad and independent organisation."<sup>2</sup>

The army is not a class by itself or a supra-class force: rather, it is a tool in the hands of a certain class. "In every class society," wrote Lenin, "the oppressor class is always armed."<sup>3</sup>

A great deal of attention has lately been given in some of the leading countries of Asia and Africa to the search for those forms of political organisation of the masses that would be the most acceptable to the country concerned and the most in line with its social and national conditions. Thus, efforts are being made to reorganise mass parties in such a manner that they would unite the most progressive forces dedicated to the revolution. This work is making slow headway so far, it must be admitted, and efforts to accelerate it have been very tentative, especially when compared with reforms in the socio-economic sphere. General Ne Vin, Chairman of Burma's Revolutionary Council, once remarked, speaking of the necessity of strengthening the Burma Socialist Programme Party, that that party, which should be the people's political leader, was still, four years since its inception, unprepared to exercise that leadership.

The process of mass political organisation varies from country to country. Some newly-independent countries hold to the one-party system of government, while others prefer a coalition of progressive political parties united in a common

<sup>1</sup> William R. Polk, *The United States and the Middle East*, New Jersey, 1964, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> See *Asia i Afrika segodnya (Asia and Africa Today)*, No. 9, Moscow, 1966, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 80.



national-democratic front. It would be wrong to generalise the experience of any one or a number of countries and mechanically apply it to others. Regardless of the form the political organisation of the masses may take in this or that country, the main point is that a new society cannot be built without their active participation.

The experience of the U.A.R., Burma, Algeria, Syria, and certain other countries has shown that the army has an important role to play in the national-liberation movement, being one of its fighting units. It can fulfil its mission, however, only if it serves the interests of the people, finds its proper place in the society, and soberly assesses its possibilities in regard to directing the complex processes of the economic, social and political development of the newly-independent state.

### 5. Democratisation of Social Life

Democratisation of social life is one of the most urgent problems of the Third World. And while this problem is being widely discussed both in the emerging states and elsewhere, its solution is unfortunately too often seen as a mere comparison of the one-party and the multi-party systems of government, thereby obscuring a broad presentation of the problem based on the consideration of all of its various aspects.

Advocates of the so-called parliamentary democracy on West European lines are critical of the leaders of those developing countries which have adopted the one-party system of government, thus allegedly trampling underfoot the democratic freedoms. In Burma such an accusation was made against the revolutionary government both by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, largely right-wing socialist, and by the ex-governing Union Party. Solicitous of bourgeois interests, they called for the re-establishment of a "parliamentary democracy", alleging that, possibly, "there is danger that not only democracy, but religion and justice will disappear under a system of one-party Communist dictatorship".<sup>1</sup>

It is rightly emphasised in the records of the Revolutionary Council that, in the conditions of Burma, any return to

"parliamentary democracy" would be a step backward. The long term of Anti-Fascist League and Union Party administration has made it plain to many (including some of the Revolutionary Council leaders who had also believed that socialism could be reached step by step, through successive stages of "parliamentary democracy") that the so-called "parliamentary democracy" in Burma had served the narrow class interests of the national bourgeoisie and not those of the majority of the people. The Revolutionary Council believes that it must develop "only such a form of democracy as will promote and safeguard the socialist development".<sup>1</sup>

There has never been any such thing as a "classless" or "supra-class" democracy. Democracy has always reflected the interests of definite classes. It is therefore not the adoption of a one-party or multi-party system of government that is a criterion of democratic development in a given country: the real criterion is the nature of the ruling party and the identity of those whose interests it reflects. Sékou Touré rightly pointed out that democracy is genuine and complete only if it is based exclusively on safeguarding the interests of the people. That, he said, was the only form of democracy and the only interpretation of the word "democracy" Guinea recognised.<sup>2</sup>

In the countries of Tropical Africa, where the pattern of class differentiation is none too clear, it is natural to expect the appearance of national political parties formed, as a general rule, in the wake of mass movements and united by their common anti-imperialist and anti-colonial aims. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, wrote as follows on this subject:

"The new nations of the African continent are emerging today as the result of their struggle for independence. This struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic one which necessarily leaves no room for difference. It unites all elements in the country so that, not only in Africa but in any other part of the world facing a similar challenge, these countries are led by a nationalist movement rather than by a political party or parties. The same nationalist movement, having united the people

<sup>1</sup> *The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment*, The Burma Socialist Programme Party, The Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1963, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> See *Voice of Africa*, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1962, p. 21.

<sup>1</sup> *The Nation*, Rangoon, Oct. 15, 1963.



and led them to independence, must inevitably form the first government of the new state; it could hardly be expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of conforming to what I have called the 'Anglo-Saxon form of democracy' at the moment of independence. Indeed, why should it? Surely, if a government is freely elected by the people, there can be nothing undemocratic about it simply because nearly all the people rather than merely a section of them have chosen to vote it into power."<sup>1</sup>

Criticism of the one-party system has a social background. Proponents of the bourgeois way of life view with concern the determination of some of the new national states to put an end to their dependence on the imperialist powers and take the road of social progress. That is why the bourgeois advocates of democracy concentrate their fire on the progressive developing countries, though one-party rule, it will be recalled, exists in some of the developing countries of Western leanings, too.

Anxious to prevent any unity among the oppressed nations, the colonialists have resorted to a variety of methods, including that of creating a multitude of political parties and then setting these against one another. In Congo (Kinshasa), for example, they banned the creation of any national political organisations and set up exclusively tribal associations. This policy produced a great many minor parties, for there were something like 70 distinct ethnic groups in the country. Over 100 political parties took part in the elections of 1959-1960. And in the March 1965 elections at Kinshasa, 65 parties nominated 305 candidates for the seven available parliament seats.<sup>2</sup>

A more or less similar situation existed in Nigeria and some other countries. It is very doubtful, too, *The African Communist* rightly remarks, "that Northern Nigeria under its feudal leadership is more 'democratic' with its multi-party system, than Guinea, with its socialist-inclined one-party system".<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from *Africa Speaks*, New York, 1961, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> See Dorothy Dodge, *African Politics in Perspective*, Princeton, 1966, pp. 156-57.

<sup>3</sup> *The African Communist*, No. 19, October-December 1964, pp. 60-61.

The peoples of Asia and Africa object to the thoughtless transplantation to their native soil of specimens of West European and North American bourgeois democracy. The ideologists of imperialism, powerless to graft alien ways of life and thinking on the liberated nations, endeavour to prove that democracy will never thrive in the countries in question. "Nor should we forget," writes one such author, "that democracy is a by-product of plenty, and that it flourishes best in societies which are rich and homogeneous. The enemy of liberty is instability, sectionalism, poverty, an absence of national unity and discipline, yet these are the conditions which the great majority of African states have inherited. Small wonder that so many Africans, although they believe in liberty and democracy, find that these conditions make it hard to stand by their principles."<sup>1</sup> Fenner Brockway, an English Labourite who takes much the same view, asserts that conditions in Africa do not favour the creation of a liberal society, which, allegedly, is why democratic socialism with its equal consideration for the rights of the individual and for economic collectivism will take root here only on a very limited scale.<sup>2</sup> Bourgeois authors do occasionally envisage the possibility of some democracy in the countries in question, but "only if the elite is willing to be the teacher and parent of democracy in a society which by its nature does not incline in that direction—and if, furthermore, it gets enough of the right kind of assistance from abroad".<sup>3</sup>

Political systems develop under the influence of objective factors and with reference to national and democratic tradition. What may be progressive for some countries, and in line with their objective circumstances, may be of no value for others. Given different backgrounds, even one and the same phenomenon may have different consequences for the national-liberation struggle. The one-party system, for example, when it is based on a common national movement uniting all the revolutionary and democratic forces concerned, is one thing; but that same system, if used to bar the most progressive and revolutionary forces from political activity, will be quite another thing.

<sup>1</sup> *African Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 252, July 1964, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> Fenner Brockway, *African Socialism*, London, 1963, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Development and Society*, ed. by David E. Novack and Robert Lekachman, New York, 1964, p. 404.



In some of the developing countries, unfortunately, there is a tendency to adopt a somewhat oversimplified approach to this problem, apparently in the belief that the one-party system will prove a cure-all for any ills. There is, indeed, a certain logic in the desire of national leaders to counter the efforts of the reactionaries, foreign and internal, to split the national front of progressive forces with a single efficient apparatus of political government. Moreover, efforts to accelerate the creation of a single political party will be pressed all the more energetically if the social and class changes taking place in a given emergent country are particularly radical and the resistance of the privileged classes and groups therefore particularly strong and vicious.

There are some, however, who are inclined to view the problem of setting up one-party government not as that of uniting existing progressive parties on the basis of a jointly elaborated single progressive ideological platform, but, rather, as that of establishing the monopoly of one party by dissolving the other revolutionary parties and organisations inasmuch as the party taking the initiative in the given instance happens to be in power. Such an approach to the problem might prove damaging to the unity of all the patriotic, revolutionary and democratic forces concerned, and might discourage the masses from participating in the country's political life. Yet it is well known that the masses, if they have no voice in policy-making, lose interest in policy implementation. To effectively withstand imperialist pressure and achieve progress in the sphere of national and social development the new independent states must make the masses their mainstay and weld a strong union of all the national-democratic forces, the communists included.

And if a sharp aggravation of internal contradictions is to be avoided at the current stage of the national-liberation movement and a united front is to be created to face the imperialists and internal reactionaries, it is essential to make good use of the positive contributions of all the patriotic, revolutionary and progressive forces, regardless of the classes, parties or political trends with which they may be affiliated.

Important steps have been taken in a number of new national states to expand and strengthen democracy. In Algeria, for instance, workers' and peasants' self-government committees have been set up; in the U.A.R., the National

Congress of People's Forces proclaimed the formation of an Arab Socialist Union and ruled that in future all political bodies in the republic (including parliament) should reserve 50 per cent of all seats for the workers and fellahs; in Burma, workers' councils are being set up at industrial plants. Reliance on the working classes and their participation in building a new life are recognised to be essential for effective progress in the social sphere, as may be seen from the programmes of some of the national-democratic parties.

It should be stressed, however, that democratisation in the developing countries is restricted mainly to the economic sphere. At the current stage of the national-liberation revolutions the economic independence of the former colonies and semi-colonies does, of course, acquire extreme urgency and vital importance. And it would, therefore, be wrong to draw an artificial line between the struggle for economic independence and the political struggle. Nevertheless, artificial restraint of the democratisation of social life, however involved that process may be, is liable to interfere with the attainment of the general democratic objectives of the national-liberation revolutions. When the masses do not take an active part in social and political life the reactionaries find it relatively easy to deal with progressive regimes by means of plots and military putsches. Indeed, what but an inadequate degree of social democratisation can explain the fact that the reactionaries still succeed in staging their counter-revolutionary plots here and there with the masses practically inert! If the people were given a chance to actively participate in the revolutionary reorganisation of society, if they came to feel themselves masters in their own house, the emergent countries would find it easier to stand up to the incessant plots and intrigues of the reactionaries, foreign and domestic. More than that: unless the working people do take an active part in the revolution and display bold initiative, it will be simply impossible to follow through to the end the progressive socio-economic reforms initiated in some of the advanced developing countries of Asia and Africa and create conditions for their transition to socialism.

These problems of expanding and strengthening democracy will gain greater and greater relative importance as the social development of the countries in question progresses, for no national programme envisaging the building of a new society can be implemented without the broad, active



and conscious participation of the whole people. "Capitalism cannot be vanquished," wrote Lenin, "without taking over the banks, without repealing private ownership of the means of production. These revolutionary measures, however, cannot be implemented without organising the entire people for democratic administration of the means of production captured from the bourgeoisie, without enlisting the entire mass of the working people, the proletarians, semi-proletarians and small peasants, for the democratic organisation of their ranks, their forces, their participation in state affairs."<sup>1</sup>

## Chapter Seven

### IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Unique and difficult are the conditions in which the ideological struggle is being waged in the lands of Asia and Africa. The peoples of these vast continents only recently freed from colonial slavery are assisting at the genesis of ideological trends, and the process is far from over. The world outlook that is taking shape here under the influence of progressive theories is feeling the impact of other ideas as well. There are those who would have us believe that theories and ideas worked out elsewhere are not appropriate for Asia and Africa, which need, allegedly, a "purely Asian" or a "purely African" theory, different from all others. Many nationalist personalities insist on the need to discover a special, different way of development, and are strongly seconded in their opinion by imperialist propaganda. The ideologists of neo-colonialism are endeavouring to win the new independent states over to the idea of a "Third Road", under cover of which capitalist relations could expand and gain strength.

This complex background of mass illiteracy, poor organisation and often inadequate political education among the proletariat, on the one hand, and of the powerful influence of imperialist propaganda, on the other, hinders the spreading of progressive revolutionary theory and aggravates the ideological atmosphere in the Third World countries. At the same time this atmosphere, still in a state of flux, seething with renunciation of the hateful colonial past, and seeking for new ideas, offers good prospects for the establishment of a progressive revolutionary world outlook.

#### 1. Socialist Trends in the Developing Countries

The peoples of the Asian and African countries that have thrown off their colonial yoke are feeling, today, the great drawing power of socialism. This is

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 25.



reflected in the wide dissemination of the theories of scientific socialism, in the genuine socio-economic reforms in some of these countries, and in the emergence of various socialist trends.

These socialist leanings in the developing countries are quite varied both as to form and content. Three types of attitude towards socialist ideas have now become prominent in these countries, though there are others, of course, which would be hard to classify.

There exist, to begin with, the concepts embraced by the national-democratic forces that are intent on a revolutionary reorganisation of society by means of broad socio-economic reforms, which would lay a basis for development in the direction of socialism. At congresses of governing political parties and in the official utterances of the leaders of such countries as, for example, the U.A.R., Burma, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Syria, and Tanzania, there has been serious discussion of ways and means of a transition to socialism, the meaning of fundamental socialist principles, application of such principles to the social and national conditions actually existing in the developing countries, the nature of socio-economic reforms, interrelations of socialism and democracy, etc.

In the second place, there have been appearing in several countries various conceptions, essentially bourgeois, in which the proclamation of "socialist aims" is mainly no more than declaratory. A number of sovereign states of Asia and Africa indicate the establishment of a socialist society as an ultimate aim, without explaining how that aim is to be achieved. That is a sign of the times, inasmuch as the political parties and national leaders concerned thereby as much as equate socialism to the more or less democratic social reforms effected in conditions of capitalist development. This view is valid, for example, in respect of the Indian "democratic socialism", the "African socialism" of Senegal and Kenya, the "Destour socialism" of Tunisia, etc.

In the third place, some pseudo-socialist conceptions have emerged in a number of Asian and African countries, in which the word "socialism" is used speciously, as a cover for the reactionary essence of forces in reality hostile to socialism. This is a case of political parties or groups using the popularity of socialism among the masses to safeguard the interests of the reactionaries and to either veil or

justify their pro-imperialist attitudes. Here belong the reactionary groups that preach "Moslem socialism", the right-wing socialist leaders of India, Indonesia, and Burma, and others of their ilk.

To gain a proper understanding of this new and intricate social background in Asia and Africa it is necessary to make an analysis, in their concrete historic context, of all the countless and extremely varied socialist programmes, as well as of the steps actually taken to implement them. In evaluating this or that trend of socialism it is necessary to ask what class interests are the object of concern of its adherents, in what sort of conditions they are acting, what socio-economic policies they are advancing, and what kind of state power they are promoting.

A common feature of most of the socialist trends in the Asian and African countries is a rejection of capitalism, though for different social-class motives. The U.A.R. National Charter, which is the country's political programme, emphasises that "Those who call for freedom of capital imagining that to be the road to progress are gravely mistaken. In the countries forced to remain underdeveloped, capital in its natural development is no longer able to lead the economic drive."<sup>1</sup>

The programme documents of the Revolutionary Council of Burma are also based on rejection of the capitalist road as unsuited to the country. They run, in part, as follows: "In the age of capitalism the means of production are in the hands of the capitalist class *de jure* merely by virtue of the bourgeois legal system, and the class which holds no capital, i.e., the working class, is exploited." "Nor should we rely on the social and political systems which can no longer serve society and which permit exploitation of man by man, nor on those classes and strata who are defending those systems."<sup>2</sup>

The urban and rural masses of the developing countries judge capitalism by their experience of their recent colonial past. For them, colonial oppression and capitalism are one and the same thing. Fearful of a return of colonialism, they put no trust in economic development by private capital. And

<sup>1</sup> *The Charter*, Cairo, 1962, p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment*, pp. 20, 12.



that explains why even in those countries which have opted for the capitalist road the ruling parties are forced to publicly criticise capitalism and use socialist slogans in order to gain the trust of the masses.

At the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress Party, currently in power, there is never any lack of public condemnation of the growing power of the Indian monopolies and their growing political influence. At one of the meetings of this party's All-India Committee the late Jawaharlal Nehru called the monopolies enemies of socialism and said that the country had deviated from socialism in the same measure as the monopolies had grown over the past several years.<sup>1</sup> No effective steps, however, have generally been taken, in consequence of such criticism, to restrain the country's development on capitalist lines. Experience shows, on the contrary, that capitalist relations are being rapidly established and expanded in India, and that capital is being concentrated in the hands of a small but powerful group of monopoly associations.

The ideologists of Indian "democratic socialism", in criticising capitalism, call only for some restriction of private capital enterprise. Desiring to moderate in some way the socio-economic contradictions of capitalist development aggravated by the legacy left by colonial rule, they are endeavouring to prevent big industry from smothering petty industry, which currently employs a force of about 20 million (as compared to 4 million engaged in big industry). Well aware that in the India of today, with her tremendous pressure of population, ruining petty industry would probably lead to the pauperisation of great numbers of workers, possibly producing a social outburst, these ideologists call for a certain decentralisation of the means of production through the development of a network of small enterprises, including craft industries. They would like to use socialist slogans as a cover-up for what is essentially capitalist development, and to retain the existing bourgeois production relations, adapting them to India's distinctive historic and national features.

In those countries where the achievement of political independence brought the bourgeois-landlord bloc to power, criticism of capitalism is motivated chiefly by a desire to

perpetuate feudal and semi-feudal relations. While the national bourgeoisie of these countries may be interested in a break-down of feudal relations, it is hesitant about any infringement of landlord property rights. As a general rule it envisages leaving big estates in the hands of the landlords while co-operating as far as possible in turning them into capitalist-type economies. For their part the feudal landlords realise that capitalism has gained a footing, in greater or lesser measure, even here, and that it will be impossible to maintain feudal relations in their "pure" form, and therefore favour a form of development which would serve to retain for a long time to come semi-feudal relations not only in the national economy but also in political life, state government, and ideology.

The emerging countries are taking the road of independent development in an epoch when capitalism has outlived itself and a change-over from capitalism to socialism is in progress on a large scale the world over. The conviction is spreading that only socialism can bring a fundamental improvement of living standards and ensure rapid economic and social progress, and this conviction is being strengthened nowadays not only by the achievements of the world socialist system, but also by the experience of carrying out the broad democratic programme of national-liberation revolution by the peoples concerned themselves.

That capitalism holds little charm for the Third World states is something that even its advocates are constrained to admit. Thus Hans Morgenthau, an American professor, writes that the Soviet Union has achieved what "the more enlightened underdeveloped nations seek: a drastic increase in national output through rapid industrialisation... Seeking the same results," he goes on to say, "the underdeveloped nations cannot help being attracted by the methods which brought about these results elsewhere. In contrast, the slow process, stretching over centuries, through which the nations of the West achieved a high standard of living through industrialisation must appeal much less to them."<sup>1</sup>

Bourgeois economists and politicians trying to make capital out of the real and imaginary difficulties involved in building socialism advise the emerging states to refrain

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, June 20, 1964.

<sup>1</sup> Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, June 1962, p. 307.



entirely from any measures calculated to restrict or eliminate private enterprise.<sup>1</sup> They point in this connection to the historical experience of capitalist countries. We know, however, that it took Western Europe several centuries to develop its productive forces to their present level. And it should also be kept in mind that the capitalist states of the West achieved their development in no small measure by looting their colonies. The experience of Latin America shows that the capitalist road leads to economic dependence of the former colonies on the imperialist powers. In the emerging countries, progressive elements are watching the socialist states, which have made giant strides in the development of their productive forces within the lifetime of a generation. Mindful of the lessons of history, many leaders of the national-liberation movement are beginning to view private enterprise as economically inadequate and the socialist system of economy as a real and virtually only hope for rapid economic development.

This rejection of the capitalist way of development is progressive in itself, for it facilitates the spread of scientific socialism in the developing countries and helps weaken the political positions of local and foreign capital.

A common characteristic of many socialist trends in the new states of Asia and Africa is a sincere desire to improve living standards for the working people, end exploitation, and build a socialist society. Owing, however, to the existing social and economic conditions (a small and unorganised working class, limited experience of political struggle, unenlightened masses, absence of a Marxist-Leninist party, and other aspects of the colonial legacy), no complete and genuinely scientific world outlook has as yet been worked out.

One of the idiosyncrasies of national-liberation revolutions in countries lacking a sufficiently clear-cut differentiation

of classes is that they are often headed by individuals with little training in Marxism and therefore with an ideological baggage likely to be a jumble of heterogeneous and contradictory views (religious, utopian, reformist, etc.). At the same time the exigencies of the national revolution force them to use various propositions of scientific socialism, which is nowadays not only a theory but also a practice, as exemplified by the world socialist system.

Lenin foresaw that such developments as changing living conditions, industrialisation, growth and consolidation of the working class, and the growing political consciousness of the people at large might induce such exponents of socialist trends as had not rejected a bourgeois-democratic world outlook to accept scientific socialism. "Marxism," he wrote, "is most easily, rapidly, completely and lastingly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists where large-scale industry is most developed. Economic relations which are backward, or which lag in their development, constantly lead to the appearance of supporters of the labour movement who assimilate only certain aspects of Marxism, only certain parts of the new world outlook, or individual slogans and demands, being unable to make a determined break with all the traditions of the bourgeois world outlook in general and the bourgeois-democratic world outlook in particular."<sup>1</sup>

It is therefore quite natural that Marxist-Leninist parties, while basically maintaining their own world outlook, should at the same time strengthen their alliance with those trends and groups, which are putting through progressive reforms.

With the experience of the socialist states to guide them, in addition to their own views and concepts worked out in the process of building a new society, national-democratic parties in a number of developing countries are putting through in practice broad democratic, anti-capitalist reforms, such as nationalisation of foreign capitalist properties, agrarian reform, planning, restriction and partial nationalisation of local capital, and so on. Many such concrete measures are of a progressive character and lay a material and social base for future socialist construction, even though theoretic thought on a number of important issues, in the countries concerned, may still be a long way from recognis-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 348.

<sup>1</sup> Walt Rostow, author of the widely acclaimed theory of stages of economic growth, asserts that "the natural, if not inevitable, evolution of developing societies is to permit a large part of the process to go forward by competitive private means. . . . We are certain, from our own experience and that of others, that the existence of a substantial private enterprise sector is consistent with and can greatly reinforce the large objectives of a national development programme." See Walt Rostow, "Economic Development. Lessons of a Common Experience", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, New York, Vol. XXIX, No. 23, Sept. 15, 1963, p. 714.



ing scientific socialism, and even anti-communist prejudices may sometimes exist.

In the United Arab Republic, the nationalisation of banks, insurance companies, big and small industrial plants and the expansion and strengthening of the state sector, which includes the most important branches of light and heavy industry, transport and foreign and domestic wholesale trade, have sapped the influence of the big and, to some extent, the middle Egyptian bourgeoisie.

In Burma, a broad programme of social and economic reforms is being implemented as outlined in *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, aimed fundamentally at expanding and strengthening the state sector, which is to be the basis of an independent national economy. "In order to carry out socialist plans," according to the declaration, "such vital means of production as agricultural and industrial production, distribution, transportation, communications, external trade, etc., will have to be nationalised. All such national means of production will have to be owned by the state or co-operative societies or collective unions. Amongst such ownerships state-ownership forms the main basis of socialist economy."<sup>1</sup>

At present all the twenty-four foreign and local private banks operating in the country have been nationalised, as have the Burma Oil Company, a mixed British-Burmese concern, and all other big industrial enterprises. Foreign trade, and the purchase and distribution of rice are now completely in the hands of the state.

In Algeria, a basis for a gradual shift to new production relations was laid by the decrees of March 1963, on the nationalisation of foreign and local capital, and more particularly by the self-administered sector set up on the initiative of the working people.

The social and economic reforms introduced in the U.A.R., Burma, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Syria, and other countries are aimed squarely at imperialism and its mainstay in the countries concerned, namely, feudalism, as well as at capitalism. That the adherents of socialist trends in these countries display tolerance in regard to the existence of other forms of ownership concurrently with the state sector does

<sup>1</sup> *The Burmese Way to Socialism*. The Policy Declaration of the Revolutionary Council, April 30, 1962, p. 3.

not invalidate this proposition, but, rather, shows that the national patriotic forces take into account the realities of the situation. The plural economies of these countries reflect an objective feature of the period of transition, to skip a number of necessary stages of which might only serve to repel the many social strata that are more or less strongly attached to the institute of private ownership from the revolution and push them into opposition to the broad social and economic reforms that are preparing the ground for an advance towards socialism.

To gain an insight into the socialist trends and current social and economic reforms in the developing countries it is important to realise that the views held by their national-democratic leaders are not static: they are going through a continuous and rather rapid process of evolution, and the tendency is towards scientific socialism. President Nasser, for instance, wrote: "As for the answer to the second question: namely the way to that which we want, I confess it has undergone in my mind as many changes as nothing else has done."<sup>1</sup>

The National Charter of the U.A.R., adopted in 1962, which refers to a certain particular stage of the country's development, reads in part as follows: "The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social underdevelopment in Egypt—with a view to achieving progress in a revolutionary way—was never a question of free choice. The socialist solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspirations of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the second part of the 20th century."<sup>2</sup>

The Charter gives the following definition of socialism: "Socialism is the way to social freedom. Social freedom cannot be realised except through an equal opportunity for every citizen to obtain a fair share of the national wealth. This is not confined to the mere redistribution of the national wealth among the citizens but foremost and above all it requires expanding the base of this national wealth, to accede to the lawful rights of the working masses. This

<sup>1</sup> Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of Revolution*, Cairo, 1952, Book I, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> *The Charter*, p. 49.



means that socialism, with its two supports, sufficiency and justice, is the way to social freedom."<sup>1</sup>

In *The Philosophy of the Burma Socialist Programme Party* the authors themselves state that they do not regard their ideology as something "complete and final" and that "our Party will keep on striving to make our ideology more and more entire".<sup>2</sup>

A certain degree of inconsistency and even eclecticism present in the programme documents of national-democratic parties of socialist tendencies may be attributed to the contradictory and unstable nature of the interests and views of the urban and rural middle strata, which are reflected in these documents. Their significance, however, lies in the fact that they testify to an intensification of the national-liberation revolutions, which are becoming increasingly social, that is to say, anti-capitalist.

The concepts of non-proletarian socialism that make their appearance in the developing countries contain a good many propositions that are at variance with the realities, take no account of the experience of other peoples, and are likely to hold up the progress of social liberation.

The Marxists, who reflect the interests of the people at large, are not the only ones to put forward socialist ideas and slogans in the lands of Asia and Africa: they are joined in this by the revolutionary leaders of the peasants, artisans, and intellectuals. There have been attempts to construct some unique brands of socialism, and socialist slogans often display, as a result, a petty-bourgeois nationalist tinge. Hence, apparently, such concepts as "African socialism", "Arab socialism", etc.

With capitalism at a relatively low stage of development in the emerging countries, small-scale commodity production continues to be important. In fact it may be said to be fundamental to their economy. The urban middle strata find themselves in a precarious position, continually threatened as they are with decline. Through force of circumstances they constitute a revolutionary element, on the one hand, and, on the other, still harbour all sorts of prejudices. Many are prone to be contradictory and inconsistent, though drawing increasingly closer to proletarian thinking. This adds to the

complexity of the processes at work in the new states in the period of their transition from colonial backwardness to a modern society.

Any attempts to simplify such processes, to make them tally with unrealistic patterns render a political evaluation only more difficult. Illustrative of such a non-constructive approach is, for example, the assertion that nationalisation, viewed as the economic foundation of socialist planning, must under no circumstances involve compensation.

Marx and Lenin, however, recognised the possibility that in certain conditions, during the period of transition to socialism, a society may find it advantageous to buy off a bourgeoisie that has been loyal to the new government. In many developing countries the state sector is built up precisely through the redemption of property owned by foreign and national capital. In Burma we see the oil industry nationalised through the purchase of the Burma Oil Company's stock. In Syria, the nationalisation decrees promulgated early in 1965 covered 114 industrial enterprises, with compensation payable to the owners. Such fundamentally anti-capitalist measures can serve as a base for subsequent progress towards socialism and may therefore be regarded as progressive.

It is quite natural, of course, that in the economically backward countries with a preponderantly peasant population, socialist trends and concepts of a non-proletarian, Narodnik<sup>1</sup>-peasant or petty-bourgeois nature should be originated and widely disseminated. They should not all be tagged "petty-bourgeois socialism", however, since there are serious differences among them, in respect of particulars and, frequently, also of essentials. The experience of such countries shows that this is not a question of an alliance of scientific socialism with petty-bourgeois movements, but one of a possible gradual acceptance of scientific socialism by national-patriotic forces.

<sup>1</sup> Narodniks—followers of a petty-bourgeois trend, Narodism, in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. Narodniks stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landed estates to the peasantry. They believed capitalism in Russia to be a temporary phenomenon with no prospect of development and they therefore considered the peasantry, not the proletariat, to be the main revolutionary force in Russia.

<sup>1</sup> *The Charter*, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> *The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment*, p. 36.



There can be no question but that the propositions of scientific socialism should be used in the full knowledge of local conditions. It would be absurd, however, to reject scientific socialism entirely on the grounds of national idiosyncrasies. In Senegal, for instance, there is much talk about a "middle road" in which allegedly the "African personality" would find satisfaction. In India people often stress the distinctive features of "Indian socialism", which rejects Western economic science and Marxist political economy along with it. Dr. Sampurnanand, one of the ideologists of "Indian socialism", paints a touching picture of capitalism peacefully merging in socialism after the ruling circles voluntarily give up their riches and privileges, without any aggravation of the class war. "Is it not possible to isolate the capitalist from capitalism?" he asks. "I think this is possible. It is possible for an individual to invest capital and run industrial and business concerns without exploiting others...."

"The relationship between the classes can be horizontal instead of vertical: not that of employer and employee but of colleagues and partners in a common enterprise. No question of class conflict can arise."<sup>1</sup>

Some authors speak of the unsuitability of the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific socialism for African countries, a fallacy which they endeavour to justify by references to the survival of communal villages in the land. Yet Marxism has long admitted that communes, such as the traditional African variety, could be used in certain conditions as a point of departure for socialist development. It is apparent, at the same time, that the peasant communes disintegrate as commodity-money relations develop. And the authors, therefore, who derive a socialist future for the African countries solely from the communal villages are evidently engaging in wishful thinking. The stratification of the peasantry in respect of both property and social standing is becoming increasingly apparent even in the economically most backward areas of the African continent where semi-subsistence farming is still the rule. Development of market farming for the domestic market and especially for export undermines and destroys communal relations. A natural desire to make the widest possible use of traditional African forms leads

<sup>1</sup> Sampurnanand, *Indian Socialism*, Bombay, 1961, pp. 27, 65.

some authors to contrast the African "tribal socialism", for which class conflict is an alien phenomenon, with what is referred to as a "European socialism".<sup>1</sup>

On the grounds that pre-capitalist production relations are dominant in the economies of African countries a kind of special—so to speak, "simplified"—socialism is occasionally mentioned, transition to which would proceed from pre-capitalist formations, rather than from capitalism. In some of the Asian countries, as in India, for example, it is still rather widely held that socialism should be built on a foundation of a developed craft industry and not mechanised production. Such an approach is unwarranted, since it leads to an oversimplified interpretation of socialism as no more than the socialisation of ownership. But while socialisation of ownership is one of the essential preconditions of a transition to socialism, other no less important socialist principles are a high level of development of productive forces, a considerably higher material and cultural level of the people at large, greater democracy, etc. Lenin stressed that "an enormous step forward must be taken in developing the productive forces"<sup>2</sup> as it would not be enough just to liquidate the exploiting classes, deprive them of their property, and socialise the basic means of production. His words have been fully confirmed by half a century of experience in the Soviet Union, including those of its areas which had been particularly backward in the past.

Socialism acquires its basic distinctive features step by step, in the process of socialist construction. This should make it easier to understand the problem of guiding the revolutionary process of transition to socialism in those countries of Asia, and even more so Africa, where the working class is numerically weak and an industrial proletariat is all but non-existent. It is possible, of course, for a country

<sup>1</sup> Thus Tom Mboya, for instance, thought that "African Socialism has an entirely different history from European Socialism. European Socialism," he wrote, "was born of the agrarian and industrial revolutions, which divided society into the landed and the capitalist on one side and the landless and the industrial proletariat on the other. There is no division into such classes in Africa, where states came to nationhood through the pressure of mass movements and where governments consist of the leaders of the workers and peasants, rather than the nobility who have ruled in Europe." (Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After*, London, 1963, p. 167.)

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 421.



to take a road eventually leading to socialism even in the absence of a class-conscious proletariat. A modern proletariat will take shape as a country moves ahead along the road of economic and social progress and develops her industry, and it will play an increasingly vigorous political role both in the activities of the governing national-democratic party and in the life of the country in general. By the time the country achieves a level of industrial development that would open the door to the building of advanced socialism her proletariat will have developed into an important political force.

We have seen that the road to socialism can be taken by any country, including those where there is as yet neither a proletariat nor a Marxist-Leninist party; but it will remain just as impossible to build socialism without the guidance of a working class and in the absence of a progressive party based on scientific socialism as it is impossible to picture socialism without a modern industry. That is the meaning of the dialectics of development for the newly-independent countries.

In some of these countries the various socialist trends may reflect other interests than those of the petty bourgeoisie. At the current stage of the struggle for political independence the national bourgeoisie dominates the petty-bourgeois masses in the ideological sphere, as a rule. As a dominant class in many countries it shares to a certain extent the interests of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois strata on a number of issues of social progress. In India, for instance, this situation has assumed such proportions that a "democratic socialism" has been duly elaborated to become the nucleus of the ideological concepts professed by the national bourgeoisie. At the same time the national bourgeoisie, anxious to retain its influence over the masses, is forced to incorporate into its programmes some of the demands of the petty bourgeoisie and the so-called intermediate strata, such as for an agrarian reform, support of craft industries, co-operation, control over big industry and the banking system. It is these broad democratic demands that are often passed off as socialist.

The concepts "development" and "socialism" are frequently interpreted by leaders in the newly-independent countries as meaning one and the same thing. While socio-economic measures (e.g., nationalisation, agrarian reform,

creation of a state sector) may be quite progressive and drastic, it is a matter of fact that their implementation does not necessarily lead to socialism. It is essential to consider such socio-economic measures in the context of the nature of state power, the level of development of the productive forces, the relationship between class and political forces, the activity of the masses, and other internal factors. Some progressive measures may prepare the ground for a later transition to socialism, but they do not *constitute* socialism. The growing might of the world socialist system and the gains made by the present-day revolutionary forces make it possible for the newly-independent states to travel the socialist road of development. But if these countries are to take advantage of this possibility they must call for an all-out effort on the part of their peoples and mobilise and use all of their internal resources. However great may be the value of external factors developing favourably for the countries of Asia and Africa, these factors are not enough to ensure success. It is the internal factors that decide the issue. For otherwise it would be hard to explain why, external conditions being similar, some of the newly-independent states have made good progress in their social, economic and cultural development, while others lag rather far behind.

A possible tendency of the various socialist trends in the new states is to accept the dominance of the interests of the national bourgeoisie. The latter could simply reject any socialist doctrines at some stage or other—which is what the reactionaries are trying to induce it to do—and openly declare for a capitalist way of development. On the other hand, as the non-proletarian masses (peasants, craftsmen, etc.) begin to realise that the national bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying through the broad democratic programmes they themselves have proclaimed, they, the non-proletarian masses, approach closer to socialism and come to see the need of a class attitude towards the socio-economic problems facing their countries.

Marxists-Leninists do not believe in any flat rejection of the socialist tendencies of various progressive forces. On the contrary, they give them careful consideration and accept and support whatever is valuable and positive in the doctrines advanced by the national-democratic parties, above all whatever contributes to the common struggle for the



implementation of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-capitalist measures. And all the more so since many of the programmes proclaiming the building of socialism were worked out in the process of a national-liberation anti-imperialist struggle and under the influence of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the achievements of the world socialist system.

The inconsistencies, contradictions, and eclecticism of many modern socialist concepts, which are often engendered, incidentally, under the influence of right-wing social-democratic ideology, as, for instance, that of the British labour movement, are no reason why the adherents of such concepts in the new national states should be "excommunicated" from socialism. Whenever a leader of a national-liberation movement sincerely endeavours to steer his country onto the socialist road of development he can count on the full support of all genuinely democratic and revolutionary forces. Marxists-Leninists take the view that there is no insurmountable wall between the socialist trends and concepts now widely current in the countries of Asia and Africa and proletarian socialism, just as there is none between the national-liberation and socialist revolutions, though there is, of course, a basic qualitative difference between them. Clumsy indeed are the efforts of those who wish to present scientific socialism as the exact opposite and contend that Marxists-Leninists flatly reject the socialist aspirations of patriotic national forces. Fenner Brockway writes, for example, that "the Marxists-Leninists come into conflict with the general socialist flow in Africa because they insist that their 'scientific socialism' is authoritative under all conditions and that its theory and method must be universally accepted".<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of their unique historical, national, social and economic background the developing countries can make a genuinely original contribution to the ways, forms, and methods in and by which socialist principles are put into practice. This, of course, should not be taken to mean that a social trend need only to call itself socialist in order to become such in fact. There is a difference between intention and fact. A relentless struggle must be waged on the ideological arena against any forces that use socialist slogans to cover up their capitalist essence, precisely in the interests

<sup>1</sup> Fenner Brockway, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

of social and national liberation and socialism. And it is just as necessary, in the same interests, to constructively criticise those erroneous theoretical propositions which might lead to delay in the advance of the peoples towards the victory of socialism, to missed opportunities for revolutionary socialist reforms, and to heavy losses and misery for the peoples.

Marxists-Leninists consider it their duty to explain the general nature of scientific socialism to the masses, and to discover ways of co-operating with the various national-democratic socialist movements, supporting all progressive tendencies and all those who, while wilfully or otherwise erring in theory, are in fact moving towards socialism, or who, while sincerely aspiring to socialism, have so far been unable for some reason or other, to fully accept scientific socialism.

It is to be expected that the objective conditions of development and the world-wide anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle will cause many non-proletarian socialist trends in the new independent states to move towards scientific socialism, for in our day the way of social progress and the way of scientific socialism coincide.

## 2. Two Trends of Nationalism

In many of the countries of Asia and Africa the struggle for liberation is motivated by nationalist feeling. The birth and growth of nationalism in countries which have been under the yoke of alien colonial rule is a perfectly logical development. Arising out of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial feeling and nourished by the ordeal of downtrodden peoples, nationalism is a protest against alien domination, a longing for freedom and a recovery of national dignity. In the countries of the former imperialist colonial hinterland, therefore, particularly when they are fighting for political independence, nationalism carries the traits of a progressive ideology, which rallies all social strata to the struggle against imperialism, regardless of class and political loyalties.

Some bourgeois Western authors try to picture nationalism as a kind of "infantile disorder" which the backward peoples might as well have and get over. Bourgeois theoreticians



would be willing to forgive the emerging Asian and African nations their predilection for their historical and cultural heritage if they gave up their anti-imperialism and accepted neo-colonialism, which is designed to keep them within the orbit of capitalism.

While some authors view nationalism as circumscribed by the territorial bounds of the Third World, others are inclined to see it as a universal phenomenon, almost as the main driving force of present-day society. Thus Raymond Aron, a French sociologist, writes of the reappearance of the old forms of nationalism in Europe and the emergence of new forms elsewhere in the world. Arnold J. Toynbee, the prominent British historian, holds that nationalism has been the most important stimulating factor throughout the history of civilisation. Nationalism, he thinks, is more powerful than any other "isms": "Thus Individualists and Communists alike are Nationalists first. They are Individualists and Communists only secondarily—that is to say, only in so far as these ideologies do not get in Nationalism's way."<sup>1</sup>

While calling nationalism a potent force in our time, Toynbee does, it is true, consider it to be one of mankind's most harmful habits, originating in tribalism and man's attachment to his society. The only way to end nationalism, he thinks, is to create a world state.<sup>2</sup>

Nationalism is a historical phenomenon and must be studied in concrete historical contexts. Marxism-Leninism rejects an abstract formulation of the problem and insists on a strict distinction between the nationalism of a nation that oppresses or has oppressed, or between the nationalism of a large nation and that of a small one.

The birth of nationalism is logical and inevitable at a time when capitalism is being established and national movements are beginning to take shape. Nationalism was a progressive phenomenon when capitalism, a more advanced social system, was replacing feudalism in Europe, for then nationalism was aiding an emerging bourgeoisie in its struggle against feudal disunity and parochialism and for the unification of nations and the creation of centralised states.

<sup>1</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *Change and Habit. The Challenge of Our Time*, London, 1966, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Later, however, as capitalism passed into the stage of imperialism, the monopolist bourgeoisie used nationalism in the interests of expansion, subjugating one nation after another. And nationalism began to take on reactionary aspects, turning into chauvinism, racism, and fascism.

The nationalism of oppressed peoples is quite a different matter. In most of the colonies and semi-colonies national movements developed and national states came into being in conditions of relatively poorly developed capitalism, quite unlike in Western Europe or North America, where those processes were associated with a substantially developed bourgeoisie. In the colonies and dependencies nationalism is not necessarily intrinsically bourgeois, as in Western Europe or North America. The developing national-liberation movements in the former facilitated turning nationalism into a broad and profound ideological movement rooted in their predominantly petty-bourgeois structure. It will be recalled, for instance, that in India (as indeed in many other Asian countries) the principles of nationalism enjoyed the support of the masses during the liberation struggle that brought political independence, for Indian nationalism actively opposed British imperialism. In the Arab countries the national-liberation movement was dominated by the ideas of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. In Africa an important driving force of the anti-imperialist movement is Pan-Africanism, an ideology dedicated to the liberation of African peoples from colonial oppression.

The period of the evolution of capitalism into the higher stage of imperialism coincided with a new wave of national movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. As capital export expanded and these countries came to be increasingly drawn into the orbit of the world market, capitalist relations developed within them, which, in turn, greatly accelerated the growth of a national consciousness and revolutionary liberation movements with a nationalist ideology.

The fact that nationalism had inspired the early revolutionary anti-imperialist struggles waged by oppressed and dependent peoples could not fail to make a deep impression on the minds of working people everywhere, and that is why nationalism has continued to play an important role in the expansion and intensification of the socio-political struggle ever since. "The bourgeois nationalism of any



oppressed nation," wrote Lenin, "has a general democratic content that is directed *against* oppression, and it is this content that we *unconditionally* support."<sup>1</sup>

In a situation where nations are still only beginning to take shape, in many of the developing countries nationalism serves very much like a catalyst to accelerate the process. The ideas of nationalism strengthen the feeling of community, promote an interest in the historical past, foster national pride, give an impetus to the development of national culture and literature, stimulate the development of national languages. More than that: greater national consciousness means greater class consciousness, and the participation of the proletariat and its allies in the national-liberation movement affords excellent training for the class battles to come. Nations form and independent national states are established in the process of struggle against imperialism and tribal and feudal disunity.

The establishment of a union state is not in itself a complete solution of the national problem. The problems of national minorities, national-tribal disunity, a single national language, etc., are extremely complicated and will probably take a long time to solve. Attempts to solve the national problem within the framework of a bourgeois democracy have hitherto failed. And the experience of the efforts to create states based on a linguistic criterion in India, together with the resulting serious clashes on grounds of national differences and border conflicts between the new independent states, furnish additional proof that capitalism offers no possibility of reaching a complete solution of the national-colonial problem that would accord with the interests of the people as a whole. One fact is undeniable, however, namely, that in order to solve the national problem it is above all essential to form an independent state. The demand of colonial peoples for the right to self-determination and secession accords therefore with the objective historical process and should be regarded as progressive.

Nationalism in the countries of Asia and Africa today implies a clear understanding of the right of colonial peoples to form independent national states, an understanding that they owe to the Soviet Union as the first to proclaim national self-determination as a principle of state policy. Before the

socialist revolution Russia recognised the bourgeois principle of multi-national states without the right to national self-determination or secession. This principle, moreover, did not apply to colonial and dependent countries, despite the fact that the national problem had long since acquired broader aspects and become merged in the general problem of colonies and was now an international rather than a domestic issue.

With the intensification of national-liberation revolutions, when changing the social structure becomes a priority task, the two trends in the development of nationalism become especially marked. Nationalism comes to be used not only by the progressive national-democratic forces but by the local reaction as well. This is possible because nationalism is intrinsically dialectically contradictory, combining both dynamic, progressive and conservative, undesirable elements.

National-democratic forces, representing the progressive trend in the development of nationalism, regard the establishment of national statehood only as a necessary precondition of the social, economic, and cultural liberation of a people. In the process of the struggle for a genuine national regeneration the adherents of this trend come to see clearly the need for radical social reforms in close co-operation with all the revolutionary and progressive forces at home and abroad. As colonial relations disintegrate and the liberated countries set out on the road of social progress and the socio-economic pattern undergoes radical changes, there will be a step-by-step liquidation of the objective foundation which supports nationalism. And despite the fact that the social and class objectives of national-liberation revolutions may be lost sight of in national demands, while the struggle over the choice of a road may be waged under the guise of various so-called "national socialisms"—despite all that the broad democratic tendencies inherent in the nationalism of oppressed nations do not hinder, and in certain conditions may even serve as an intermediate step for, a shift of the national-democratic forces in favour of scientific socialism.

The fact is that in conditions of foreign imperialist domination and a weak local bourgeoisie the *national* consciousness of an oppressed, impoverished and illiterate populace in a liberated or emerging country constitutes to all intents and purposes an inchoate form of *class* consciousness and,

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 412.



growing stronger, heightens the latter. In backward countries, where the position of the national bourgeoisie and its influence on political activities are weak, as in some of the states of Tropical Africa, nationalism is revolutionary-democratic, not bourgeois, and aims at achieving both national and social freedom for the people.

However, as we have already said, nationalism harbours a reactionary tendency as well as a democratic. The forces representative of the reactionary tendency strive to empty nationalism of its broad democratic content and use it in the interests of those classes and political groups which object to any radical changes in the socio-economic structure of the developing countries. These forces regard the achievement of independent statehood as their ultimate objective. To draw the attention of the people from domestic problems they preach nationalism, sow dissent among the different nationalities and urge isolationism. These are the forces on which the imperialists count in their effort to halt any further development of national-liberation revolutions.

Nationalism typically manifests itself in its efforts to avoid the problems and difficulties that are inevitably associated with the building of a new society, and to draw the masses away from urgent socio-economic objectives.

Inasmuch as countries differ in respect of objective conditions, levels of socio-economic development, and ways of formation of bourgeoisie and working class, manifestations of nationalism in them also differ. In Indonesia, for example, nationalism as a protest against "domination by the rich countries" was made a part of state policy in recent years. Objectively this was a reflection of the desire of bureaucratic capital, now firmly in the saddle, to turn the country into a private reservation where Indonesia's "own" capitalists would exploit "her own" masses. Consolidation of the power of bureaucratic capital, however, meant that the national-democratic revolution would be slowed down, the country would be economically weakened and its dependence on foreign monopoly capital increased. As a matter of fact Indonesian nationalism was increasingly emptied of its anti-imperialist content, which was replaced by anti-imperialist *démarches* which the country's leaders hoped would turn the attention of 100 million Indonesians away from the domestic scene. That was mainly the reason for the costly confrontation with Malaysia, Indonesia's withdrawal from the

United Nations, etc., all of which created merely an illusion of a more vigorous anti-imperialist stand.

Unfortunately even the revolutionary and democratic forces were often deceived by this policy, which objectively delayed the development of the national-liberation revolution and in the ideological realm led to the merging of Marxism in petty-bourgeois leftist opportunism.

Growing nationalist feeling has lately strongly influenced the foreign policies of many of the liberated countries, which now display greater autonomy in the international arena and less dependence on the Western powers, reject any exclusive Western orientation, and seek wider contacts with the socialist countries. And in this respect the growth of nationalism has been a positive factor.

At the same time this growing nationalism is being rather successfully used by the ruling circles of a number of countries to dull class consciousness among the working people so that no discordant notes should sound in the general nationalist chorus. The concept of national unity as such is sometimes used by the ruling circles to veil class contradictions and push them back out of sight.

Two facts must be taken into account in evaluating the role of nationalism in the anti-imperialist movement and its current trends. In the first place, the imperialist forces have come to realise the insufficiency of the feudal landlords and the small segment of the openly co-operating bourgeoisie as a social base and are therefore now looking for allies mainly among the right-wing national bourgeoisie, with whose help they are endeavouring to empty nationalism of its progressive content and develop the reactionary elements it contains. In the second place, the bourgeoisie of the Asian and African countries is closely allied with the feudal-landlord circles. The growth of nationalism here usually goes hand in hand with mounting religious fervour, which is often used to fan separatist, chauvinistic, and even racial feelings. We have seen in Congo, Indonesia, Nigeria and elsewhere how the imperialists do everything possible to support these aspects of nationalism to split the anti-colonial forces and weaken the anti-imperialist front of the emerging nations.

The current political situation in many of the new states requires a particularly flexible and skilful approach to nationalism, which is still historically justified when it comes to strengthening national independence already won or to



establishing and developing national statehood in the struggle against imperialism. Strong national feelings in the masses are engendered precisely by these objective conditions, not only by the ideological propaganda of the national bourgeoisie. A flexible and skilful approach to nationalism is no simple task, however, and it becomes still more difficult now, in the presence of a definite upswing of patriotic nationalism among the masses following the winning of independence, and with the bourgeois elements in power intent on taking advantage of them to strengthen their dominance as a class.

The tug-of-war between the two trends of nationalism reflects the polarisation of forces in respect of the choice of a road of development, which is the most important problem currently facing the new independent states. Nationalism being above all a social issue, victory in this tug-of-war will depend on the actual correlation of class and political forces, on the pitch of class conflict, and on the road of development chosen. The situation in the countries in question has not changed after the winning of national sovereignty to such an extent that nationalism, as the ideology of the non-proletarian millions, could evaporate swiftly and completely. Imperialism—nationalism's objective foundation—remains, and continues its policy of forcing the new independent states to submit to its influence.

The dialectics of the national-liberation movement is such that the nationalism of an oppressed nation, which is a powerful uniting force while that nation is fighting for its political independence, may in certain conditions work to weaken its anti-imperialist unity. The revolutionary forces that use the nationalism of oppressed nations for their purposes, historically justified as its use may be, have to take the consequences.

History shows that practically all the forces of the revolutionary movement have experienced to some extent the nationalistic fervour. In the post-war period this nationalistic fervour has been particularly common in the Third World countries, where a particularly powerful petty bourgeoisie and a numerically small, politically weak and unorganised proletariat helped retain nationalist prejudices. Experience teaches, however, that nationalistic fervour recognises no bounds, state or geographic, and that such fervours recur in any revolutionary force, even in countries relatively advanced in the economic and social fields. One that adapts

itself to bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalism, or makes a fetish of bourgeois legality or rejects the class struggle for fear of alienating the masses, and so on, will eventually contribute to a stronger nationalism, forget the international objectives of the national-liberation movement and strengthen the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influences in it; and neither time nor place will make a difference.

Historically viewed, nationalism is a transitory phenomenon. In our world today, however, even within the liberation movement in fact, there are many forces, population strata, and individual political figures who, vaunting their nationalism to entice the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and sometimes even working-class elements, would like to delay the progress of that movement or else to turn it to their own selfish uses. They are interested, for reasons of their own, in walling off the national-liberation movement from the world socialist system and other international revolutionary movements and in emptying it of its social-class content, and they are endeavouring to steer the struggle that the oppressed peoples are waging to gain their freedom into the channel of nationalism and to convince the masses that it is a struggle of the poor peoples against the rich nations.

It is nationalism that underlies the various concepts conjured up to prove that the division of our present-day world into diametrically opposite social systems is based on levels of development, race or anything else, but not on the criterion of class. Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., an American professor, writes as follows: "For them, the crucial division in the world is not between the rival political faiths of Communism and liberal democracy, but between the rich and the poor, the economically developed and the underdeveloped, the technically competent and the technologically 'backward' areas of the world."<sup>1</sup> And Fritz Schatten wants us to believe that "in the mind of the African the world is divided far less into 'capitalists' and 'proletarians' than into 'rich whites' and 'poor coloured people', and the dream of many is directed not towards an 'International of the Workers', but towards an 'International of the Coloured'".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, New York, 1963, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> See *Polycentrism. The New Factor in International Communism*, ed. by Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, New York, 1962, p. 240.



These and other such views constitute an ideological doctrine which relegates such concepts as "social classes", "class war" and "class contradictions" to the past, inasmuch as modern capitalist society is allegedly evolving into a developed industrial society free of social antagonisms and the working people are turning into the equal partners of other social groups, equally interested in a flourishing "people's capitalism". As to the Third World countries, according to this theory, class relations have not reached a stage of maturity that would warrant treating these nations as class societies. Hence the conclusion that if the existence of classes and class war in the world of today is to be recognised, they should be viewed on an international rather than on a national scale. Thus originated the concepts of "bourgeois nations", meaning the advanced capitalist states, and the "proletarian nations", that is to say, the economically and socially backward countries of Asia and Africa. The term "proletarian nations" is widely used by many bourgeois authors,<sup>1</sup> who want to show that the working class of the advanced capitalist states has more in common with its bourgeoisie than with the working people of the backward countries for whom it is also an exploiting stratum.

This concept is intended to convince the working class and the working people at large in the advanced capitalist states that in relation to the population of backward countries they are no less a bourgeoisie than the ruling classes. The ideologists of the imperialist bourgeoisie use this concept to line up the populations of their own countries against the national-

<sup>1</sup> Thus, Pierre Moussa, the French scholar, has called his book *Les Etats-Unis et les nations prolétaires* (*The United States and the Proletarian Nations*). Elsewhere he writes that relations between nations today repeat the pattern of relations between classes a hundred years ago (see Pierre Moussa, *Les nations prolétaires*, Paris, 1959, p. 182). Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist, writes as follows: "On a fundamental level, the differences between nations have similarities with differences between social classes in a national community—as they existed before they began to dissolve rapidly, on account of national integration in our modern welfare states. The larger part of the rest of mankind forms in this sense a lower class of nations—with a number of nations in a middle class position between. As a matter of fact, and considering their actual levels of living, the term 'proletariat' would be more appropriate in such an international comparison than it ever was or, anyhow, is now within any of the advanced nations" (see Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy. Problems and Prospects*, New York, 1956, p. 318).

liberation movement which they try to picture as a force directed not against monopoly capital but against the advanced capitalist countries generally, that is to say, against the "bourgeois nations". One such author writes as follows: "Since the 'proletarian nations' have appropriated for themselves the role of Marx's proletariat, as grave-digger of capitalism, there is little historical role left for the proletariat of the advanced countries. In the new theoretical model, they are either passive or active accomplices of imperialism, so long corrupted that they have become historically insignificant as a revolutionary force."<sup>1</sup>

The concept of "bourgeois nations" and "proletarian nations" was seized upon by the reformists, by opportunists of all shades who saw in it an antidote for the proletarian revolution, and by the petty-bourgeois extremists who saw in it a justification of their "disillusionment" with the revolutionary possibilities of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries. The main danger, however, lies in the fact that certain circles in the developing countries are also using this theory as a weapon. It is easy to understand why the national bourgeoisie, and especially its right wing, should be interested in it: they are trying to increase their ideological influence on the masses, conceal their privileged status in the society, and prevent class war in the newly-independent countries. And they have been quick to turn to their advantage the fact that a certain amount of mistrust of the peoples of the oppressing countries still lingers among the peoples of the oppressed nations, including a considerable section of the working class. Lenin wrote in this connection: "The age-old oppression of colonial and weak nationalities by the imperialist powers has not only filled the working masses of the oppressed countries with animosity towards the oppressor nations, but has also aroused distrust in these nations in general, even in their proletariat."<sup>2</sup>

The stressing of national dignity and national pride sometimes turns into propaganda of national particularism and even national exclusiveness. When they rally the national forces against imperialism the ideologists of nationalism flatly deny, as a rule, the existence of class differences, class interests, and the very idea of class conflict. While

<sup>1</sup> Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, London, 1964, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150.



an ideology that emphasises national unity does help overcome tribal disunity and promotes the national consolidation of anti-imperialist forces in such cases, and may therefore be considered progressive, nationalism as a whole can lead to a splitting of the world liberation struggle and become a reactionary movement.

Particularly dangerous are efforts to prove that any unity among the working people on an international plane is out of the question when living standards vary greatly from country to country and that contradictions within the community of developing countries, no matter how sharp, are still "domestic difficulties", whereas contradictions between the newly-independent countries and the advanced states are irreconcilable. That is the theory that underlies all the discourses about a rich North, meaning all the industrially developed countries, which will never understand the needs and aspirations of a poverty-stricken South, meaning the Third World countries. In other words, the contrast and the conflict between the two social systems, which constitute the main content of our time, are rejected in favour of purely national and occasionally even racial concepts which oppose the nationalism of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie to the internationalism of the working people.

Marxists support the anti-imperialist tendencies present in the nationalism of the oppressed nations, though never failing, at the same time, to criticise it for its narrowness or its objectionable features and to promote the principles of internationalism. Marxism and nationalism are irreconcilable. A basic Marxist principle is to fight determinedly for a consistently democratic approach to the national issue while helping shake the masses out of their feudal torpor and aiding them in their struggle for national sovereignty and an end of any and all national oppression. "But this is the limit the proletariat can go to in supporting nationalism," wrote Lenin, "for beyond that begins the 'positive' activity of the *bourgeoisie* striving to fortify nationalism.... But to go *beyond* these strictly limited and definite, historical limits in helping bourgeois nationalism means betraying the proletariat and siding with the bourgeoisie."<sup>1</sup>

### 3. Anti-Communism Is a Foe of Social Progress

Bourgeois ideologists and politicians are well aware that if the development of the Third World countries is left to follow its natural course the influence of the imperialist powers in that area will disappear completely in the foreseeable future. The theoreticians of neo-colonialism, unsure of solely military or economic methods, are urging the imperialist powers to bring ideological pressure to bear upon the peoples of the newly-independent countries. The main obstruction to the ideological penetration of this area, as they see it, is set up by the communists, who, above all others, are fighting consistently to bring the national-liberation revolutions to a victorious end. Imperialist propaganda does its best to discredit communism and to prove that the fundamental propositions of Marxism-Leninism are unsuited to the unique conditions of the Third World, drawing for support of their effort on the survival of nationalist, religious, caste and other prejudices, as well as on the difficulties, chiefly economic, currently experienced by the countries that have taken the road of independent development.

There is particularly extensive speculation about relations between the communists and the ruling national-democratic parties in the leading countries of Asia and Africa. The imperialists endeavour to convince the nationalists that the communists are incapable of sincere co-operation with them and are working to bring about the overthrow of the existing regimes. This tactic may prove more effective in certain cases than an opposition of nationalism and communism on an ideological plane; for the leaders of the countries in question are not anti-Marxists and are not apt to take fright at the prospect of socialism. And it is easier to turn them against the communists by convincing them that the communist parties are determined to replace the national-democratic governments with purely communist governments. That is why imperialist agents are trying to compromise the communists as being a "subversive element". That is the line the anti-communists take in their propaganda campaign.

Being aware, at the same time, of the popularity of socialist ideas in the developing countries, the ideologists of imperialism are endeavouring to spread such versions of

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 34-35.



"national" socialism which use socialist phraseology solely to cover up or justify the capitalist way. In addition to the propaganda of such versions imperialist agents resort to the falsification of the scientific socialist theory which they describe as a "European model" which the communists want to foist on the nations of Asia and Africa regardless of either local conditions or the distinctive features of their development. Bourgeois theoreticians are rather sure that nationalism will prevail over socialism in the countries in question.

Unfortunately, there are elements in these new states, which are misled by bourgeois propaganda, become victims of anti-communist prejudices, and, as a result, try to ignore the communists and to oppose communism with nationalism, which leads objectively to the weakening of the progressive forces' position *vis-à-vis* the united front of foreign and domestic reaction. It was emphasised at the 23rd Congress of the C.P.S.U. that "the struggle for social progress and national independence is more successful, where there is greater unity of all patriotic, progressive and democratic forces. Communists, being as they are, selfless fighters against imperialism for the interests of the people, are active in this struggle. Unquestionably, where this is forgotten and where Communists are even persecuted, the cause of strengthening national independence and freedom is harmed."<sup>1</sup>

The ideologists of the monopoly bourgeoisie and the advocates of anti-communism in the developing countries have set out to formulate a system of "arguments" that would theoretically justify a policy of isolating the communists. Let us examine some of these "arguments".

*First "argument".* It is claimed that conditions in the economically backward countries do not favour the independent existence of communist parties. In support of this theory it is usually pointed out that the proletariat in these countries is numerically weak. Where peasants form a preponderant part of the population the appearance of a communist party, according to the anti-communists, is unjustified and constitutes proof of the interference of international communist forces.

It is true that the formation of a working class in the

<sup>1</sup> 23rd Congress of the C.P.S.U., Moscow, 1966, pp. 35-36.

countries of Asia and Africa is not proceeding rapidly enough and that, in consequence, the proletariat of these countries differs in certain respects from the proletariat of the advanced capitalist states. It is numerically small and its industrial component is relatively unimportant. It is closely tied to the farm, dispersed, poorly organised, etc. All of which, together with mass illiteracy and strong tribal, caste, and religious prejudices, retards the growth of class consciousness among the proletariat and the strengthening of unity in its ranks.

It would be wrong, on the other hand, to ignore facts pointing to the sustained numerical growth of the working class, its improving organisation, the appearance of new Marxist-Leninist parties, and the expansion of the workers' movement. A feature of the current stage of the national-liberation movement is that the positions of the working class are growing stronger from year to year. But the bourgeois ideologists endeavour to show that the working class and its party are incapable of playing an independent and active role in the national-liberation movement and refer to the immaturity and lack of experience of the working class to clinch their argument.

*Second "argument".* In some of the developing countries the ruling circles are ever ready to lay the blame for any turn of the domestic situation for the worse, whatever the cause, on the communists, whom they describe as mere spectators, always critical, never offering any constructive suggestions.

Actually, if the communists are "guilty" of anything, it is of being the most consistent fighters for the social progress of their peoples. Putting the main objective of social progress above the interests of the proletariat, the communists welcome broad alliances with any and all national patriotic forces, without insisting on their own leadership of the united anti-imperialist, anti-neo-colonialist front in its fight for social progress.

The communists are ready to back any progressive measure, regardless of who suggests it, so long as it is designed to strengthen national independence and improve living standards for the working people. They are of a high opinion of the socio-economic reforms currently being introduced by the national-democratic forces in some of the newly-independent countries. Keenly aware that socio-



economic reforms should not be rushed without due consideration of the specific conditions prevailing in the developing countries, the communists nevertheless feel bound to criticise those who intentionally hold up progressive reforms designed to benefit the working people, prefer to sit on the fence, refuse to co-operate with the most consistently revolutionary forces, and seize upon any pretext to deny the latter active participation in building a new life.

The reforms now being put through in the developing countries on the basis of blue-prints for a socialist-type society refer to the economic sphere and are hardly concerned with problems of state and political organisation. This is quite logical, for at the present stage of the national-liberation revolutions the role of economics is very important. There can be no political independence and no internal political stability without economic independence. At the same time there is danger in underestimating the political aspect of the reforms in question. It is important above all that democracy should be expanded and strengthened.

The building of a new society, to which many national-democratic Third World forces claim to be dedicated, is not a single finite action but a long and complicated process which progresses the more successfully the more actively the masses are drawn into active participation. Socialist construction requires the conscious creative endeavour of millions so organised as to be able to fruitfully participate in administering a country's social, economic and political life. "There can be no victorious socialism that does not practise full democracy,"<sup>1</sup> wrote Lenin. Communists view a consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy as an important component of the struggle for socialism and react quickly to any attempts to curtail democracy and to overcome difficulties at the expense of the interests of the working people. There is nothing negative about such criticism, which is, on the contrary, extremely constructive, and aims at creating within the newly-independent countries conditions in which all progressive forces, including the communists, will have an opportunity to contribute their knowledge, experience and effort to the prosperity and social progress of their respective countries.

One important difference between the communist parties

and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties is that the communists do not merely offer sound programmes of concrete action but also fight energetically for their implementation both in the government, if they are represented in it, and by other means. "Our Party," wrote Ajoy Ghosh, the late Secretary General of the Indian Communist Party, "has not merely put forward a programme on whose basis all patriotic forces can unite, but it has also fearlessly championed the cause of the people, both inside and outside the legislatures. In every struggle of the people for their just demands our Party has ever been in the forefront."<sup>1</sup>

*Third "argument".* Anti-communists in the developing countries declare that they are not against communism as such. In fact they are favourably inclined towards the international communist movement, being impressed by its high theoretical level and its profound scientific analysis of the urgent issues of our time. And if they are constrained to oppose "national" or "local" communism, it is because the latter allegedly gives a distorted interpretation of the ideas and principles of the world communist movement as applied to the conditions prevailing in the developing countries. There are people even today, admittedly, who still dream of eradicating communism, as in Indonesia, for example, where the opinion is voiced that communist parties must be destroyed not only on Indonesian soil but, if possible, all over the world as well.

More often, however, "local" communists are described as an organisation lacking any prestige at home and being no exponent of the views of the world communist movement. Some maintain, for instance, that the communist parties are the worse possible choice as a link between the communist world and the countries that have set out on the road of liberation and development. Such authors attempt to prove that the communist parties of Asian and African countries have been the source of doubt and distrust even when these countries and the socialist community were beginning to get on friendly terms.

These and other similar arguments are addressed to people who have a faint notion, if any, of the situation in the world communist movement. They are designed to drive

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 144.

<sup>1</sup> Ajoy Ghosh, "Some Features of the Indian Situation", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1962, p. 13.



a wedge between the various sections that compose that movement. But they are doomed to failure, for the world communist movement is a united movement based on a common Marxist-Leninist platform and common political and organisational principles, and pursuing a common ultimate purpose.

Such, then, are the basic "arguments" put forward by the ideologists of anti-communism. All kinds of sins are imputed to the communists. Backed by the petty bourgeoisie and utilising the nationalist, religious and other prejudices still current among people, the anti-communists still find it possible to obfuscate the most benighted sections of the population. Nevertheless, more and more people are beginning to understand that nowadays, when the activation of the imperialist forces and domestic reaction makes it increasingly urgent to strengthen the unity of all progressive forces on a national as well as an international scale, there is danger that the policy of anti-communism might split and weaken the anti-imperialist front.

Communists have always been in the forefront of the fight for national and social liberation. The appearance of communist parties in Asia and Africa has done much to activate the forces of national liberation and to foster the growth of political consciousness among the masses.

Communists co-operated in all good faith with all democratic forces taking part in the anti-colonial struggle. Nor was it just a tactical manoeuvre on their part. Being consistent foes of any kind of oppression, the communists have always, everywhere backed oppressed nations against the oppressor nations. They cannot do otherwise, since to make an end of imperialist exploitation in whatever shape or form is their most important aim. Communists spare no effort nor even their lives to uphold the vital interests of the people. They are the exponents and propagandists of progressive socialist ideas, which are being put into practice now by progressive national democratic forces. They have the Marxist-Leninist teaching to rely on in searching for answers to new problems that crop up in the course of the national-liberation movement.

In Asia and Africa, communists face difficult tasks. It is up to them to apply Marxist-Leninist theory and practice in trying and unique conditions, such as have not been encountered in the countries of Europe. Under the circum-

stances the fight for the purity of Marxism-Leninism and against any distortions thereof will be the special concern of the communist and workers' parties, as also the fight against revisionism, which empties the proletarian doctrine of its fighting revolutionary content to make it toe the line of bourgeois ideology, and against the dogmatism that endeavours to fit Marxist thought into patterns long since dead and breeds sectarianism and leftist adventurism.

While the importance of combating revisionism is not to be underestimated, it is necessary to especially stress the danger of dogmatism in the conditions of Asia and Africa. The situation here is extremely unstable and there has been so far no clear-cut polarisation of class forces; and there are numerous groups and elements which have not as yet chosen their particular credo and which are still open to a guiding influence; so that an especially flexible, constructive approach is needed here to the choice of tactics and policy, as well as to the problem of alliances. Moreover, there is a serious shortage of mature, trained Marxist cadres in these countries, and the accumulated force of anti-imperialist, anti-colonial protest stimulates spontaneous outbreaks and fans revolutionary impatience, so that dogmatism here might do great harm to the revolutionary movement, leading to pseudo-radical tactics, false revolutionism, and leftist adventurism. Marxists, Lenin pointed out, must "take cognisance of real life, of the true facts of *reality*, and not cling to a theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, at best only outlines the main and the general, only *comes near* to embracing life in all its complexity".<sup>1</sup>

There is still another reason why it is essential for the communist parties to increase their activity in the ideological sphere. The fact is that the democratic and socialist forces in the developing countries and elsewhere, while backing the progressive measures being carried through by the various national leaders and governing parties in the social and economic sphere, refrain—for understandable reasons—from any discussion of ideological problems with them. Among the peoples of the newly-independent countries such an attitude may create the impression that these democratic and socialist forces also fully share the ideological concepts of the national leaders. The masses often tend to

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 45.



identify scientific socialism and Marxist ideology with the views of different nationalist leaders who are not in sympathy with Marxist theories. This does not mean that the progressive forces should engage in violent debate with the national-democratic leaders who are sincerely working for the development of their countries the socialist way. It means that the object of criticism should justly be the ideologists of imperialism who pose as interpreters of socialism. It means that the ideological problems of the national-liberation movement require serious consideration. The transition to the socialist world outlook will be the more successful the more actively the revolutionary forces influence the formation of a progressive world outlook among the masses, and among the national-democratic leaders, too.

It is highly important in this connection that an uncompromising and principled attitude in the ideological sphere should not be confused with ideological intolerance of all who think differently, of all non-communists and non-Marxists. Success in the ideological conflict, especially with the embattled anti-communists, largely depends on the ability to enlist the aid of the many natural allies in this struggle—both as a whole and in respect of individual issues—that can be found among the middle bourgeoisie, the intermediate urban strata, the anti-imperialist-minded national bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals, who are still under the influence of the reactionary ideas of bourgeois nationalism and anti-communism and have a false understanding of the issues of our time. No victory in this ideological war can be won without their sympathy and support. As for those who seek an alliance with the forces of democracy and are moving, however slowly and often gropingly, towards scientific socialism, the revolutionary forces should learn to meet them half-way, though not, of course, at the sacrifice of any of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The basic Marxist-Leninist attitude should be a tactful approach to people still victims of bourgeois and even feudal prejudices, on the one hand, and uncompromising exposure of the ideologists of anti-communism, on the other.

## Chapter Eight

### SOCIALISM AND THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION STRUGGLE

The historic changes in the lives and destinies of oppressed peoples that are taking place in the lifetime of our generation are closely connected with the political and economic growth of the world socialist system and its growing influence on all aspects of the development of society the world over. Marx, pointing out the connection between the struggle waged by the proletariat and the movement for equality among the peoples, wrote, back in 1847, as follows: "The proletariat's victory over the bourgeoisie means at the same time elimination of all national and industrial conflicts that now give rise to enmity between the peoples. That is why the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie sounds at the same time a call for freedom for all oppressed nations."<sup>1</sup>

The central thesis of the founders of scientific communism was that social oppression and exploitation of one people by another is based on the system of private ownership and that the working class, which is more than any other interested in abolishing the capitalist system of production, is therefore a natural ally of those peoples who are victims of rightlessness, both social and national.

A powerful impetus to the movement against social and national oppression was given by the socialist revolution of October 1917, in Russia. This first socialist revolution in history began a new epoch of the national-liberation movement. The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says: "Imperialism suppressed the national independence and freedom of the majority of the peoples and put the fetters of brutal colonial slavery on them, but the rise of socialism marks the advent of the era of emancipation of the oppressed people."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Marx and Engels, *Works*, Vol. 4, p. 371 (in Russian).

<sup>2</sup> *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 35.



The victory of the Russian proletariat and peasantry over their capitalists and landlords helped carry the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine far and wide, including the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Marxism awakened keen interest among the progressive leaders of the Third World countries, who saw in it an answer to the problems of social and national liberation. Even those among them who refused to accept Marxism *in toto* considered it necessary to use some of its elements in their struggle for national independence.

Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote: "This Russian revolution is a most significant turning point in history. It will determine the course of civilisation for the centuries to come."<sup>1</sup> Li Ta-chao regarded the Soviet state as "the vanguard and great bulwark of the workers and peasants of the world".<sup>2</sup>

Ho Chi Minh, the late chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, had this to say: "... the Marxist-Leninist principles in the question of colonial liberation have been triumphantly confirmed. The October Revolution provided strong impetus for this struggle [of the peoples of the East], and the existence of the Soviet Union constituted an important historic factor which helped that struggle develop rapidly."<sup>3</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote as follows in this connection: "A study of Marx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on my mind and helped me to see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social development appeared to have some meaning, some sequence, and the future lost some of its obscurity.... The Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and it had laid the foundations for that new civilisation towards which the world could advance."<sup>4</sup>

The October Revolution of 1917 dealt the world imperialist system a heavy blow: it was unable henceforward to play the same role on the international scene or influence the course of events the world over as extensively as be-

<sup>1</sup> Li Ta-chao, *Izbranniye statyi i rechi (Selected Articles and Speeches)*, Moscow, 1965, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, Hanoi, 1962, p. 273.

<sup>4</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London, 1951, p. 14.

fore. The disintegration of the imperialist colonial system picked up speed. Socialism, now established in the Soviet Union, became a powerful political bastion of the oppressed peoples. More than that, however: the Soviet state, not yet recovered from the effects of the first world war and the civil war and still in the grip of economic dislocation, had lost no time in extending material aid to the revolutionary-democratic movements in the neighbouring countries.

The peoples of Turkey, China, Mongolia and other countries, bolstered by Soviet ideological, political, economic and military aid, stepped up their national-liberation struggle and took new hope of victory over their foes. "There can be no revolution if we do not study the Russian experience..." wrote Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary-democrat. "Our party will achieve no results in its revolutionary struggle, unless we are willing to learn from Russia."<sup>1</sup>

Kemal Atatürk, leader of the Turkish national-liberation movement, in his message of 1920 to the Soviet Government wrote, in part, "of the Turkish people's admiration for the Russian people, who, not content with breaking its own shackles, has been carrying for over two years a gallant fight for the liberation of all the world, courageously facing unparalleled hardships in order to wipe oppression off the face of the earth once and for all".<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet state has extended all the aid in its power to a national-liberation movement that was basically bourgeois-democratic and non-proletarian.

In doing so it was motivated by the consideration that the proletarian movement for socialism and the national-liberation movement share a common objective, namely, their struggle against imperialism. The Marxists-Leninists reasoned that the sustained development of the struggle for national liberation with the active participation of the working people would eventually develop into a struggle for social liberation. Given certain conditions, an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggle has every chance of turning into an anti-capitalist movement. Addressing the Third Congress of the Communist International, Lenin said: "It

<sup>1</sup> Sun Yat-sen, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya (Selected Works)*, Moscow, 1964, p. 502.

<sup>2</sup> *Üneshnaya politika SSSR (Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.)*, Vol. 1, p. 457.



is perfectly clear that in the impending decisive battles in the world revolution the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we expect."<sup>1</sup>

The intervening years have proved Lenin's expectations to be correct. In a number of countries of Europe and Asia the peoples' movement for national liberation did develop into a struggle for socialist reforms, and the socialist forces have been victorious in their anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle whenever they had gained influence and moved to the forefront of the movement. Experience has shown that the bourgeoisie is incapable of following through their bourgeois-democratic reforms: only the working class is capable of accomplishing that task.

Lenin, recalling that "the direct and immediate object of the revolution in Russia was a bourgeois-democratic one", stressed that "in order to consolidate the achievements of the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the peoples of Russia, we were obliged to go farther; and we did go farther. We solved the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in passing, as a 'by-product' of our main and genuinely proletarian-revolutionary, socialist activities."<sup>2</sup>

The second—basically anti-fascist—world war gave further proof of the identity of interests of socialism and the national-liberation democratic movement. The crushing defeat inflicted on German fascism and Japanese militarism and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in that victory over the enemy of all mankind showed beyond any doubt that socialism was that precise force which could save the peoples of the world from social and national subjugation.

The victory over fascism and reaction in the second world war hastened the disintegration of the colonial system. The increased influence now wielded by the Soviet Union helped expand the area of the anti-imperialist struggles, emphasised the progressive elements of the national-liberation movement and added a new content thereto. The alliance between socialism and the national-liberation (i.e.,

bourgeois-democratic) movement grew stronger and could not but aid the development of the latter: its historic successes of the post-war period were the result of the expansion and strengthening of the world socialist system, while the scope of the oppressed peoples' anti-imperialist struggle helped, in turn, to bolster the world socialist system.

Socialism and the national-liberation movement may be likened to a powerful torrent washing away the foundation of the capitalist system of social and national oppression. The peoples of the socialist countries are just as interested in the destruction of imperialism as the peoples of the liberated or emerging countries. All are equally interested in improving as rapidly as possible their living standards, raising their cultural level, and ensuring the most rational exploitation of their national resources and rapid development of their productive forces for the benefit of the entire society. That is why the socialist countries and many of the countries that have but recently achieved the status of sovereign states are unanimous in their efforts to safeguard the peace and prevent a thermonuclear war.

The socialist countries are true friends and reliable allies of the new independent nations. It is to the mutual advantage of the forces of socialism and the forces of the national-liberation movement to aid each other. Efforts to oppose these two trends of the world-wide revolutionary process, to estrange them, to picture them as incompatible and mutually hostile only play into the hands of the imperialists and reactionaries. Leaders of nationalist leanings are trying to bring about a quarrel between Marxists-Leninists and the revolutionary democrats of the Third World countries by fanning useless argument over which of the two trends is of greater importance. In other words, instead of taking up the serious and urgent problem of ways and means of co-operation and mutual aid of the various anti-imperialist forces in their fight for social and national progress, those nationalist leaders are arguing the question of who is to sit at the head of the table.

The assault of the strongholds of imperialism and reaction is being delivered by the forces of progress in a manner different from that of an armed force. Revolutionary tactics are not always similar to military tactics, and the deployment of the former forces on the anti-imperialist

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 482.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, pp. 51, 54.



front differs substantially from troop formation on the march. Comparative importance of rank is not of paramount importance to the urgent task of strengthening the common anti-imperialist front in the fight for peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism. It is much more useful to consider in what way socialism can best help the new sovereign states move forward along the road of freedom, democracy, and social progress.

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We might begin our study of the problem by considering in what measure Marxist-Leninist theories and the principles of scientific socialism can help those nations who have not yet made their decision to determine what method of national and social development would be the most rational and effective in their case. In our time, when the Marxist-Leninist theories of scientific socialism have ceased to be mere abstract speculation and become a living reality, there is no need to conjure up projects or schemes of an ideal reorganisation of society on principles of reason and justice as students of utopian, pre-scientific socialism were obliged to do.

That is not to say, of course, that the emerging countries now need only to copy the existing theory and practices of socialist construction and that it is now enough to apply at home the accumulated experience of the socialist countries to get things going. On the contrary, mechanical copying and borrowing would mean distorting the substance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of scientific socialism and would lead to results which would discredit the very concept of the possibility of building socialism in countries with an insufficient infrastructure. Lenin repeatedly warned European and Asian communists not to follow blindly the experience of Russia. There must be no mechanical transplantation of the accumulated collective experience of socialist construction: what is needed is its creative assimilation and selective application in the specific historical and national conditions of the society concerned.

The inevitable ultimate acceptance of socialism by all nations does not rule out but, rather, presupposes a multitude of forms of democratic organisation of social life and economic administration, as well as different rates of social

reorganisation and therefore of economic and cultural development. According to Lenin, "the transition from capitalism to socialism is conceivable in different forms, depending upon whether big capitalist or small production relationships predominate in the country".<sup>1</sup>

In its efforts to keep the newly-independent countries from choosing socialism bourgeois propaganda has lately stepped up its attacks upon Marxism-Leninism. This bourgeois criticism of Marxism follows three basic lines.

To begin with, attempts are made to find contradictions between the views of Marx and Lenin; between Lenin's evaluations and the directives of the Comintern; and between the conclusions and formulations contained in the documents of the Comintern and in modern Marxist literature. Some bourgeois theoreticians would have us believe that Marx did not view the backwardness of the colonial peoples as the product of the capitalist powers' colonial policies and that he emphasised only the construction activities of the colonialists, British capital in India, for example, whereas the modern communist theoreticians claim, contrary to Marx's theories, that colonialism had been the cause of backwardness.<sup>2</sup> And "proof" is adduced in this connection to show that inasmuch as the Marxist theory had had the proletariat of the developed capitalist countries in view, it was generally helpless in regard to the problems the international communist movement had to face as a result of the revolutionary upheaval of the East. Charles B. McLane, an American historian who shares this view, says that the shift in communist policy towards the national-liberation movement occurred only after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, i.e., after 1928,<sup>3</sup> while there are some who go so far as to claim that revolutionary Marxism turned to the undeveloped countries only after the second world war, when it became clear that it didn't stand a chance in Western Europe.

In the second place, critics of Marxism today are frequently willing to admit that the founders of scientific communism had been right in their evaluation of the character

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> This view is advanced, among others, by Kurt E. Müller and Henen Ray in *Der Kommunismus in Indien*, Hannover, 1966, pp. 14-15.

<sup>3</sup> Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, Princeton, 1966, p. 74 et al.



and basic objectives of the national-liberation movement. Thus Professor Richard Löwenthal of West Berlin admits that Lenin was right when he predicted that after the proletarian revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule in Russia national-liberation revolutions would inevitably merge in the world proletarian revolution, just as he was right in predicting that the process of de-colonisation, which set in after the first world war, would inevitably develop and turn, in many countries, into revolutionary movements. He was also right, Löwenthal continues, in foreseeing that the struggle for independence would pose not only strictly national problems but would also bring up entirely new problems of economic development and social regrouping which in many cases would not yield to solution by the traditional methods of Western capitalist development.

There is, however, a purpose behind such admissions: after their candour wins the reader's confidence the authors bring out their main thought, which is that if the Marxists' expectations did come true in respect of some colonial or semi-colonial lands, that was only as an exception, for in their basic predictions regarding the future development of the national-liberation movement the Marxists, in their opinion, were wrong. This line of reasoning is set out very clearly by the American professor Thomas P. Thornton, who writes: "The Communists had long predicted the collapse of the imperialist colonial system, but when it came they were slow to appreciate the significance of the change. Nothing in Marxist theory had prepared them for such a sudden and radical transformation. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

In the third place, bourgeois authors grant that the Third World countries may find Marxism-Leninism attractive, but only, they say, in so far as they are concerned with their resistance to the advanced countries of the West and their struggle for independence. When it comes to coping with their own domestic problems, however, these countries allegedly want nothing to do with Marxism. Robert A. Scalapino, well known for his anti-communist sentiments, goes even farther. According to him even communists in the Asian countries reject Marxism as being allegedly incom-

patible with the unique conditions prevailing in the newly-independent countries. In his quest for social modernisation, Scalapino writes, "the Asian Marxist, in certain critical respects, has not seen or interpreted his creed in the manner of Marx. . . . Few doctrines in human history have undergone more extensive revisions than Marxism in Asia."<sup>1</sup>

While differing in some respects, these views—and the bourgeois authors who expound them—pursue quite obviously the sole purpose of disproving Marxism, showing it to be obsolete, picturing it as incapable of analysing the new problems that beset the developing countries.

Western "theoreticians" are working hard to discredit the position and activities of the Comintern in regard to the national and colonial problem and to belittle the significance of its decisions to the national-liberation movement.

Not all of the Comintern's estimates and conclusions, needless to say, have been fully confirmed in practice. Some of its propositions and formulations on the national and colonial problem carried a touch of sectarianism. But it would be a mistake to ignore the fact that many Marxist concepts advanced by the Comintern did bear fruit and are just as meaningful today as they were at first.

Marxists-Leninists reject the erroneous propositions resulting from an unconstructive attitude towards the realities and a mechanical application of certain theoretical conclusions verified through the experience of revolutionary movements in the advanced capitalist states to the regions embraced by the national-liberation struggle without due consideration of the national and social features peculiar to the countries concerned. Therein lies the strength of Marxist thinking, which the bourgeois ideologists try to pass off for its weakness. Marxism-Leninism rejects the idea of forcing living realities into hard and fast patterns, and that is why it has won such wide acceptance, to become the world's most potent political theory.

Marxism has been finding the right solutions for all the problems of current development, including the complicated processes and phenomena of the Third World, because it has never stood still but ceaselessly developed, adding new propositions and conclusions to its body of theory. In the

<sup>1</sup> *Communism and Revolution. The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*, ed. by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, p. 245.

<sup>1</sup> *The Communist Revolution in Asia. Tactics, Goals and Achievements*, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, p. 2.



long run those concepts won out which were a true reflection of the realities, even though at some particular stage, for one reason or another, they failed to become dominant.

The "studies" of bourgeois authors devoted to the history of the Comintern are shot through with a desire to prove that in its activities the Comintern drew increasingly away from Lenin's position on the national-liberation movement towards sectarianism and dogmatism. The authors usually refer to the well-known propositions advanced by M. N. Roy, an Indian communist, and certain other fallacious propositions, in an attempt to show that these were the propositions—not Lenin's—that formed the basis of the Comintern's tactics and policies in regard to the national-liberation movement. Let us see if that was the case.

It will be recalled that the Second Congress of the Comintern, which adopted a resolution on national and colonial problems, based on Lenin's "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions", also approved M. N. Roy's "Additional Theses", which disagreed with Lenin's views on the basic question of leadership of the national-liberation struggle. Lenin had made a profound analysis of the social and economic conditions in the colonies and dependencies and the alignment of class and political forces and had come to the conclusion that in its initial period of existence in conditions of preponderantly pre-capitalist relations the national-liberation movement would inevitably be bourgeois-democratic. Speaking at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin said: "It is beyond doubt that any national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consists of peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist relationships."<sup>1</sup>

On the strength of this evaluation of the nature of the movement Lenin emphasised that it was possible for a country to change to socialism but that it would have to pass through several definite stages of development to do so. In the initial stage, communists would therefore have to support the revolutionary movements in the colonies and semi-colonies even though these movements may be headed by bourgeois elements, for in many of these countries pre-capitalist relations still prevail and any possibility of a

purely proletarian movement is therefore out of the question.

As to the propositions advanced by Roy, these retained, even after a rather thorough revision by a Congress committee, the fallacious idea that the leadership of revolutions in the colonies should not be placed in the hands of the bourgeois democrats even in the initial stage. Roy's ninth thesis reads as follows: "In its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried on with a programme which will include many petty-bourgeois reform clauses, such as division of land, etc. But from this it does not follow at all that the leadership of the revolution will have to be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats."<sup>1</sup>

Criticising this viewpoint, one of the members present said: "In actual practice we find it necessary to work together with the revolutionary nationalist elements, and our work would be half done if we should deny the nationalist revolutionary movement and play the dogmatic Marxists."<sup>2</sup>

If we look at the record of the national-liberation struggle we shall find that the conclusions of the Comintern have not always proved entirely right. R. Palme Dutt, who took part in the Comintern debate on the national-liberation movement, writes as follows: "Initial signs of some trends to sectarianism appeared in some of the formulations of the Sixth Congress in 1928, especially in its potentially misleading main slogan 'Class Against Class!', as also in some narrowness in the otherwise valuable treatment of the colonial question..."<sup>3</sup> An interesting comment in this connection was made by the late O. W. Kuusinen, who wrote: "Our historians and propagandists have every reason to review and revise some of our other publications as well, for instance, the well-known theses of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. I must mention, specifically, the critique and evaluation of the role of the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, given in these theses. There was a tinge of sectarianism in that evaluation at the time the theses in question were being formulated. In the changed conditions of our time, with the prestige of the Soviet Union greatly increased, that evaluation is very much

<sup>1</sup> *The Second Congress of the Communist International. Proceedings*, Moscow, 1920, p. 579.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>3</sup> R. Palme Dutt, *The Internationale*, London, 1964, p. 209.

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 241.



at odds with the realities."<sup>1</sup> Even the petty bourgeoisie was denied, to all intents and purposes, any progressive role. Such an evaluation ran counter to the views of Lenin, who worked out the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies on the strength of his conviction that the national bourgeoisie was still capable of working for a progressive cause of historic importance.

This underestimation of the revolutionary capabilities of the national bourgeoisie led to another mistake: a certain neglect of the national factor in the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples, a tendency to overlook the obvious fact that a liberation struggle cannot but be a national movement. This could create the impression that Marxists attached less importance to demands prompted by national feelings than to demands of a social nature. As a result, the proper balance between the national and social elements of the national-liberation movement was affected, leading in a number of cases to the estrangement of the pre-eminently consistent revolutionaries from the nation's other democratic forces.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, some of the fallacious propositions and formulations contained in the Comintern publications, which have been critically reviewed by various communist parties, are being used nowadays not only by the bourgeois critics of Marxism, but also by those who pose as the sole guardians of the integrity of the Marxist doctrine. In China, today, the leaders base their theoretical and political concepts on the old dogmas which are now at variance with the realities, ignoring the many useful concepts arrived at collectively by Marxist scholars in the pre-war period and written down in the publications and records of the Comintern. This is a logical enough development, for these concepts do not fit into the fixed pattern of dogmas that the leadership of the C.P.C. are trying to foist upon the national-liberation movement.

For the national-liberation movement, the significance of the Comintern and its decisions is truly great and varied. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that it has, first, rightly

<sup>1</sup> O. W. Kuusinen, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1966, p. 509.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

estimated the nature of the movement and its historic role as a revolutionary force constituting an element of the world revolution, and, secondly, opened the eyes of the backward peoples to the possibilities of social progress based on the growing alliance of the national-liberation forces and the world socialist system.

Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance of a careful study and objective evaluation of both the specific national characteristics of the countries concerned and the nature of class and party relations peculiar to each. Speaking at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) he said: "Not a single socialist in the world denied that the building of communism would take different courses in countries where large-scale farming prevails and in countries where small-scale farming prevails. That is an elementary truth, an ABC."<sup>1</sup>

The theory of scientific socialism offers only an outline of the process of changing the old production relations (capitalist and pre-capitalist) in order to achieve more rational exploitation of natural resources and better utilisation of scientific advances, to accelerate the development of productive forces in the interests of higher living standards, especially for the working people, and to create conditions conducive to social and economic equality.

Lenin believed that no form of transition to socialism could be considered conclusive until the building of socialism had been brought to completion. He spoke of the necessity of a prudent and rational approach in working out transitional forms and methods of organisation for each country individually. Those countries that are particularly backward in their economic and cultural development must, naturally, be particularly cautious and prudent in their choice of forms and methods relating to socio-economic reforms and in decisions on changes in the way of life of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. The pace of reform will obviously be much slower in those countries where the material and technical foundation of socialism is non-existent or all but non-existent than in the economically developed countries. Undue haste in the socialisation of small-peasant farming, small-scale private trade and industry, and domestic crafts can only discredit socialism and its principles.

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 205.



In recent years, the theory of scientific socialism has become a target for criticism and condemnation on the part of Mao Tse-tung and his followers, who, while putting a biased and distorted construction on China's experience, nevertheless convert it into an absolute, offer as a universal panacea their own concept of an "ideal" society allegedly free of the defects and faults of capitalism. Rightly rejecting the bourgeois conceptions of "consumer societies", the Chinese theoreticians go to the other extreme of offering as an ideal a society in which people are to be mere producers, and in which poverty and privation, and the rejection of all human sentiments, passions or joys are declared to be the highest virtue and the ultimate aim. Approbation of asceticism, austerity and cultural poverty, understandable and justifiable in times of war, takes on a new meaning in times of peace, when it is proper to take up the question of a fair distribution of material and spiritual benefits, of a balanced utilisation of the products of scientific and technological progress, instead of discussing how to freeze the already low living standards among many of the Third World nations.

People are ready to accept any privations and face any dangers for the sake of the revolution in the hope of a better life and not in order to perpetuate their wretched existence. The Chinese theoreticians take too light a view of the extremely difficult and complex problem of transition from pre-capitalist or inadequately developed capitalist relations to a socialist society. Their formulas are not the prescriptions of a doctor who has correctly diagnosed an illness and prudently suggests the procedures and medicines to cure it. They resemble, rather, the magic incantations of a sorcerer or witch doctor whose nostrum is a resonant tom-tom or tambourine. The ideals of socialism as preached by Mao Tse-tung and the methods of overcoming economic backwardness he recommends have failed in China: which makes all the more pretentious his attempts to attribute to them a magical power and universal validity.

The peoples of the ex-colonies and dependencies, formerly able to study scientific socialism only in theory, are now free to verify the merits and advantages of the socialist system of social organisation through actual experience and observation of the realities. Marxism-Leninism has been actually practised for a little more than half a century, but even this historically brief span of time has been enough to

give a convincing and impressive exhibition of how fair and rapid solutions can be found for many of the social and economic problems that confront, today, the nations that are setting out on the road of independent development.

Bourgeois politicians and ideologists admit the efficacy of socialist concepts. Thus Eugene R. Black, a prominent American economist and former president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, laments the fact that "communism has an insidious appeal to the new leaders of the underdeveloped world" and that "communism offers the appearance of a workable programme to the frustrated elements among the educated—an outlet for personal ambition and a sense of participation in building national power. As evidence that this programme works, the Communists point to Soviet Russia and Communist China, both underdeveloped countries only yesterday, which have pulled themselves up by their bootstraps until now they are great powers, feared by the West."<sup>1</sup>

Many bourgeois leaders—those who are still capable of sober, realistic judgement—are forced to recognise the strong impact of socialist principles on the thinking of the people of the economically underdeveloped countries. Thus William O. Douglas, of the United States Supreme Court, writes as follows: "Soviet communism makes a powerful psychological impact in underdeveloped areas because of the way it has exploited the industrial revolution. In about forty years, Russia has risen from feudalism to an industrial society; her scientific advances have been widely heralded by Sputnik and by her astronauts. Her propaganda—'Why take 165 years like the United States did? Why not do it our way in your lifetime?'—has had a great impact on people in a hurry to escape the misery of mud huts."<sup>2</sup>

Imperialist propaganda media are trying to foster among the peoples of the East an attitude of suspicion towards the socialist world, using the tiresome fabrication that it is the intention of communism to establish its control over the underdeveloped countries. This mendacious propaganda is unanimously given the lie by those who are carrying on the fight for national independence.

<sup>1</sup> Eugene R. Black, *The Diplomacy of Economic Development*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> William O. Douglas, *Democracy's Manifesto*, New York, 1962, p. 31.



When the peoples who have thrown off the colonial yoke compare the socialist world with the world of capitalism they give their preference to the former, because they see that "*socialism*", as the Programme of the C.P.S.U. points out, "*is the road to freedom and happiness for the peoples*. It ensures rapid economic and cultural progress. It transforms a backward country into an industrial country within the lifetime of one generation and not in the course of centuries."<sup>1</sup>

Proof that the prospects offered by socialism are real may be found in the economic and cultural development of the peoples of Central Asia since the October Revolution. Before the Revolution the life of the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Turkmens, and Tajiks was little different from that of colonial peoples. Industry was practically non-existent. So was learning in the modern sense, and illiteracy was the rule rather than an exception.

With the establishment of the socialist system these outlying lands of the former Russian empire struck out on the road of economic, cultural, and social development. In Kazakhstan, for instance, the output of large-scale industry increased more than a hundredfold over the past 50 years; so that at present the republic's output of manufactured goods per head of population is the same as in Italy, while the output of electric power equals that of Japan and surpasses that of Italy.

Before the Revolution, the power output of all of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan totalled no more than 7 million kwh. Wick-and-saucer affairs or kerosene lamps, at best, provided light for the felt-covered yurts of the nomad herdsmen: today, electric lighting is universal in factory and home. The aggregate annual power output of these republics stands at 19,000 million kwh, which is nine times that of all of Russia before the Revolution. The per head annual power output of these republics totals roughly 800 kwh, as compared with 95 kwh in Turkey, 36 in Iran, and 11 in Pakistan. Numerous cadres of teachers, physicians, engineers, technicians, and scientists specialising in all the various branches of science have been trained over the past half-century in every one of the republics. Tens of thousands

of students now study where not a single higher educational institution existed before the Revolution.

There are 3 times more university students per 10,000 population in Uzbekistan than in France, over 3 times more than in Italy, 4 times more than in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 times more than in Spain, nearly 8 times more than in Turkey, and nearly 17 times more than in Iran.

Kirghizia offers another convincing example of a backward country that has made rapid progress on the road of development. Here, too, industry was all but non-existent before 1917. Nomad animal husbandry was the main occupation. At present there are hundreds of large modern industrial plants all over the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, and its output of industrial goods is 117 times that of pre-revolutionary times.

In parallel with the industrial and technological development of these formerly backward lands on the fringes of the Russian empire there has been a continuous improvement of living standards, in respect of both material and spiritual values. The peoples of Soviet Central Asia have achieved high standards in the realm of modern science, literature and art. There has also been a genuine revival of national traditional cultures. And the world's classics have been made widely available in the republics. Far from feeling abused, isolated from other nations, as before, the peoples of these Central Asian republics are conscious of their status as equal members of the international community and proud of their own contribution to the common fund of science and culture.

There is much that many of the new independent states can learn from the experience of the Mongolian People's Republic, which has made the transition to socialism by-passing the capitalist stage. It used to be one of the most backward countries in Asia—before the people's revolution—a land out of the Middle Ages if judged by its way of life. Illiterate, ignorant, deprived of all rights, the working people suffered cruel oppression at the hands of the lamas and feudal princes.

After the revolution of 1921 the Mongolian people opted for a non-capitalist way of development, and with the aid of the Soviet Union laid the foundation of a national industry, which currently accounts for about one half of the output of the national economy. Cattle-breeding, the country's

<sup>1</sup> Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 39.



main branch of economy, is on the up-grade. The arat nomads are taking to a new way of life. Club-houses, recreation and reading rooms, and hospitals are multiplying. Radios and periodicals are invading the yurts. And there is a trend away from nomadism, towards a settled life. As compared with perhaps a dozen schools in the old Mongolia, the country now has 419 general secondary schools, 15 specialised secondary schools, and seven higher educational institutions. An Academy of Sciences has been organised. Cadres of physicians, teachers, agronomists, veterinarians, engineers, and technicians are being trained.

Ivor Montague, a prominent British public figure, recording his impressions of the country's progress, wrote that the story of Mongolia's liberation and revival is a source of hope, encouragement and inspiration for peoples still suffering from oppression elsewhere throughout the world.

The People's Democratic Republic of Korea, occupying the northern part of that peninsula, is well on its way to recovery from the effects of colonial rule. Landlordism has been abolished. Peasant co-operatives have been set up, and village life is undergoing a change. Ninety-two per cent of all villages and 62 per cent of the peasant households have electric lighting. Seven times more land is under irrigation than before the liberation of the country by the Soviet Army. More and more tractors and other farm machinery are being supplied to the co-operative farms.

Heavy damage was suffered by North Korea during the war, but she has completely reconstructed her industry and even substantially developed it further. Her industrial plants are producing many new modern types of machines, machine-tools, tractors, motor-cars, electric motors, radios, etc. Large chemical combines have been built.

In North Vietnam, the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, formerly a semi-feudal colonial society, are building socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. Exploitation of man by man is a thing of the past. The rice fields, which are the mainstay of the country's economy, no longer belong to feudal landlords: they are the property of peasant members of agricultural co-operatives. Collective farming methods, incidentally, have helped increase crop yields.

There were practically no industrial enterprises in Vietnam under the French colonial rule. Nowadays, dozens of

new industrial plants are operating in the D.R.V., built with the aid of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries.

Illiteracy is practically non-existent. One out of every four Vietnamese goes to school. Epidemics have been ended in town and country.

The experience of the socialist countries of Asia is enough to show those peoples who are setting out on the road of independent development what the working masses can accomplish when, once they have thrown off the colonial yoke, they do not stop short of their goal but carry their national-democratic revolution through to the end, under the leadership of the working class, and go on to build a socialist society.

The claims of the proponents of colonialism that Marxist-Leninist theory cannot solve the social problems of the colonial countries and is alien to the peoples of the East are simply laughable.

The ideological influence of the world socialist system is strengthened by the fact that socialism is no longer merely a set of abstract principles for the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries but a living reality, lofty ideals already put into practice. When progressive leaders of colonial countries begin by admiring the principles of bourgeois democracy and then see for themselves capitalism in action, they come to realise that the promising slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity are nothing but so much verbiage. But when, on the other hand, leaders of the national-liberation movement observe the realities of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, they see many of their own ideals and aspirations put into practice.

Formerly, the peoples of colonial countries were not free in their choice of a way of national development. In our time, however, with a world socialist system existing, growing stronger, flourishing, the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies can compare the two worlds, the socialist and capitalist systems, and make their own choice.

Once upon a time Tamango, the negro leader of Prosper Merimée's story of the same name, raised a revolt on board a slaver, killed the slave traders and freed the slaves. But he didn't know how to navigate the ship and bring it back to his native land, and so the ship was destined to roam the seas. In much the same way colonial peoples, on winning



freedom, did not know which way to turn until the powerful socialist community came into being. Today they need no longer search for the right course to steer, for socialism, like a beacon, shows them the surest way to freedom and a new life.

Socialist aid to the emerging countries is not limited to setting an example or expounding the theory of scientific socialism. Practical political support and economic assistance do much to bolster these countries.

The efforts of the socialist states to safeguard the peace, prevent war, and promote a policy of peaceful coexistence create conditions favourable to the development of the new independent countries.

Contrary to the assertions made by the Chinese leaders, the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not run counter to the national-liberation movement, but, on the contrary, considerably facilitates this movement in the face of the superior forces of colonialism. The Chinese theoreticians endeavour to prove that the policy of peaceful coexistence means that the peoples who are today fighting for their freedom and independence are expected to lay down their arms and await the outcome of the competition between the world socialist system and the world capitalist system. That is a distorted interpretation of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence. Actually, that policy, as pursued by the socialist states, holds the aggressive forces of international imperialism in check, keeps them from starting a thermonuclear war, and helps the struggling nations make use of all available means, military and political, to win independence and make it secure. The alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence is the policy of continued and growing international tension, which is pursued by the present leaders of the C.P.C. That policy, however, far from holding the forces of imperialist aggression in check, is exceptionally favourable to their expansionist course. The greater the international tension, the easier it is for the imperialists to justify their acts of aggression and their creation of military bases all over the globe, and to exercise pressure on the governments of the Third World countries.

By opposing the national revolutionary struggle to the struggle to safeguard the peace the Chinese theoreticians line themselves up, to all intents and purposes, with the bourgeois

ideologists, who also believe that the world revolution is incompatible with peaceful coexistence and that a peace policy is tantamount to a refusal on the part of the socialist states to support the national revolutionary struggle. The Marxist-Leninist view, however, is that the struggle on behalf of peace does not at all mean that the peoples who have taken up arms against their oppressors must rely solely on their own resources. The socialist states consider it their internationalist duty to help the national-liberation struggle in every possible way. Any easing of international tension offers greater opportunities for such aid.

The policy of peaceful coexistence does not imply any "grovelling" before the imperialists as the Chinese leaders describe it. On the contrary, it implies an active, complicated and multiform struggle against them, a struggle that the Soviet Union has been waging since its earliest days, along with its struggle to safeguard and strengthen the peace.

The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia inaugurated a new era in international relations. Lenin's Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People made a great impact on the peoples of the East, for in it the Soviet Government completely rejected the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which founded the prosperity of the exploiting elements in a few favoured countries on the subjugation of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in colonies generally, and in the smaller countries.

Lenin's policy, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, self-determination, equality, mutual respect and mutual aid among all nations, made a lasting impression upon the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and exerted an active revolutionary influence on their struggle for national liberation. The development and growth of genuine friendship among the peoples of the former Russian empire was viewed the world over as an example of a new type of relations among nations and stimulated national and class consciousness among the oppressed peoples.

In the early years after the October Revolution, when the Soviet state was still economically weak and confronted with many difficulties in that field, it nevertheless supported its next-door neighbours in their struggle against the imperialists. It lent its support to the Mongolian people in their fight against their foreign oppressors. And it helped the



Turkish people defend its independence at a time when that young republic was in a difficult situation.

In October 1920, Kemal Atatürk wrote to the Soviet Government about the importance of concluding an alliance between Turkey and Soviet Russia "in order to unite against the Western imperialists all those who have till now supported the latter's rule by a submissiveness born of patience and ignorance".<sup>1</sup>

Valuable aid was extended by the Soviet people to the people of China in their struggle for national independence and social freedom. During the revolution, between 1924 and 1927, and during the national-liberation war against the Japanese invaders, that is, between 1932 and 1945, the Soviet people consistently supported and helped the working people of China. Speaking of the role of the Soviet Union in China's fight against the Japanese imperialists, Mao Tse-tung said: "Since the war against the Japanese aggressors began no imperialist government offered us genuine aid. Only the Soviet Union came to our aid by providing us with war planes and supplies."<sup>2</sup>

The defeat of Hitler Germany and militarist Japan, in which the role of the Soviet armed forces proved decisive, gave a fresh impetus to the national-liberation movement. In the post-war years the economic might of the Soviet Union made impressive gains. And a number of European and Asian states broke with the capitalist system to form, together with the Soviet Union, a great socialist community of nations.

The peoples who have risen against the imperialists can count on the unfailing support of the socialist states. The Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of 1960 points out that "the socialist countries are true and sincere friends of the peoples fighting for liberation and of those who have thrown off the imperialist yoke. While rejecting on principle any interference in the internal affairs of young national states they consider it their internationalist duty to help the peoples in strengthening their independence. They help and support these countries generously in achieving progress,

<sup>1</sup> *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Foreign Policy Papers of the U.S.S.R.)*, Vol. 3, pp. 11-12.

<sup>2</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya (Selected Works)*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1953, p. 190.

creating a national industry, developing and consolidating the national economy and training national personnel, and co-operate with them in the struggle for world peace, against imperialist aggression."<sup>1</sup>

The disintegration of the colonial system is no simple historical process. And there are more ways than one of winning national independence. Some countries achieve their liberation from colonial oppression after a long revolutionary struggle, while in other cases national independence is granted by the imperialists as a gracious act of "manumission". Regardless of how such national independence is achieved it is perfectly clear that this dropping of "the white man's burden" is no act of free will on the part of the colonialists.

It used to happen, in the past, that a people that had thrown out its oppressors was allowed but a short spell of freedom, for the erstwhile masters were soon replaced by new and even stronger masters. Towards the close of the 19th century the Filipinos drove out the Spanish colonialists after a long struggle. But hardly had the latter departed, when the Filipino people were fastened upon by new aggressors: this time the United States of America. The trick has since been repeated in other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Nowadays, however, in the presence of the powerful community of socialist states, emerging peoples need no longer fear losing their freedom. They are well aware that they can count on tried and trusted friends for protection. Whenever the imperialists try to crack the whip, a grave warning from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries forces them to back down. The socialist states are carrying on an active struggle for the rights and interests of the peoples of the Third World countries, which paralyses imperialist activities and helps the national-liberation movement expand and gain in strength.

By establishing diplomatic relations with the newly-independent countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states are putting them out of their political isolation and providing them with an opportunity to strengthen their national

<sup>1</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1963, p. 66.



sovereignty and end their dependence on alien lands. A review of the events of the past few years will show that the opportunities open to the imperialists have become fewer and that their former dash and daring are all but gone.

The American imperialists and their British, French and other colleagues are less all-powerful than once upon a time not only in the Western Hemisphere but in the Eastern as well.

In 1956, Egypt, now independent, decided to nationalise the Suez Canal. Britain and France refused to accept this decision and together with Israel launched an attack upon Egypt. That act of aggression was of short duration. The determined stand taken by the Soviet Union and its vigorous warning to the aggressors helped the Egyptian people safeguard their independence, and the imperialist gamble in Egypt came to an inglorious end.

When in July 1958, the Iraqi people rose in revolt against the country's corrupt reactionary regime, and the imperialists moved up their troops to the frontiers of that small Arab country—the Soviet Union once again spoke out in defence of the revolutionary gains of the Iraqi people and once again forced the imperialists to beat a retreat.

The Soviet Union has been extending aid to revolutionary Cuba who valiantly lighted the torch of liberty under the very noses of the American imperialists. All counter-revolutionary attempts against Cuba from foreign parts have ended in failure in the face of the resolute stand of the Cuban people and the energetic support of the socialist nations.

Great political and material aid has been given by the Soviet Union to the Indonesian people in its efforts to strengthen its national independence. Back in 1947-48 the Soviet Union strove stubbornly and consistently in the United Nations to stop the fighting, to secure the national rights of the fledgeling Indonesian Republic and to obtain a condemnation of the Dutch aggression. The Soviet Union and the other socialist states actively supported the Indonesian people in the interests of a peaceful settlement of the problem of Western Irian.

Using the right of veto in the United Nations Security Council, the Soviet Union was able to ward off attempts against the national rights of India, and prevented the adoption of a resolution condemning the action of India in driving the Portuguese colonialists out of Goa.

Of great significance for the liberation struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples has been the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the Fifteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in December 1960, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and with the support of other socialist countries. The Soviet draft Declaration contained a demand "to grant immediately to all colonial countries, trusteeship territories and other non-self-governing territories complete independence and freedom in the building up of their own national states in conformity with the freely-expressed will and desire of their peoples. Colonial rule, colonial administration in all its forms should be abolished completely so as to make it possible for the peoples of such territories to determine their destiny and form of government."<sup>1</sup>

The Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples exercises a powerful rallying influence, stimulates colonial peoples to action, and fosters feelings of sympathy for their struggle in other countries. After getting the Declaration adopted, the socialist states have consistently fought for the implementation of the principles proclaimed therein.

While the socialist countries support whatever is new and progressive in the countries of the East, American imperialism, which loudly proclaims its devotion to progress, lines itself up, in actual fact, with thoroughly corrupt, medieval, obsolete regimes. Many Americans admit as much today. Professor John W. Spanier, addressing his rebukes to the United States Government, regrets that, blinded by its hatred of communism, "the United States has associated itself with feudal regimes whose days were numbered because they had alienated mass support: Chiang Kai-shek in China, Bao Dai in Indochina, King Husein in Iraq. . . . The fact that these countries' feudal governments were or are pro-American and anti-Communist qualified them in our eyes as 'democratic', or at least potentially so."<sup>2</sup>

The war psychosis fanned by the American imperialists forces many states to divert substantial funds to the training and maintenance of armed forces and the acquisition of

<sup>1</sup> Fifteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Proposals by the USSR. Sept. 23, 1960, New York, 1960, p. 88.

<sup>2</sup> John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, New York, 1960, p. 199.



arms despite the fact that their economies are still insufficiently sound. It is estimated that economically underdeveloped countries currently spend \$5,000-6,000 million annually on their military establishment, to the detriment of their economic and cultural development. That is why most Asian countries approve and value so highly the policy of peace resolutely pursued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The struggle to safeguard peace and achieve general and complete disarmament is of great importance for the national-liberation movement, for it strengthens—not weakens—the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial front. And more and more nations the world over are rallying to the support of this struggle.

This effort to prevent a destructive thermonuclear war and keep the peace is the common cause of the peoples of the socialist countries, the working people of the capitalist countries of Europe and America, and the peoples that have won or are fighting to win their independence. This struggle to safeguard a durable peace on our planet is in complete harmony with the aims and interests of the national-liberation movement and in no way at variance with it.

Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems by no means signifies a weakening of the anti-imperialist front: on the contrary, it tends to put new vigour into the class struggle waged by the working people in capitalist countries and the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples. The Statement of the 1960 Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow stressed that "peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism against capitalism".<sup>1</sup>

The events of the post-war period show that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, while striving unremittingly to carry out the policy of peaceful coexistence, have always been ready to support, and have actually supported, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their noble struggle for national liberation. There is nothing incompatible in the two lines of action.

The newly-independent countries are interested in safeguarding the peace. Many of them pursue a policy of neutrality and do not adhere to any imperialist military

blocs. And if the imperialist powers are now forced to take the will of these countries into account, this is due, above all, to the fact that the world socialist system has become a powerful factor in international affairs.

Before, where the countries of Asia, Africa or Latin America were concerned, the imperialist powers recognised but one policy—that of dictate and violence, and but one language—that of threats and intimidation. Nowadays the imperialists find themselves, willy-nilly, forced to manoeuvre, to flirt with the new independent states, and sit down with them to talk over international problems.

These former colonies and semi-colonies consider the socialist states their allies, on whose support they can count. Their friendship with the socialist states fortifies them in their independent foreign policies and in their refusal to be intimidated by threats and challenging acts. And they, in turn, act as the allies of the socialist states in the struggle for peace, disarmament, and an end of colonialism, thereby strengthening the position of world socialism.

There are some among the leaders of the national-liberation movement who believe the struggle for general and complete disarmament to be in contradiction with the struggle for national freedom and independence. They are wrong, however, for the struggle for disarmament presupposes the disarming, first and foremost, of those powers that are armed to the teeth and possess the most modern and powerful means of destruction. Disarmament of the imperialist powers would obviously favour the expansion of the national-liberation struggle.

No longer do the imperialists enjoy a monopoly on the sale of arms; which makes the political positions of the new national states that much stronger. During the lifetime of Mohammed V of Morocco, France offered to supply airplanes to that country provided it abandoned its policy of non-alignment. The King refused to accept that condition and approached the Soviet Union, which duly furnished the Moroccan army the required planes with no strings attached.

The struggle for peace and general and complete disarmament, and the intensification of the national-liberation movement are closely associated; they complement each other. Disarmament means the disarming of the forces of war and is therefore completely in line with the further development of the national-liberation movement.

<sup>1</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 59.



It makes no difference which of these problems—disarmament or decolonisation—is given priority. To argue the point would mean to split the progressive forces and the peoples of Asia and Africa united in their struggle against colonialism and to undermine the common anti-imperialist front.

With peace guaranteed and general and complete disarmament achieved, the economically underdeveloped countries would be able to accelerate their economic and cultural development, build more industrial plants, irrigation facilities, schools, hospitals, sports stadiums, etc.

With disarmament accomplished, economic, scientific and technical assistance for the new independent states could be substantially expanded. These states are in urgent need of the kind of aid that the industrially developed countries can furnish. Taking advantage of this need and of the other difficulties facing the underdeveloped countries, the imperialist monopolies strive, under the guise of aid, to maintain and strengthen their hold on their former colonies and semi-colonies.

This struggle that is being waged to secure peace and implement the policy of peaceful coexistence also opens up greater possibilities for economic assistance for these countries on the part of the socialist states. This assistance is intended to strengthen their independence. Specifically, it promotes their economic independence, that is, helps them overcome their backwardness and end the domination of foreign capital, get better terms in their trade with the capitalist countries; promotes an independent line in foreign policies (e.g., neutrality, non-adherence to military blocs); and aids in the training of scientific and technical cadres.

In a word, this aid speeds up the rate of economic and cultural development in the new national states.

The Soviet Union provides long-term credits at low rates of interest. Loans are repayable in the recipient country's traditional exports, not in gold or foreign currencies.

Bourgeois economists who compare American and Soviet aid to India point out that while Soviet loans may be smaller, Soviet aid is more attractive in four respects, namely, (a) Soviet credits are provided at only 2½ per cent interest, as against the 5 per cent asked by the capitalist states; (b) they are repayable over 12 years, reckoning from the day the plant concerned is commissioned, whereas Western

credits are for shorter terms; (c) they are provided direct to governments, so that they can be used more easily at the recipient country's discretion; and (d) the Soviet Union provides technical aid in connection with deliveries of capital equipment.<sup>1</sup>

*The Far Eastern Economic Review* of Hongkong wrote in this connection: "Although North America and Western Europe, as the richest of the industrialised nations, have most to offer the South, the volume of trade between the underdeveloped world and the countries of Eastern Europe has been rising steadily. As the Eastern Europeans begin to climb into the upper reaches of the prosperity league, their capacity to provide financial assistance to the poor nations of Asia, Africa and South America is rapidly increasing. Furthermore because the socialist countries have so recently achieved economic take-off, they have valuable technical expertise to pass on to the developing world about the best way to overcome the obstacles to agricultural and industrial progress."<sup>2</sup>

Commenting on the fact that the socialist states buy from the countries of Asia and Africa their traditional export commodities as well as the products of their new industrial plants and the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods produced within the framework of economic co-operation, the bourgeois press sees this as a factor of great importance for their economic development.

At the present time the Soviet Union is a party to agreements with 34 Third World countries. Extensive credits on favourable terms have been provided to these countries, credits to Asian countries accounting for three-fourths of the total.

The Soviet Union is providing technical aid for over 600 industrial and other construction projects, more than 220 of which are already in operation. A substantial number of these projects are heavy industry plants, highly important for the industrial development of the new national states. Soviet technicians are aiding in the construction of metallurgical, machine-building and chemical plants, power stations, etc.

<sup>1</sup> See *Narody Azii i Afriki (The Peoples of Asia and Africa)*, Moscow, 1967, No. 5, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hongkong, Dec. 31, 1967-Jan. 6, 1968, No. 1, p. 23.



Soviet geologists are taking part in prospecting for mineral deposits in the underdeveloped countries. Western monopolies had been responsible for reports on the absence of petroleum deposits in India: that myth has been exploded by Soviet and Rumanian prospectors.

Deliveries of complete sets of equipment from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries contribute to the strengthening of the state sector in the economies of underdeveloped countries. An important feature in this connection is the practice of experts from the socialist countries to make the greatest possible use of local building materials in order to save foreign currency for more urgent needs.

In Afghanistan, power stations are being built, roads laid, and valuable raw-material sources tapped with Soviet aid.

Satisfactory progress is being made in the field of economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and India, where over 30 large-scale projects are under construction with Soviet aid. The famous iron and steel plant at Bhilai stands as a symbol of Soviet-Indian friendship and is already operating at designed capacity.

Two other iron and steel plants, besides Bhilai, have been built for the state sector in India: one, with British aid, at Durgapur, and another, with West German aid, at Rourkela. When the three iron and steel works are compared, Indian experts and observers from foreign countries all rate Bhilai higher than the others.

"Bhilai Sets Records", "Breakdowns, Delays and Repairs at Rourkela" and similar headlines often appear in the Indian newspapers. The Bhilai Works produces as much steel as the Rourkela and Durgapur works put together. Of the three, Bhilai is the only one that yields the state a profit. The Indian engineering, technical and worker cadres were trained with the aid of Soviet experts.

Mr. Sen, director general of the Bhilai Works, expressed a high opinion of the Soviet specialists. Highly efficient Indian cadres have been trained at the plant, he said. Production targets were being attained and the plant was working at designed capacity. Mr. Sen had been in England, the F.R.G., and the Soviet Union to study cadre training problems, and gave it as his opinion that the Soviet approach and system were superior. The Soviet experts at Bhilai did more than give technical instruction and share experience, he said; for they worked with a will, which stimulated the

Indian personnel and was largely responsible for building up a fine staff at the plant.

In May 1962, India placed a contract with the Soviet Union for the designing of a heavy electrical equipment works to be built in the Uttar Pradesh region, which is to be the largest such plant in all of South-East Asia. This is the first contract to provide that the Indian engineering and technical personnel receive preliminary training by Soviet experts in India, after which they go through practical training in some of the largest plants in the Soviet Union. This system is expected to save time in creating Indian engineering and technical cadres.

Speaking of personnel training, the Aswan High Dam project already mentioned is notable for its broad technical training programme for national cadres, who go to work not in the United Arab Republic alone but in other countries of the Arabian East as well. The *Al Mussawar*, a Cairo daily, wrote in this connection as follows: "It is precisely the cadres trained at Aswan that will go to work on the project of bringing under cultivation 312,000 feddan [approx. 324,500 acres] of virgin land in Egypt, a project of vital importance for the country. Moreover, such 'graduates' of the 'Aswan University' are even now taking part in some of the biggest and most important construction projects in the friendly developing countries of the Arabian East and Africa. Pleasing reports on Egyptian specialists and workers are coming in from Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other countries."<sup>1</sup>

In Iraq, Soviet aid is contributing to the development of a strong and sound economy. Since a number of industrial plants built with Soviet aid went into production, the country has been able to make a substantial cut in its imports.

Soviet experts are helping with the construction of a railway line that will link Baghdad with the port of Basra. The biggest radio broadcasting station in the Middle East has been built, and an antibiotics factory and concrete railway sleeper plant are in process of construction. These plants will provide work for 15,000 men.

Iraq newspapers point out that experts from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, while aiding in the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from *Za rubezhom* (Foreign Press Review) No. 3, Jan. 12-18, Moscow, 1968.



laying of the foundation of a national industry, contribute in many ways to the training of local engineering and technical cadres. That is one of several points on which the technical assistance of the socialist states differs widely from that provided by the capitalist countries. The petroleum refinery at Dora, near Baghdad, is an example. Built by the Americans and British, it employed, up to 1958, a staff of 153 foreign specialists at an aggregate annual salary of one million dinars. During May and June 1959, they were replaced by Iraqi engineers and 24 Soviet experts, who soon put the plant on a paying basis. A year later only three Soviet engineers still worked at the plant, the others having gone home after completing the training of a local staff of specialists.

The organisation of farm machinery servicing and renting stations has been another enterprise in which the Soviet Union provided important material and technical assistance. Great quantities of Soviet farm machinery were delivered, such as tractors, cultivators, seeders, harrows, together with repair-shop equipment. And special courses were organised, which trained a staff of 120 Iraqi tractor drivers, mechanics and other agricultural specialists.

Turning now to the economic aid provided to underdeveloped countries by other socialist states, we see that Czechoslovakia is delivering machinery and complete sets of equipment to many countries in Asia and Africa. A cement plant, a cannery, and other industrial plants are being built with Czechoslovak aid in Afghanistan. A tractor plant and a technological institute are being built in India. A big tyre factory is under construction in Indonesia, which will be able to meet roughly a third of the country's requirements in tyres. Czechoslovak machinery and equipment are being supplied to Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and other countries.

Polish experts are employed on various projects in many Third World countries, as, for instance, prospecting for natural resources and compiling a geological map in Guinea; planning a water resources development project in Iraq; and helping develop a sugar industry in Ceylon and Afghanistan.

The Rumanian People's Republic is providing important aid in the development of the petroleum industries of India, Ceylon, and other countries.

The German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic are likewise providing economic and

technical assistance to the growing industry of the underdeveloped countries.

Speaking on behalf of the Russian communists, before the October Revolution, Lenin said: "We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe it is our duty and *in our interest* to do this for otherwise socialism in Europe will not be secure. We shall endeavour to render these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, 'disinterested cultural assistance', to borrow the happy expression of the Polish Social-Democrats. In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism."<sup>1</sup> Today, we see these precepts being put into practice.

The rapidly growing productive forces in the socialist countries and their gains in the economic competition with the capitalist countries tend to restrict the latter's field of activity, undermine the economic foundation, and weaken the capitalist system as a whole.

The bourgeois press uses every occasion to play down the value of socialist aid, pointing out that the amount of this aid is less than that of American "aid". That may be true, of course, but socialist aid pursues different aims, namely, the strengthening of national independence, and helps the recipient countries get on their feet and start building the way of life they want.

Another fervent wish of the American and West European press is to create the impression that the aid provided by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is nothing but propaganda. Yet back of these histrionics over the "worthlessness" of Soviet aid there is ill-concealed worry over the warm reception given that aid in the Third World countries. Hellmut Kalbitzer, an expert of the social-democratic faction of the West German Bundestag, is concerned over the fact that Soviet aid influences "many people in the underdeveloped countries to accept the Marxist doctrine, which they expect to help them solve their problems".<sup>2</sup>

But try as they might to smear the aid of the socialist states and misrepresent its aims, the advocates of capitalism will never be able to convince the peoples of the under-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 67.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from *Za rubezhom* No. 12, March 15-21, 1968.



developed countries of any "evil intentions" on the part of the socialist states. Bhilai for an Indian—as Aswan for an Egyptian—is indelibly associated with the Soviet Union. The land that travelled all the way from wooden plough to atomic reactor and spaceship provokes the admiration of the peoples who have lagged behind in their economic development through the fault of the colonialist states.

The *Révolution Africaine*, an Algiers newspaper, wrote as follows: "The Soviet Union has proved itself an excellent partner *vis-à-vis* Algeria in her effort to develop her economic relations. It has demonstrated that a great power can negotiate an agreement with a poor country on terms of equality without bringing in the dominance-dependency issue.

"Broad possibilities lie ahead for bilateral co-operation, for relations based on the principles of fair play and harmonious development."<sup>1</sup>

Bourgeois propagandists are not alone in their efforts to play down Soviet aid: the present Chinese leaders are nowadays a close second: they keep repeating that the relations of the countries of Asia and Africa with the socialist states are exactly like their relations with the imperialist powers. The leadership of the C.P.C. are endeavouring to persuade the peoples in question that they cannot rely on socialist aid and must therefore either rely on themselves or only on aid from China. Such an idea is harmful and dangerous not only because it is essentially an effort to lure the national-liberation movement away from the world socialist system and create a void around it, but also because it weakens the struggling or already liberated nations in their fight to prevent a return of colonial rule.

The course of history, and the events of our own time, have done much to convince the peoples of the Third World—Asia, Africa and Latin America—that they can put full trust and confidence in the friendship of the socialist states. The alliance of the forces of socialism and the forces of the national-liberation movement is a powerful factor of our day and largely determines the advance humanity is making on the road of social progress.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from *Za rubezhom* No. 12, March 15-21, 1968.



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